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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
AN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: INDUSTRY, TRADE, AND FINANCE IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM MIND 
by 
Christopher William Calvo 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kenneth Lipartito, Major Professor 
 The purpose of this study is to assess American economic thought during the antebellum 
period.  Antebellum political economy has been largely neglected by historians.  They have 
ignored both the valuable contributions made by America’s first political economists to domestic 
intellectual culture, as well as the importance of American economic thought in the transatlantic 
discourse.  A dynamic, sophisticated, and complex political economy marks the antebellum era, 
and when studied in its proper context provides insight into how Americans understood the 
transformative economic changes they experienced. 
 This dissertation draws on an extensive body of primary and secondary literature.  
Special consideration is given to the more learned articulations of economic thought.  However, 
recognizing the immature state of the science during the period under investigation works of 
various levels of theoretical erudition are referenced.  In their attempts to fashion a distinctly 
American political economy domestic thinkers entertained a wide range of economic principles.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom the Americans were not absolutist in their dedication to British 
orthodoxy.  Antebellum political economy manipulated British authorities to suit the immediate 
concerns of contemporaries, thus spoiling the essence of classical doctrine.  This dissertation 
makes clear that few Americans accepted classical orthodoxy without important qualifications.     
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 Classical theory was confronted with its most systematic challenge by protectionists.  
Despite protectionism having shaped the course of American economic development, its 
theoretical underpinnings have been summarily discounted by historians and economists.  
Protectionists, however, afforded the quintessential expression of American antebellum political 
economy.  This dissertation intends to rescue the protectionists from historical abandon and 
reclaim the position of relevance they enjoyed during their own time.  The antebellum period also 
hosted a fiery set of intellectuals determined to upset the emerging free-market order, exhibiting a 
particular disdain for institutions of finance and the industrial ethos.  Conservatives from the 
North and South aimed to slow America’s march into the modern economy.  These elements did 
not operate on the fringes of intellectual society, rather they represent something central to the 
American discourse and are illustrative of the difficulty attendant to classifying antebellum 
thinkers according to traditional notions of economic ideology.     
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Chapter I 
Introduction: History and Antebellum Economic Thought 
 
American economic thought before the Civil War has attracted very little scholarly attention.  
Charles Dunbar set the trend in a widely read 1876 essay by arguing that antebellum American 
political economists had contributed “nothing towards developing the theory of political 
economy.”  Economic discourse in America, he wrote, suffered from a "general sterility."1  
Eighty years later Joseph Schumpeter reiterated Dunbar's blanket dismissal in his History of 
Economic Analysis.  Dunbar's appraisal, Schumpeter wrote, had "not been invalidated by the 
information made available by more recent research."  The Austrian-import found in the pool of 
American economists of the pre-Civil War period, "no first-rate man among them, and they made 
nothing of the great opportunity before them."2  The dismissive tones of Dunbar and Schumpeter 
gave subsequent generations of historians little incentive to examine antebellum economic 
thought.3 
 This dissertation intends to liberate antebellum political economy from the shadows of 
Dunbar and Schumpeter and reclaim for posterity the relevance antebellum thinkers enjoyed 
during their own time.  American political economists wielded strong influence in the domestic 
discourse.  They constructed a dynamic body of thought that shaped American perceptions of the 
national economic experience and they contributed in significant ways to the formation of 
economic policy.  They also made important revisions to nineteenth-century economic formulas, 
particularly British classicism.  Antebellum debates over industry, trade and finance drove an 
                                                            
1 Charles Dunbar, “Economic Science in America, 1776-1876,” The North American Review (January, 
1876), pp. 140, 146. 
 
2 Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Oxford, 1954), pp. 514, 519. 
 
3 The criticisms of Dunbar and Schumpeter in part reflect the notion that economists who wrote outside of 
the classical and neoclassical traditions did not contribute to the scientific development of the economics 
discipline. 
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intellectual wedge between American thinkers.  Still, refuting classical orthodoxy was the 
decisive element that united antebellum political economy.  
 The historiography on antebellum economic thought, however, tends to minimize the 
differences by painting a broad intellectual consensus.  For decades, the literature has been guided 
by Joseph Dorfman’sThe Economic Mind of American Civilization, 1606-1865 (1949).  
Dorfman’s work makes for an excellent reference, but his analysis is limited to a short Preface 
that asserts the consensus narrative of American intellectual history.4  “The most potent 
determinant of economic action and thought was world commerce,” Dorfman argued, “the 
commerce that gave us treasure, the commerce that brought foreign goods and took our exports, 
that profited shipper, middleman, and speculator; the commerce, in short, that created the rich 
urban community and enlarged the money economy.”  Dorfman conceded other forces at play, 
but by the end of the period these had “shifted gradually toward liberalism, democracy, and 
agrarianism.”5  The existence of the latter should not be understood as disrupting the commerce-
oriented laissez-faire consensus, Dorfman noted.  “Again and again the farmers as well as the 
relatively unimportant laboring class,” Dorfman wrote, “appeared in the arena as the auxiliaries 
of rival business factions for which they provided the bucolic pen names signed to ‘capitalistic’ 
pamphlets.”6 
 Dorfman’s consensus interpretation implied that antebellum thought was marked by a 
near universal acceptance of the laissez-faire model.  This interpretation was made more explicit 
in his analyses of individual political economists.  Dorfman isolates antebellum thinkers who 
                                                            
4 Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind of American Civilization, 1606-1865,vols.I and II (New York, 
1946).  Book 2, “From Independence to Jackson” and Book 3 “From Jackson to the Civil War” cover the 
periods dealt with here.  Dorfman also published The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1865-1918, 
vol. III (New York, 1949) and The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1918-1933, vols. IV and V 
(New York, 1959).  
 
5 Dorfman, The Economic Mind of American Civilization, vol. I, p. ix. 
 
6 Ibid.,vol. I, pp. x-xi. 
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wrote outside the laissez-faire tradition.  He also underestimates the subtle, though important 
variations within the antebellum free-trade movement, and thus ignores the broader shift away 
from classical orthodoxy. 
  After Dorfman, a full generation passed before any scholar treated in a substantial way 
antebellum thought.7  In 1980, Paul Conkin’sProphets of Prosperity modified parts of Dorfman’s 
sweeping consensus view.  “Except for a common commitment to economic growth and to a 
proprietary society,” Conkin argued, “our first economists scarcely agreed on any beliefs or 
values.”8  Still, while Conkin identified areas of debate in antebellum thought, the general tone of 
his work amounted to a liberal-consensus reading of American intellectual history.  Like 
Dorfman, Conkin stressed the affinity antebellum thinkers had for British laissez-faire.  Indeed, 
America lacked a strong intellectual tradition of political economy precisely because domestic 
thinkers marched lock-step with British authorities.  The Wealth of Nations, Conkin wrote, 
“quickly established itself in America as a work of tremendous authority.”  The French free-
                                                            
7 Paul Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity: America’s First Political Economists (Bloomington, IN, 1980).  
Besides Dorman and Conkin, there have been other works in the historiography that inform my 
dissertation.  These are, however, mostly outdated.  Michael O'Connor, Origins of Academic Economics in 
the United States (1944; reprint New York, 1974); J.F. Normano, The Spirit of American Economics: A 
Study of the History of Economic Ideas in the United States Prior to the Great Depression (New York, 
1943); Ernest Teilhac, Pioneers of American Economic Thoughtin the Nineteenth Century (New York, 
1936); Frank A. Fetter, “The Early History of Political Economy in the United States,” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society (July, 1943); William Barber, ed., Economics and Higher Learning in the 
Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick, 1993); UgoRabbeno, American Commercial Policy (London, 1895); 
Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (1903; reprint, New York, 
1974), vols. I and II; Malcolm Rutherford, ed., The Economic Mind in America: Essays in the History of 
American Economics (London, 1998); Michael Hudson, Economics and Technology in 19th-Century 
American Thought (New York, 1975); Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy 
(Ithaca, NY, 1993); James Huston, Securing the Fruits of Labor: American Concepts of Wealth 
Distribution (Baton Rouge, LA, 1998); Allen Kaufmann, Capitalism, Slavery, and Republican Values: 
Antebellum Political Economists, 1819-1848 (Austin, TX, 1982).  Besides Conkin, Hudson, Huston and 
Kaufman are the most recent works that offer a fairly sweeping and critical account on antebellum thought.  
Hudson and Huston are more topic specific.  Kaufman’s work is driven by a Marxist understanding of 
economic ideology.  He is perhaps the most insightful historian on American economic thought, but his 
work is limited to mainly Daniel Raymond, Thomas Roderick Dew and Jacob Cardozo.   
 
8 Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity, p. 312. 
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trader Jean Baptiste Say, Conkin argued, “had an enormous impact.”  And Ricardo, according to 
Conkin, “had the greatest impact on Americans.”9 
 This dissertation will show that antebellum political economists articulated serious 
reservations, both theoretical and ideological, about the laissez-faire paradigm.  As much as 
America’s domestic economy grew in accordance with the principles of Adam Smith, the nation’s 
economic thought, as it was expressed by the period’s most seasoned academic and public 
intellectuals did not subscribe to an absolutist laissez-faire ideology.  Antebellum political 
economists made significant departures from the free-trade model.  And they did so with 
complete knowledge of the authority British laissez-faire had in nineteenth-century economic 
discourse.  Most antebellum thinkers did not try to “domesticate” British classicism; nor were 
they, as Conkin argued, powerless “to create their own universe of discourse.”10 
 American economic thinkers built off the laissez-faire tradition to craft arguments that 
comported with the unique economic conditions of their new world.  For some, this meant 
accepting parts of the laissez-faire model, but with distinctive American twists.  Chapters 2 and 3 
of this dissertation show that even within the antebellum free-trade movement, there lacked 
definitive consensus.  American thinkers developed different types of laissez-faire political 
economy, each suited to the particular regional interests of the authors.  This was especially the 
case in the South.  Southerners manipulated laissez-faire logic to match Southern traditions.  By 
the 1830s Southerners realized laissez-faire complimented the ideal of the negative state.  They 
employed free-trade political economy to strike at the North by attacking protective tariffs and 
                                                            
9 Ibid., pp. 17, 28, 30. Dorfman and Conkin consensus interpretation of American political economy 
compliments broader studies of antebellum society that depict a pervasive liberal-democratic-capitalist 
order.  Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought 
since the Revolution (New York, 1955), is the authority on this interpretation.  Richard Hofstadter, another 
consensus historian, argued American history is marked by the “common, bourgeois, entrepreneurial 
assumptions of most of the effective forces in American political life and the tendency of these forces to 
group ideologically around a Whiggish center rather than to be polarized in sharp ideological struggles.” 
The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York, 1948), pp. xxvii-xxxi. 
 
10 Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity, p. 17. 
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combating assertions that the state could claim or destroy private property notably slavery.  
Smith had denounced slavery, but the ostensible incompatibility between a Southern political 
economy of slavery and the enlightened, free-trade moral philosophy of Smith did not stop 
Southerners from becoming antebellum America’s chief disseminators of laissez-faire.  Nor did 
Southerners, hostile to industrialization, see their brand of laissez-faire inconsistent with British 
classicism and its emphasis on industry.  Free traders in the South shaped laissez-faire into an 
intellectual strategy to advance the political doctrine of states-rights, defend an agrarian-based 
slave regime, and stall the emergence of a national industrial economy.  It was, in short, not the 
economic liberalism of the British tradition. 
In Northeastern colleges and universities professors taught a brand of laissez-faire 
doctrine quite different from the political economy of Southern free trade.  In consequence, 
laissez-faire in the American discourse was split along regional lines and never united into a 
single intellectual movement.  The influence of regional institutional and cultural conventions 
brought Northeastern free traders closer to the Smithian tradition.  The Northeastern free traders 
emphasized the moral and religious benefits of market economies.  They considered free-trade 
political economy as confirmation of a benevolent, Christian deity.  Northeastern professors were 
typically clergy who might have otherwise distanced themselves from a discipline still linked to 
the materialism of David Hume.  But because free trade in the Smithian tradition was originally a 
branch of moral philosophy, teaching political economy was amenable to the clerical style and 
substance of curricula in the Northeast.  The sluggish pace with which Northeastern freetraders 
removed elements of moral philosophy and religion distinguished their interpretation of laissez-
faire from the more secular versions of Southern free trade, and it was in stark contrast to the 
political economy of nineteenth-century British classicism.  Moreover, the Northeastern clergy 
free traders largely rejected, on theological grounds, the pessimism of the classical school.  Both 
the Southerners and the Northeastern cleric economists drew from British authorities, but the 
 6 
 
Americans followed an economic logic that was different from laissez-faire as it existed in the 
nineteenth-century British discourse.              
The divisions between antebellum free traders and British laissez-faire are made more 
explicit in the American treatment of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo.  This is the subject of 
chapter 4.  This chapter demonstrates how antebellum thinkers largely abandoned Malthus and 
Ricardo, or manipulated their logic to suit distinctly American conditions.  Antebellum economic 
and social conditions convinced domestic writers from both the North and South that the theories 
of Malthus and Ricardo were simply inapplicable.  The few Americans who accepted Malthus 
and Ricardo, typically distorted these British authorities to advance their own special political and 
social prerogatives.  It is not uncommon to find an American writer stressing certain conclusions 
of the British economists while flatly denying the legitimacy of others.  In this way antebellum 
American writers created their own economic discourse out of the raw material of British 
classicism.  By the 1850s this tendency of American thinkers to twist the British classical 
tradition in ways that fit particular political and social agendas had reached its height.  This was 
especially the case in the South, where the gloomy forecasts of the British pessimists were 
employed in a defense of slavery.     
 The American break from British classicism was largely a response to wide-spread 
assumptions about American exceptionalism.  Declarations of American exceptionalism hark 
back to the colonial period, but during the antebellum era the concept became a central feature of 
American intellectual culture.11  The belief in American exceptionalism contributed to an almost 
constant invitation for antebellum writers to construct a native political economy.  An American 
economic renaissance of sorts was heralded, one demanding an economic thought suited to the 
historically unique domestic conditions.  It was determined that to best appreciate the nature of 
                                                            
11 Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge, 1991); Arthur Ekirch, The Idea of 
Progress in America, 1815-1860 (New York, 1951); Carl Russell Fish, The Rise of the Common Man, 
1830-1850 (New York, 1927). 
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the American economy there required an alternative, nuanced political economy penned by 
domestic hands.            
 The task of creating a system of economic thought designed specifically for the American 
experience fell to the protectionists.  Chapter 6 traces the intellectual evolution of antebellum 
protectionism.  Protectionism was the most important development in antebellum economic 
thought and it has rightly been designated the American school of political economy.  By fusing 
together various strains of domestic intellectual, social, economic and cultural history, 
protectionists captured the essence of the antebellum economic mind.  These writers cherished a 
bouyant optimism, a strong commitment to national economic development, and a spirit of 
independence from the Old World.  The protectionists substituted the pessimism of the classical 
tradition with a distinctly American understanding of economic phenomena based on an 
economics of affluence.   
 The popularity of protectionist thought and the practical application of protectionist 
policy throughout the nineteenth century illustrates the disconnect between American political 
economy and British classicism.  For protectionists the exceptional conditions of America made 
permanent economic progress possible.  By commanding through the will of human agency and 
the instruments of state what for the British thinkers was an uncompromising and arbitrary natural 
order, the protectionists aimed at catapulting the American economy into an unprecedented 
economic condition.  Attaining economic and political independence was made possible by 
controlling what Smith had referred to as the “natural system of liberty.”  In these ways, 
protectionists challenged the foundational principles of laissez-faire.  But protectionists did not 
believe their economic system was at odds with liberal values.  Rather they thought that by 
regulating markets through tariffs they would increase the personal autonomy of American 
citizens and augment national sovereignty.  As much as protectionists held in disdain the free-
trade ideology, their economic theory managed a defense of an otherwise liberal, competitive, 
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capitalist industrial order.  Protectionists believed the tariff was capable of creating an industrial 
society with capitalists, machines and workers coexisting harmoniously.  The industrial ideal that 
protectionists worked toward would avoid the dismal outcomes predicted by Malthus and 
Ricardo.  In antebellum political economy it was the protectionists, not the free-traders, who 
promoted economic modernization and the expansion of industrial capitalism.  Chapter 7 
investigates the works of Henry Carey, the period’s most important protectionist thinker.  Carey 
united protectionism into a coherent economic ideology that remains the most significant 
contribution to the antebellum economic discourse.   
Protectionists offered the most popular and influential antebellum rebuke of laissez-faire.  
A far more violent and darker rejection came from a small legion of Southern reactionaries and 
Northern laborites. Chapter 5 examines the economic thought of Southern reactionaries and 
Northern laborites responsible for the period’s sharpest critique of bourgeois economic ideology.  
They include Southern agitators like George Fitzhugh and George Frederick Holmes, and labor 
activists like Langton Byllesby and Thomas Skidmore.  Although the Southern reactionaries and 
Northern labor advocates often operated on the periphery of the domestic economic discourse, 
their ideas further showcase the lack of consensus in American thought.  
 The Southern and Northern radicals also reinforce the argument that antebellum political 
economy was not dedicated to the laissez-faire/classical model.  They were perhaps the most 
intriguing sets of intellectuals in the antebellum catalogue of economic commentators, for they 
provoked a fundamental reclassification of ideological alignments by questioning traditional 
American values of natural liberty, property rights, personal economic sovereignty and state 
prerogative.   
This chapter also invites substantial revisions to conventional notions of economic 
ideology as they existed within the framework of the antebellum discourse.  By combining these 
groups into a single chapter, the intellectual relationship between these seemingly adverse 
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economic ideologies are revealed as actually having shared a close affinity.  Both groups desired 
a complete alteration of the existing economic order.  And both groups couched their programs on 
a systematic critique of the laissez-faire industrial order.  The interpretations of industrial society 
provided by the Southern reactionaries and Northern laborites were as dismal as the British 
classicists.  The Southerners argued that the free market pushed much of humanity into a 
miserable condition, marked by exploitation, ceaseless drudgery, and a bare subsistence.  Their 
opposition to industrial capitalism was based on a Tory-like morality that reflected Southern 
paternal values, Southern social and economic institutions, and an attachment to plantation 
slavery.  The Northern laborites echoed the criticisms of the Southern reactionaries, but their 
analyses rested on a nascent socialist political economy then gaining favor in American industrial 
quarters.  They demanded a redistribution of property, an end to the perceived exploitative 
tendencies of industrial labor, the abolition of economic classes, and a radical reconfiguration of 
commercial exchange.  These groups shared important values and their relationship is indicative 
of the rather awkward intellectual alliances that emerged in the antebellum economic discourse.       
While the consequences of industry and trade were the most heatedly debated economic 
topics of the era, finance inspired the most severe form of panic.  Chapter 8 deals with the 
antebellum reaction to financial capitalism.  This chapter argues that Americans held a variety of 
positions in their perceptions of finance, but most coalesced around a strong opposition to the 
expansion of financial capitalism.  By the Jacksonian era financial institutions were deeply rooted 
in the economy, and during this period both the forces sympathetic to and those determined to 
resist financial capitalism matured into full-fledged political, social, and intellectual movements.  
Historians have paid considerable attention to Americans’ suspicions of finance.  However, they 
tend to reduce antebellum attitudes into either neatly organized antagonistic camps, or simply 
paint with a broad stroke an image of consensus.   
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 My dissertation concentrates on a middle variant often ignored in the 
historiography─political economists who were otherwise committed to the free market, but clear 
in their opposition to financial institutions, fearful of the moral, social, political, and economic 
residuals of the expansion of banks, credit, debt, and stock-corporations.  The conventional 
wisdom on the relationship between advocates of free markets and finance was rare in the 
antebellum literature.  American commentators on finance operated within ideological parameters 
unique to the antebellum period.  A separate but related vein in the opposition literature on 
finance attempted to fuse a liberal economic creed with classical republicanism.  In the 
historiography on the revolutionary and early national periods republicanism has attracted 
significant attention.12  Still, historians have largely overlooked the subtle differences between 
republican critics of finance in the antebellum discourse.13  Nor have historians done justice to the 
opponents of finance by representing them as radical outliers.  Antebellum critics of finance were 
essential components of the era’s economic thought, reflecting an engagement with the virtues of 
the free market but with a cautionary element that recognized the dangers of unfettered finance.    
 America’s response to the development of financial institutions illustrates the dialectic 
tensions attendant to the nation’s economic ideology.  The aim of my work is to contextualize the 
conflicts in which Americans constructed their economic thought.  As evidence, my dissertation 
draws on an extensive body of antebellum economic literature, with special consideration given 
to the more academic, or abstract writings.  However, recognizing the period’s lack of 
professionalization in the field of economics, I also incorporate fair discussion of more popular 
                                                            
12 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967); Gordon 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (New York, 1969); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975);Drew 
McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980).   
 
13 The notable exceptions are Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political 
Roots, 1690-1860 (Cambridge, 1998); Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of 
the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York, 1984);Major Wilson, "The ‘Country’ versus the 
‘Court’: A Republican Consensus and Party Debate in the Bank War," Journal of the Early Republic 
(Winter, 1995). 
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tracts.  Economic knowledge was not monopolized by a single group.  It was disseminated by 
academics, farmers, merchants, craftsmen, mechanics, industrialists, pamphleteers, journalists, 
and politicians, many of whom, despite obtaining nothing near to what the present age would 
consider sufficient training, were confident enough in their expertise to claim the title of ‘political 
economist.’  In the current study the latter term is used liberally, conferred upon those who 
contributed to what stands as a large and diverse assemblage of economic knowledge, found in 
speeches, memorials, journals, newspapers and academic publications.  Perhaps the most difficult 
task of intellectual history is patching together the ideas and passages of disparate groups into a 
representative whole.  This is particularly the case with American economic thought, where sharp 
differences encumber the formulation of broad generalizations.  Still, intellectual culture in 
antebellum America was encouraging and pursuant of an economic discourse, and when 
examined closely improves our appreciation of the psychology of America’s homo economicus 
and broadens our understanding of the theoretical basis for America’s empire of wealth.       
12 
 
Chapter II   
Laissez-faire and Moral Philosophy in the Northeast 
 
Only three months before Thomas Jefferson began writing the Declaration of Independence, 
Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations.  Antebellum Americans eager to find significance 
in the historical connection between Smith and the nation’s founding celebrated the concurrence.1  
“The nativity of the science is to be dated from that event, and the coincidence is to be remarked 
that it was contemporaneous with our Declaration of Independence in 1776.”2  Today, 
conventional wisdom still links the two.  "The ideas of Adam Smith,” one historian has recently 
written, “helped form the model for the development of the American economy.”  Another has 
argued that "the United States has consistently come closer to the Smithian ideal over a longer 
period of time than any other nation."3  Many of Smith’s recommendations were implemented as 
antebellum policy.  In the antebellum economic discourse, however, few Americans were 
absolutist in their following of Smith.   
 This chapter explores laissez-faire political economy in the antebellum Northeast.  In 
contradiction of the conventional wisdom, free-trade thinkers in the Northeast largely ignored the 
economic logic of Smithianlaissez-faire.  Instead, Smithianlaissez-faire was championed for its 
moral consequences.  Although Smith is remembered for his economic discussion, his political 
                                                            
1 On the influence of Smith’s Wealth of Nations in antebellum America see Paul Conkin, Prophets of 
Prosperity: America’s First Political Economists (Bloomington, 1980), p. 17; Samuel Fleischacker, “Adam 
Smith’s Reception Among the American Founders, 1776-1790,” William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 59, no. 
4, 2002; Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606-1865 (New York, 1946), 
vol. II, p. 512.  On the existence of shared ideas between Britain and America generally see Robert Kelley, 
The Transatlantic Persuasion: The Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone (New York, 1969); 
Michael Kraus, The North Atlantic Civilization (Princeton, 1957); Frank Thistlethwaite, The Anglo-
American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century (New York, 1971). 
 
2 “Political Economy,” The Southern Review (February, 1832), p. 493 
 
3 Roy Smith, Adam Smith and the Origins of American Enterprise: How America’s Industrial Success was 
Forged by the Timely Ideas of a Brilliant Scots Economist (New York, 2002), p. 201; John Steele Gordon, 
An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power (New York, 2004), p. 67.   
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economy was based on moral philosophy.4  The Northeastern version of laissez-faire followed in 
this strain of his thought.  The clergy-academics of the Northeastern free-trade movement 
combined a strikingly cosmopolitan perspective of international trade and a general whiggish tone 
to highlight the potential laissez-faire policies had in creating a just and righteous society.            
 The preference for moral philosophy in Northeastern laissez-faire followed logically 
from the socially-conservative institutional and cultural factors distinct to the region.5   Academic 
instruction of political economy in the Northeast was taught to college seniors in what was 
considered the climax of an early nineteenth-century higher education, a course in moral 
philosophy.  The subject, according to one historian, “studied human affairs as the realm within 
which individuals sought moral improvement.”6  As it was treated in America’s most prestigious 
colleges, free-trade doctrine provided a strategy for enhancing material wealth, but it was more 
concerned with designing a society founded on sound moral principles.   
Smithian economic philosophy blended well with the devout and dutiful nature of 
Northeastern curricula.  The Scotsman’s emphasis on the universality of free-trade principles, the 
benign qualities of the natural economic order, and the cosmopolitan character of free trade that 
encouraged mutually advantageous exchange complimented the religious character of 
Northeastern academia.  Almost all of the region’s institutions of higher learning maintained 
                                                            
4 A sample of the historiography on Smith includes Joseph Cropsey, Polity and Economy: With Further 
Thoughts on the Principles of Adam Smith (South Bend, IN, 2001); Andrew Skinner, A System of Social 
Science: Papers Relating to Adam Smith (Oxford, 1996); T.D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals 
(London, 1971); Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith’s Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce, and Conscience (New 
York, 1994); Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith’s 
Thought (Oxford, 2001); Charles Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (Cambridge, 
1999); Glen Morrow, The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith (New York, 1969); Jacob Viner, 
The Long View and the Short (Glencoe, IL, 1958); Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in 
Historiographic Revision (Cambridge, 1978); J. Ralph Lingred, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith (The 
Hague, 1973). 
 
5 The Northeastern brand of free trade also corresponded to the cultural and commercial interests of the 
region.  Both the Northeastern and Southern varieties of free-trade were wedded to institutions that by the 
end of the nineteenth-century had lost influence in American society.  Scientific analysis trumped divine 
explanation in academia, especially in political economy, and Southern slavery died at Appomattox.          
 
6 Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge, 1991), p. 36. 
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close ties with the Church and clergy professors did most of the instruction.  Congregationalists 
had their Harvard and Yale, the Episcopalians, Penn and Columbia, the Presbyterians, Princeton, 
and the Baptists, Brown.  Curricula emphasized theology, moral philosophy, biblical studies, and 
occasional direction in mathematics and the physical sciences.7 
Professors in the Northeast were almost always clerics and their letter of instruction 
almost always conservative.  The relationship between Church and antebellum academic 
institutions worked against the introduction of new curriculum, especially a discipline whose 
pioneers were the skeptic David Hume and the deist Smith.  American colleges were founded and 
funded under the assumption that students were taught civil and religious obedience that aimed at 
the maintenance of social tranquility.  During the antebellum period colleges continued in this 
tradition by operating essentially as aristocratic theocracies.8 
When political economy was introduced as an autonomous discipline, it entered stripped 
of its radical, materialist associations.9Laissez-faire among the antebellum Northeastern clergy-
academics was, in the words of one historian, “a sedative, not a stimulant;” it was employed to 
advance “defensive social campaigns.”10  Students were encouraged to answer the merchant’s 
calling, rather than the radical agitator’s.  Pacifying or discrediting the latter became important as 
                                                            
7 Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606-1865 (New York, 1946), vol. I, p. 
112; Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York, 1951), p. 224; Michael Hudson, 
Economics and Technology in 19th-Century American Thought (New York, 1975), pp. 22-33. 
 
8 William Barber, ed., Economists and Higher Learning in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 4-5; Dorfman, The 
Economic Mind in American Civilization, vol. I, p. 112; Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American 
Civilization, 1606-1866, vol. II, p. 512; Curti, The Growth of American Thought, p. 224.  On the wider 
influence of Christianity in American liberal political culture see James T. Kopplenberg, “The Virtues of 
Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse,” The Journal of 
American History (June, 1987). 
 
9 Michael O’Connor, Origins of Academic Economics in the United States (New York, 1974),pp. 78-94. 
 
10Ibid, pp. 106, 108.  Following the French Revolution, egalitarian and democratic interpretations of Smith 
were increasingly minimized in the discourse.  Dugald Steward, professor at Edinburgh University, 1775-
1820, is often credited with having purged Smithian political economy of its potential for ‘Jacobinism.’  
Richard Teichgraeber, “Adam Smith and Tradition: Wealth of Nations before Malthus,” Stefan Collini, 
Richard Whatmore and Brian Young, eds., Economy, Polity, and Society: British Intellectual History, 
1750-1950 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 95-97.  
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the Northeast developed industrially.  Far from being in the vanguard of intellectual movements, 
early American colleges aimed to preserve the established social order.11  The accumulation of 
wealth was reward for moral, industrious behavior; while poverty a mark of an individual’s 
deficiency.   
The religious and moral impulse of Northeastern laissez-faire differed significantly from 
most others in the trans-Atlantic free-trade movement.  Freeing political economy from theology 
and moral philosophy took almost a century longer in America than it did in Britain.12  
Incorporating sacred principles into free trade helped popularize the ideology with American 
intellectual circles otherwise closed to the nuances of Enlightenment thought.  By tying elements 
of Christianity to free-trade political economy, the Northeast clergy-academic helped legitimize 
the discipline in American institutions of higher learning.  If laissez-faire political economy was 
censored by some critics for its materialism, presenting free-trade doctrine as evidence of a higher 
power facilitated its acceptance as a branch of learning worthy of instruction in America’s 
religiously oriented colleges.  Just so, Northeastern intellectual culture required political economy 
to assimilate religious conventions before the science was permitted to secede as an independent 
field of study.  Deliverance of American political economy from its theological heritage was no 
easy task, it was one of several paradigmatic challenges the discipline faced during its formative 
years and it had a profound impact on the evolution of domestic economic thought.    
This is not to say American free traders were disengaged from an increasingly secular 
economic discourse.  Even after the ascendancy of Ricardo, a British evangelical strain of free 
                                                            
11 O’Connor, Origins of Academic Economics in the United States, pp. 80-89. 
 
12 Jacob Viner, “Fashion in Economic Thought,” Douglass Irwin, ed., Essays on the Intellectual History of 
Economics (Princeton, 1971), p. 190; A.W. Bob Coats, On the History of Economy Thought (London, 
1992), p. 343. William Lewtin, The Origins of Scientific Economics: English Economic Thought, 1660-
1776 (London, 1963), pp. 81, 147-148; Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago, 
2005), pp. 2, 12; Joyce Appleby, Economic Though and Ideology in 17th-Century England (Princeton, 
1978), p. 54.  Lewtin argues that as early as the mid-seventeenth century the Church in England had lost its 
authority to speak on economic matters. 
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trade emerged, touting the moral and spiritual benefits of open markets.13  The coexistence of an 
American and British free-trade movement that accentuated the spiritual over the material 
illustrates the intellectual ties between the two nations.  It also indicates that the Northeastern 
clergy-academics influenced the paradigmatic evolution of the nascent science.  Contrary to 
claims that antebellum Americans made negligible contributions to political economy, the 
Northeastern clergy-academics had an impact on the development of free-trade ideology.14  The 
political economy of a variety of men illustrates these common ties and developments.       
 Columbia professor John McVickar exemplified the connection between Christian piety, 
moral philosophy and free-trade political economy in antebellum America.  Born in 1787 into an 
elite New York City merchant family, he entered Columbia at thirteen as a student and graduated 
four years later at the top of his class.  Ordained by the Episcopal Church in 1812, McVickar’s 47 
years at Columbia were preceded by serving as rector of the Church of St. James, Hyde Park, 
New York.  In 1817 he returned to his alma matter as professor of moral philosophy.15 
Throughout his career McVickar worked to popularize free-trade doctrine in America.    
He was largely responsible for the American introduction to Ricardo through his 1825 Outlines of 
Political Economy, which republished with extensive editor’s notes J.R. McCulloch’s essay 
“Political Economy.”16McVickar considered inquiry into laissez-faire principles an opportunity to 
reunite American and British minds.  “It may serve to moderate the hasty zeal...by showing how 
nearly reflecting men on both sides of the Atlantic arrive at the same conclusions, and thus tend to 
                                                            
13 Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 
1785-1865 (New York, 1988). 
 
14 Charles Dunbar, “Economic Science in America, 1776-1876,” The North American Review (January, 
1876), pp. 140, 146; Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Oxford, 1954),pp. 514, 519 
 
15 J.B. Langstaff, The Enterprising Life: John McVickar, 1787-1868 (New York, 1961), p. 74. 
 
16 McCulloch’s essay appeared in the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1824 and helped establish Ricardian 
principles as classical orthodoxy. 
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draw together two kindred nation, whom an unwise and illiberal policy has too often disunited.”17  
But free trade did more than strengthen the bond between America and Britain.  For McVickar 
laissez-faire was the harbinger of universal fraternity.  Free trade aided humanity in its historical 
quest to eliminate those evil tendencies that exist between men. “It inclines them to drop the 
sword from their hands, by demonstrating to them, that they are about to plunge it into their own 
bowels.”  Free trade also moderated national hostilities.  “It teaches among nations and federative 
states,” McVickar wrote, “the all-important lessons of peace and mutual benefits...It unites 
nations, not by treatise or federations…but by the laws of mutual interest.”18  What scripture 
revealed to be man’s duty, political economy exposed to be in their interest.McVickar believed it 
his primary function to bridge the principles of all sciences and divine scripture, for every piece 
of human knowledge was evidence of Providence’s design. 
McVickar’s interest in political economy was also driven by a desire to employ the 
science as a vehicle to spread his theology.  Although McCulloch, the eminent Scottish 
economists, noted in 1824 that political economy was divorced from the study of ethics─“the 
production of wealth is the only question they admit,” McVickar argued for the ethical and 
religious consequences for teaching the science.19  “Though it be but the science of wealth, yet 
does it show that wealth to be the result of the moral and intellectual, as well as the physical 
powers of man.  It demonstrates that to man, ignorant and vicious, there is no road to 
wealth.”20The economist’s mission was to uplift and enrich individuals.21  “Gold and virtue,” 
                                                            
17 John McVickar, Introductory Lecture to a Course in Political Economy Delivered at Columbia 
University (London, 1830), p. i. 
 
18 Ibid., p. 9.  
 
19 John McVickar, Outlines of Political Economy: Being a Republication of an Article upon that subject 
contained in the Edinburgh Supplement to the Encyclopedia Britannica (1825; reprint, New York, 1966), p. 
160. 
 
20 McVickar, Introductory Lecture to a Course in Political Economy, p. 5. 
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McVickar wrote, are not “balanced against each other in opposite scales.” Indeed, he continued, 
“the greatest pursuit of wealth is still the greatest safeguard of virtue.”22 
At Brown, Francis Wayland gave further form to the link between Christianity and 
political economy.  Wayland was born in 1796 in New York City.  Like McVickar, Wayland 
served the church before entering the academy.  The five years prior to Wayland accepting the 
posts of president and professor of moral philosophy at Brown were spent at the First Baptist 
Church of Boston.23  Upon arriving at Brown in 1827 Wayland introduced political economy in 
his lectures on moral philosophy and in the following year the subject was included in the 
university’s catalogue.  Wayland was also responsible for antebellum America’s most popular 
economics textbook, The Elements of Political Economy.  Published in 1837, it was standard 
reading for students.  The work went through eighteen editions before the Civil War and sold 
nearly 60,000 copies.24 
Like McVickar, Wayland employed Smithian principles to strengthen the connections 
between laissez-faire and moral philosophy.  “The principles of political economy are so closely 
analogous to those of Moral Philosophy, that almost every question in the one, may be argued on 
grounds belonging to the other.”25  He insisted the natural economic order established a direct 
correlation between virtuous behavior and the accumulation of wealth.  “The circulation of the 
scriptures, the inculcation of moral and religious truth upon the mind of man, by means of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
21 Joseph Dorfman, “The Reverend John McVickar, Christian Teacher and Economists,” Joseph Dorfman 
and Rex G. Tugwell, Early American Policy: Six Columbia Contributors (Plainview, 1972), pp. 116, 132.  
 
22 McVickar, Introductory Lecture to a Course in Political Economy, pp. 6, 7. 
 
23 Joseph Blau, editor’s introduction in Francis Wayland’s The Elements of Moral Science (1837; reprint, 
Cambridge, MA, 1963),pp. xii-xv; O’Connor, Origins of Academic Economics in the United States, p. 77; 
Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, vol. II, pp. 758-567. 
 
24 William Barber, “Political Economy from the Top Down: Brown University,” William Barber, ed., 
Economists and Higher Learning in the Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick, 1993), p. 74. 
 
25 Francis Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy (New York, 1837), p. vi. 
 19 
 
Sabbath schools, and the preaching of the gospel, are of the very greatest importance to the 
productive energies of a country.”26  ‘In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread’ was 
characteristic of Wayland’s doctrinal disposition.  “If a man complain because God made him to 
labor; it is a difficulty which the complainant must settle with his Maker.”27  In his discussion of 
paupers and poor relief, Wayland concluded “the fault lies, not in their wages, but in themselves.”  
And he continued logically, “of course, the correction must come, not from a change in wages, 
but from a change in habits.”28  Connecting laissez-faire to a Protestant ethic, Wayland believed 
free-trade political economy compelled the masses to righteous and industrious behavior.   
For Wayland, free trade was also proof of a providential order.  Although separated by 
wide distances, people required each other for sustenance.  Thus, Providence constructed a 
cosmopolitan trade regime that compelled humanity to cultivate a Christian fraternity.  The laws 
that governed universal exchange were established by God, scientifically observable, and 
designed so “that men should live together in friendship and harmony.”29  The theory of 
comparative advantage was akin to divine revelation.  “From this universal dependence, we learn 
that God intends nations, as well as individuals, to live in peace, and to conduct themselves 
towards each other upon the principles of benevolence.”30  Free traders like Wayland held an 
enlightened world view of international relations, where nations worked peaceably toward 
reciprocal benefit.  The Northeastern free-traders looked externally, beyond America’s borders, to 
                                                            
26 Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
 
27 Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
 
28 Ibid., p. 329. 
 
29 Ibid., p. 90. 
 
30 Ibid., p. 173. 
 20 
 
a benign global market coordinated to foster a humanitarian ethic and weaken those prejudices 
which disposed men to acts of war and national rivalry.31 
Wayland’s positive view of the economic order broke with the pessimism of nineteenth-
century British classicism.  His spiritual commitments drew him closer to the more optimistic 
Smith.  Humanity, Wayland argued, was not destined for the dreary existence predicted by 
Malthus and Ricardo.  Although Wayland favored agriculture as “the most healthy 
employment...attended by the fewest moral temptations,” he did not believe industrialization 
hastened labor’s demise.32  The providential order intended for each successive generation to 
enjoy greater material prosperity.  Improvement is the permanent condition.  Through the more 
efficient application of labor, the discovery of new technologies, and augmented investments of 
capital, those who in earlier times might expect to suffer privations enjoyed comfort.  “It is thus 
that a society, age after age, grows rich, and each successive race of men leaves the world more 
richly provided with means and facilities of production, than it found it.”33 
An attachment to Christian ethics drove a wedge between Wayland and the British 
classicists in still other ways.  In his seminal piece on moral philosophy Wayland reverted to an 
almost pre-modern form of economic thought when he offered a critique of self-interest.  Self-
love was sometimes least productive of social and individual happiness.  The economic order was 
not calculated “to secure the happiness of any single individual,” Wayland found, “and he who 
devises his plan with sole reference to himself must find them continually thwarted by that 
Omnipotent and Invisible Agency which is overruling all things.”34 
                                                            
31 Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War 
(Charlottesville, VA, 2006), pp. 176, 182. 
 
32 Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy, pp. 40, 100-104. 
 
33 Ibid., p. 30. 
 
34 Ibid., p. 60. 
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Wayland and McVickar represented a religious vein in American economic thought that 
dates to the colonial period.  Theological and ethical imperatives played a powerful role in early 
American political economy.35  The economic literature of the colonies emphasized the role of 
clerics in maintaining an orderly and hierarchical society to counter the increasingly 
commercialized nature of social relations.  Northern colonists calculated a 'just price,' applied the 
golden rule of the Old Testament to economic exchange, and filled broadsides with anti-merchant 
rhetoric critical of the corruptive and anti-social tendencies of trade and money.  Influential 
thinkers like John Winthrop of Massachusetts interpreted scripture to defend public over private 
economy, state surveillance and control over the distribution of wealth, and struck against the 
notion of buying cheap to sell dear.36  Winthrop also found interest sacrilege.  Lend money to 
those least able to repay, and later forgive the insolvent debtor, or better, consider your loan an 
act of Christian charity.37  Pennsylvania Quakers also believed religious doctrine paramount when 
directing economic policy.  Sumptuary laws were not uncommon, and some expected the Church 
to take the lead role in guarding against inflation.38 
McVickar’s discussion of criteria for restricting free trade illustrates the lasting influence 
Christian moralism had on Northeastern economic thought.  “If...individual gains may be pursued 
to the detriment of national wealth,” McVickar wrote, “then must the guardians of the national 
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welfare be ever upon the watch against individual encroachment.”39  The conditions McVickar 
presented for limiting free enterprise included “those necessary preparations for a state of war.”  
But McVickar struck a tone reminiscent of colonial times when he censured “home speculation,” 
as well as those occasions when “individual profits are....extracted from the miseries of other, 
from the vices and passions of society.”40 
The transition from medieval scholasticism to secular rationalism was for American 
political economy a cumbersome trail.  Wayland and McVickar gave sharp expression to the 
historical dialectic between Christianity and economic thought.  They employed the 
moral/economic philosophy of Smith to facilitate acclimation of free-trade principles to 
prevailing social and cultural institutions in the Northeast.  In doing so, the Northeastern free-
traders signaled their opposition to the analytical transformations within the laissez-faire 
tradition.41  McVickar and Wayland did not hold fast to the methodological developments 
ushered in by the more secular Ricardo.  Instead, they resorted to divine explanation and 
standards of moral propriety.   
McVickar and Wayland conformed to the social prerogatives of clerical elements 
committed to employing laissez-faire toward the construction of a pious society.  This was a 
consequence of the prolonged association between academic and Church institutions in the 
antebellum Northeast.  It was also owing to Northeastern academics approaching political 
economy from the disposition of a moral philosopher.  The inability of McVickar and Wayland to 
recognize that laissez-faire was splitting from its Smithian roots and moving closer to nineteenth-
                                                            
39 McVickar, Outline of Political Economy, p. 90. 
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century technical modes of analysis illustrates the region’s reticent intellectual culture.  In this 
sense, free-trade political economy was not in the avant-garde of social and intellectual change.                               
The Northeastern political economists did not have a domestic monopoly on the 
instruction of the budding science.  The South developed its own distinct form of free-trade.  And 
like the Northeastern brand, the Southern version reflected the region’s intellectual heritage, 
social customs, and institutional traditions.  Institutions of higher learning in the South were 
decidedly secular.  And while the South emphasized a practical, policy-oriented brand of free 
trade that illustrated the region’s anti-intellectual culture, the Northeastern economists celebrated 
the merits of metaphysical erudition.  Neither did the Northeastern economists exhibit a rigid, 
doctrinal commitment to anti-statism.  Although the Northeastern free-traders celebrated 
individual enterprise and were generally suspicious of legislative initiatives, they did not employ 
laissez-faire as a vehicle to advance states-rights ideology.      
As an intellectual movement, antebellum free-trade was divided by sectional lines.  A 
disassociation existed between free-traders in the North and South.  Despite advocating the same 
policy, neither side seemed interested in what the other was saying.  The emphasis paid to moral 
philosophy by the clergy-economists was difficult to reconcile with the pro-slavery influence in 
Southern free trade.  In consequence, the American free-trade movement was missing an element 
of cohesiveness.  A division, both politically and intellectually, that likely inhibited the 
promulgation of free-trade policy during the antebellum era.42  The division also limited the 
dissemination of British classicism in the domestic discourse, leaving open a cerebral void in the 
American economic mind that was ultimately filled by the protectionists.                   
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Chapter III  
Free Trade in the Slave South 
 
The laissez-faire movement in the South arose in a fundamentally different environment than the 
Northeast.  The Southerners adapted free-trade ideology to reflect their own particular 
intellectual, cultural, and institutional traditions.  In contrast to the religiously-inspired 
Northeastern political economists, laissez-faire thinkers in the South ignored Smithian moral 
philosophy.  The Southerners pushed free-trade political economy toward secular analysis, 
discounting appeals to a higher power and deflecting concerns of ethical responsibility in favor of 
practical policies.1 
 Most critically, slavery was at the center of Southern free-trade political economy.  Still, 
the region’s attachment to laissez-faire complimented a broader Southern ideology.  Free trade 
offered Southerners a device to preserve the region’s political strength in national affairs.  The 
latter was thought to have been secured by the South’s economic relevance, which rested on the 
perpetuation of slavery.  By the 1830s laissez-faire evolved into an economic appendage to 
states-rights political doctrine.  Thomas Cooper and John Calhoun cemented the association 
during the nullification crisis.2  As the nation drew closer to the Civil War, the bond between 
states-rights and free trade became almost inseparable.  Furthermore, laissez-faire was also 
adjusted to accommodate the anti-industrial bent of Southern economic culture.3  In this regard, 
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the Southern free-trade movement was radically different from all other free-trade movements in 
the trans-Atlantic discourse.4  The Southern version of laissez-faire drew heavily on an American 
agrarian tradition and sponsored a program of national economic development friendly to 
Southern agrarian institutions.5  In short, free-trade thought advanced the slave interest, but it 
corresponded well to other components of the Southern mind.  
   Thomas Cooper was the principal intellectual force behind the Southern free-trade 
movement.  Born in 1759 in London, Cooper emigrated to the United States in 1794.  He first 
won notoriety in America through a series of stinging attacks in 1799 on President John Adams.  
Cooper scoffed at the administration’s Sedition Act, the same act under which he would be 
charged with libel.  In 1800 he served a six month prison sentence for an article published in the 
Northumberland, Pennsylvania Gazette.6Cooper went on to teach at Carlisle College (Dickinson) 
and later the University of Pennsylvania.  He eventually settled in Columbia as professor of 
chemistry at South Carolina College.  In 1821 he became the college’s president, a position held 
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until 1834.  Cooper died five years later in Columbia, South Carolina.  He was praised by 
Jefferson as “the greatest man in America in the power of the mind.”7 
 Cooper’s seminal economic treatise, Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy, was 
published in 1831 during the midst of the nullification crisis.  In 1828 President John Quincy 
Adams signed into law the so-called Tariff of Abominations.  The tariff galvanized Southern free 
traders and transformed tariff policy into a debate over the nature of representative government.  
Cooper’s Lectures propelled him to the fore of the national discourse over trade policy.  He 
became, along with Calhoun, the symbolic head of South Carolina’s nullification movement.8 
      More than any other Southerner, Cooper merged laissez-faire and states-rights into a 
single doctrine.  By doing so, he illustrated the intimacy between the political and the economic 
in Southern thought.  Just so, he established in the antebellum discourse a defense of the negative 
state with an economic logic rooted in the philosophical skepticism of Smith.9  Like Smith, 
Cooper questioned man’s capacity for rational thought.  "Temptations, from caprice, from 
prejudice, from flattery, from temporary excitements...from imperfect apprehensions of the 
questions before them…[and] from sudden impulse," he wrote, drive humanity to irrational 
behavior and obscure comprehension of an enlightened self-interest.  "When I was young," 
Cooper reminisced, "I took for granted, that every man, and every body of men, would act 
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uniformly on the obvious motive of self-interest.  I was mistaken.  The fact is otherwise; not in a 
few, but in a majority of cases.”10 
 Cooper and Smith shared a cynicism toward the legislator’s capacity to judge the 
interests of individuals.  This skepticism served as a foundational principle for laissez-faire 
economics.  Smith, however, never explicitly tied his philosophical skepticism to political theory.  
Cooper broadened the scope of Smithian laissez-faire to be inclusive of all policy─political, 
social, and economic.  Cooper’s suspicions of man’s intellectual capacities were intensified in his 
discussion of elected officials.  Legislators, Cooper wrote, "promiscuously chosen, who have 
neither the same means of minute information, the same imperious motives to use them, or the 
same experience," should exercise deference in economic matters, for "every man who has 
dedicated his whole time and attention to the business by which he supports himself and his 
family, must have more perfect and accurate knowledge."11 
From this point Cooper constructed a case against the positive state.  Having already 
attacked the practical value of legislative judgments, Cooper denied the moral and historical value 
of nations.  The tendency of philosophers to exaggerate the importance of states by finding in 
them “some existing intelligent being” drew Cooper’s ire.  The state was simply a means to 
secure the well-being of individuals.  “Every nation is composed of its individual citizens; the 
terms nation, state, community, are words merely─they do not denote any thing separate from the 
individual members whose aggregation and association has received these names.”12  Nations 
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were no more than associations of men, created to “protect nothing but the laws affording a 
common protection.”13 
 In the antebellum economic discourse, Cooper offered the strongest case for the negative 
state.  He combined philosophical skepticism and the discounting of state authority with two key 
economic principles.  First, Cooper presented a narrow definition of what constituted national 
wealth.  He argued national wealth was simply the aggregate of that which is possessed by 
individuals.  “The wealth, the capital of every nation, is nothing else than the aggregate of the 
wealth and capital of the individuals who compose it.”14  Second, his political economy was 
based on the “buy where you can buy cheapest” principle.  “If I can buy of my neighbor any 
commodity, cheaper than I can make it at home, I save the difference of expense of buying it; and 
I am more profitably employed in making some exchangeable commodity for my neighbor.  
Cheaper than he can make it, then by making the article that I want from him.”15  Cooper aimed 
to shape the economic and political narratives over the legal exercise of state authority.  An 
individual-centered definition of wealth devalued the role of political institutions.  And the “buy 
where you can buy cheapest” tenet undermined state prerogatives in establishing restrictions on 
trade.   
 By diminishing the role of the state Cooper united his political and economic thought.  
He also made nullification the natural adjunct of his version of laissez-faire.  Restrictions on trade 
were contrary to economic logic, “founded on fraud, misrepresentation, and intrigue on the part 
of monopolists,” and thus politically void.16  Cooper vilified protectionists and their supporters in 
Congress as perpetuators of legislative corruption.  Neither represented political legitimacy.  
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Protectionists were like any other special interest group, anathema to republicanism, damaging to 
individual liberty, and the executors of aristocracy in the modern age.   
 The anti-statism in Southern political economy corresponded to theoretical developments 
in the nineteenth-century laissez-faire movement.  In the trans-Atlantic discourse, laissez-faire 
was increasingly wedded to liberal politics.  In Britain, for instance, laissez-faire was associated 
with a larger set of values consistent to social, political, and economic freedoms.17  But Cooper’s 
attachment to Southern institutions also drove him to articulate a version of laissez-faire without 
reference to industrialization.  Moreover, he celebrated traditional agrarianism.  “If any 
profession is to be fostered, let it be the tiller of the earth, the fountain head of all wealth, and all 
power, and all prosperity.”18  “The whole system,” Cooper wrote of manufactures, “tends to 
increase the wealth of a few capitalists, at the expense of the health, life, morals, and happiness of 
the wretches who labor for them…we want in this country, no increase of proud and wealthy 
capitalists.”19  Cooper’s agrarian brand of laissez-faire was an anomaly in the nineteenth-century 
discourse, especially after David Ricardo had championed industrial interests.   
 Cooper’s tirade against industry symbolized the larger debate in antebellum literature 
over the trajectory of the American economy.  During the middle decades of the antebellum 
period two incompatible national economic and political programs had emerged.  Protectionists 
encouraged the rapid industrial development of the North.  Southern free traders imagined a zero-
sum game, whereby Northern industrial development undermined the plantation economy and 
empowered Northern politicians with the legislative authority to hasten the demise of slavery.  
The Southern attachment to states-rights and free trade, and the intellectual and policy creation of 
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nullification as a viable option came in part as a response to the increasing influence 
protectionists wielded over trade policy.20  In their defense of Southern institutions, economic 
thinkers like Cooper drew on long-standing free-trade values that accentuated the political 
consequences of economic policy.  In the antebellum period, the Southern version of laissez-faire 
evolved into one of the most important political challenges to federal authority.  By doing so, the 
Southern free traders adapted an ideology initiated by the enlightened Smith and grounded in a 
compassionate moral philosophy to protect slavery.        
More than any figure John Calhoun popularized in the public discourse the connection 
between laissez-faire economics and slavery.21  Born in 1782, Calhoun matriculated at Yale and 
the prestigious Tapping Reeve Law School in Litchfield, Connecticut.  He had a long and 
distinguished career in national politics stretching from 1811 to his death in 1850.  He served 
terms in the House and Senate, was Vice President under two administrations, and was Secretary 
of War and State.  He was one of the most important political figures of the middle period and the 
most sophisticated theoretician to serve in Congress.  Under Jackson, he led South Carolina in the 
nullification crisis.  It was then that Calhoun provided the intellectual foundation for Southern 
secession.   
Calhoun loaded Cooper’s economic analysis with political and sectional overtones.  In 
speeches, papers and letters written during and after the nullification crisis, Calhoun integrated 
selective principles of laissez-faire into a tightly woven political doctrine.  He developed an 
intellectual affinity for laissez-faire; but he was more concerned with the political ramifications 
of economic policy than its theoretical rationale.  Calhoun employed the standard assumptions of 
laissez-faire as a defensive strategy aimed at preserving the South’s economic and political 
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significance in national affairs.  Like Cooper, tariffs were the target of Calhoun’s ire.  Also like 
Cooper, Calhoun extended his criticisms of tariffs into an anti-statist and anti-industrial political 
economy.             
The Tariff of Abominations was the catalyst in the development of Calhoun’s economic 
thought.  When the tariff was signed into law in 1828 the planter economy of South Carolina was 
reeling from western migration and exhausted soils.  Calhoun wrote a friend that summer that 
“my property has ceased to give profits, which I believe is true of 9/10 of our planters.”22  He 
nailed tariffs as the cause of this malaise.  “The whole of our profits are intercepted at the 
customs House, through high duties on what we consume,” Calhoun wrote.23  “We are the serfs of 
the system,” Calhoun charged, “out of whose labor is raised, not only the money paid to the 
Treasury, but the funds, out of which are drawn the rich reward of the manufacture and his 
associates in interest.  Their encouragement is our discouragement.”24 
 Like most Southerners, Calhoun saw the tariff through a sectional lens.  The tariff, 
Calhoun figured, enriched the North at the expense of the South.  It served as a bounty for 
Northern labor and a tax on Southern consumers.  “The very acts, which imposes the burden on 
the consumers gives to the labor of one section the power of recharging and more than recharging 
the duty, which cannot be shifted to the shoulders of others.”  For every cent paid in tariffs 
Northern labor was awarded higher prices for their products and thus higher wages.  “Almost 
every man to the North, let his employment be what it may…hopes to receive more from the 
tariff by the increased price of his labor, or his property than what he pays in duties, as a 
consumer.”25  Since trade was merely a transfer of commodities and labor, paying an additional 
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tax diminished the exchange value of Southern commodities and labor.  This weakened the 
South’s competitive advantage.  Tariffs burdened the South with added costs on articles necessary 
in the production of staples, undermining the region’s capacity to contend with foreign producers.  
Furthermore, by diminishing the number of goods imported into America, the tariff restricted 
access of cotton producers to foreign demand.  Duties on imports were equivalent to taxes on 
exports. British textile manufacturers, Calhoun argued, would only consume in Southern cotton 
an amount equal to what Americans purchased in British wares.26 
Calhoun’s economic reasoning illustrates the sectional tone of Southern economic 
thought.  Southerners believed the tariff made them dependent upon either heavily taxed British 
imports or Northern manufactures.  The necessity, forced upon the South by tariffs, of having to 
resort to the latter incensed Calhoun.  Legislation imposing habits of consumption to create 
pecuniary advantages for a specific class of producers reeked of privilege.  “You compel an 
exchange with you by taxing our exchanges with the rest of the world…”27 
 With the theory of nullification Calhoun raised particular principles embedded in free-
trade economics into a full-fledged political doctrine.  In essence, he advocated an ideology that 
synthesized states-rights and laissez-faire.  He interpreted tariff legislation as having grown from 
practical measures to stabilize the revenue and remit government debt into policies that doled out 
privilege to the North and enhanced the authority of national institutions.  The tariff, Calhoun 
lectured Congress, “extracts from the South a large portion of the proceeds of its industry, which 
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bestows upon the other sections, in the shape of bounties to manufactures.”28  Calhoun added to 
his argument principles of classical republicanism.  Excessive duties gave the national 
government revenue to spread patronage and ultimately corrupt the republican character of the 
American polity.  It made no difference that tariff legislation was promulgated by a democratic 
legislature.  According to Calhoun, majority rule was the most dangerous form of all 
governments.  “No government, based on the naked principle, that the majority ought to govern, 
however true the maxim in its proper sense, under proper restrictions, ever preserved its liberty 
even for a single generation.”29  Calhoun’s constitutional reasoning brought him to nullification.  
The reserved rights of the states implied “a veto or control within its limits on the action of the 
General Government, on contested points of authority,” or put simply, the right to nullification.30 
Laissez-faire complimented other important factors in Calhoun’s political philosophy.  
Like Cooper, he challenged the positive state.  “That all governments are actuated by a spirit of 
ambition and avarice, and that there is a universal tendency in consequences to the abuse of 
power, be the form of government what it may, monarchical, aristocratical, or republican, and 
which, if unchecked, must lead to tyranny and oppression, is a truth so well established by 
uniform experience, that it may be considered an axiom in political science.”31  Calhoun’s distrust 
of government extended beyond the conventional republican fears of legislative abuse of power 
and corruption; like Smith he doubted the legislator’s ability to manage the economy.32  Writing 
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in the Southern Quarterly Review, Calhoun cautioned, “In view of the errors to which legislators 
are subject…it appears to us that the benefits that may flow from it are more than 
counterbalanced by the ill consequences that may arise from unadvised attempts to foster an 
unnatural growth, which no care or protection can naturalize.”  However genuinely interested the 
impartial, seasoned legislator might be, the intricate webs of commerce spread throughout and 
beyond the American economy made any attempt at supervision impossible.  “The ramifications 
of trade are so extensive, the circumstances that combine to make any manufacture in this or that 
position, likely to succeed, or the contrary, are so numerous, that it is altogether beyond the grasp 
of human intellect to adjust to nice calculation.”33 
 Calhoun’s thought also reveals the dialectic between a staunch dedication to laissez-faire 
and a commitment to agrarianism.  Southern free traders like Calhoun were part of an earlier 
eighteenth-century trans-Atlantic free-trade tradition grounded in agrarianism.34  Smith had 
decried the harmful social ramifications of industrial labor, and he noted the economic 
efficiencies of agricultural pursuits.35  Accommodating laissez-faire to manufacturing and 
machine-based systems of social production was hardly Smith’s intention.   
 It was not until Ricardo’s defense of manufacturers that an association between free trade 
and industrialization emerged.  Ricardo’s position was owed to historical circumstances then 
evolving in nineteenth-century Britain, much like the Southern commitment to free trade was 
determined by peculiarities in the American condition.  Free trade in Britain was, according to 
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one historian, the product of “vast cultural dimensions.”36  Those credited with synthesizing the 
maxims of Smith, Malthus and Ricardo with the industrial order were not academics, but a mix-
bag of manufacturers and political entrepreneurs.  When industrialists reckoned free trade in 
agriculture would cheapen the cost of British labor and thus make its manufactures less 
expensive, they launched a campaign that elevated laissez-faire to orthodoxy.37  British free-
traders targeted the Corn Laws.  By the early nineteenth century Britain’s growing population and 
increases in domestic grain prices brought the Corn Laws to the fore of domestic politics.  In 
1839 free-trade activists organized the Manchester based Anti-Corn Law League.  The League 
matured into a political machine the likes of which had never before been seen in Britain and 
shortly after its establishment spun off a subsidiary organization popularly known as the 
Manchester School of Economics.  These two groups popularized laissez-faire in British 
intellectual and political culture and brought an air of respectability to the industrial sector.38  The 
campaign against the Corn Laws was provided further impetus by Parliamentarians interested in 
advancing the industrial superiority of Britain, or in the words of Joseph Hume, MP, “render all 
the world tributary to us.”39  When the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846 it signaled a marked 
shift in public opinion over trade policy.40  From this point free trade was increasingly considered 
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the policy most effective at developing Britain’s industrial economy, and has since affixed 
laissez-faire ideology to the industrial order.     
While free trade metamorphosed into a doctrinal instrument of modern industrialism in 
Britain, in the South it was attached to an agrarian regime.  Conversely, the landed aristocracy in 
Britain defended tariffs with arguments against laissez-faire ideology that mirrored almost 
verbatim those employed by antebellum protectionists, the difference being that American 
protectionists championed industrialization.41These differences indicate both the variance 
attendant to ideas in their historical context, as well as the malleability of nineteenth-century 
political economy to serve divergent interests.  Southern free traders borrowed concepts from 
British classicists, but only those that suited their particular regional context.   
 Like Cooper, Calhoun pushed the Southern free-trade movement against industry and 
away from the style and purpose of free trade in the Mancunian tradition.  Calhoun also tied his 
defense of slavery to agrarianism, which the rapidly industrializing North increasingly 
challenged.  At the same time, industry, according to Southern doctrine, also undermined the 
republican experiment by radicalizing the working class and destroying America’s social 
structure.  On the floor of the Senate Calhoun warned of the dangers posed by the twin evils of 
industrialization and urbanization.  “I hold then, that there has never existed a wealthy and 
civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labor 
of the other.”42  Wages would sink below levels of subsistence, until civil strife descended on the 
North, “between the capitalists and operatives for into these classes it must, ultimately, divide 
society.  The issue of the struggle here, must be the same as it has been in Europe.”43  Northern 
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workers were quickly realizing their condition was comparable to, if not worse than the chattel 
slave.  Leveling elements would inevitably seize the private property of all Americans.  These 
fears prompted Calhoun to propose a partnership between conservative ‘gentlemen’ of the North 
and Southern planters.  Southerners would work to silence labor if Northern capitalists helped 
hush abolitionists.   
There was, however, more to Calhoun’s proposed union between Northern capital and 
Southern slaveholders.  Calhoun’s version of laissez-faire was compatible with classical 
republicanism.  He feared most an alliance between capitalists─manufacturers and bankers for 
Calhoun─and the federal government.  As Lacy Ford has pointed out, “Calhoun fought in defense 
of economic liberalism against a potentially reactionary alliance of government and capital.”44  
He dreaded equally the revolutionary inclinations of industrial workers as he did the ability of 
capital, wielding the powerful arm of state, to exploit the working class and subvert the 
republican nature of American government.45 
Calhoun’s Tory-like disparaging of industrialization, couched in a Jeffersonian agrarian 
idealism, represented a prominent strain in the American free-trade tradition.46  It compels 
historians to refigure conventional associations between laissez-faire and industrial capitalism.   
The Southern version of laissez-faire was not, in twenty-first-century parlance, anti-capitalist.  
But it was aimed at perpetuating economic institutions as they existed, resisting the forces of 
economic modernization, and thwarting the North’s desire to catapult America into the industrial 
age.                                                                                     
 In the antebellum economic discourse the champions of free trade provided some of the 
strongest arguments against industrialization.  The relationship between Southern laissez-faire 
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and agrarianism marks a breach between the domestic free-trade movement and British 
classicism.  American freetraders followed an alternative course in the intellectual and historical 
development of laissez-faire political economy as it passed from Smith to Ricardo.  In short, 
laissez-faire in the American discourse broke from the British authorities.     
  In antebellum America there co-existed two forms of laissez-faire ideology that were 
fundamentally incompatible with each other.If the United States did indeed symbolize in practical 
terms the ideal of free-trade economy, the nation did not harbor a singular, synthesized expression 
of free-trade ideology, rather there were multiple articulations.  Neither did America’s free-trade 
political economists conform to the widely recognized theoretical authorities of the trans-Atlantic 
laissez-faire tradition.  The Southerners in particular, existed on an isolated laissez-faire 
intellectual plane.  Although the Southern free traders adopted a more secular methodology, 
something the Northeastern academics were reluctant to do, the Southern version of laissez-faire 
failed to incorporate the values of the Mancunian tradition.  Neither did it emphasize Smithian 
moral philosophy.  The highly politicized nature of Southern thought compelled men like Cooper 
and Calhoun to engage the laissez-faire discourse pursuant of interests and ideas that were 
radically different from all other nineteenth-century free-trade political economists.   
The American free-traders were, in this way, awkwardly arranged.  The Northeastern 
brand was bound to an intellectual tradition that by the early nineteenth-century had largely 
expired.  And the Southerners, prone to resourceful theoretical inventiveness, chartered their own 
laissez-faire course.  Although the origins of both the Northeastern and Southern free-trade 
brands were Smithian neither maintained an absolute commitment to the Scotsman, and they were 
less interested in devoting themselves to the British authorities who succeeded Smith.     
The latter is exhibited in the following chapter.  Antebellum Americans were obstinate in 
their treatment of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo.  Like the Northeastern and Southern 
packaging of Smith, the Americans who reviewed Malthus and Ricardo were not theoretical 
 39 
 
purists; they manipulated, detracted, and essentially rejected the British giants.  The belief in 
American exceptionalism, which almost every antebellum American subscribed to, inhibited 
domestic thinkers from consenting to the sometimes apocalyptic forecasts of Malthus and 
Ricardo.  In consequence, a distinctly American political economy emerged; one that did not 
depend on tradition, nor seek out intellectual precedent.  American free-trade literature discovered 
its own discourse, suited to the American experience and fit for the American mind.                                  
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Chapter IV   
Progress and Poverty: Malthus and Ricardo in America 
 
The flexibility of Adam Smith’s principles facilitated the accommodation of laissez-faire to the 
cultural traditions of both the Northeastern and Southern free-traders.  Thomas Malthus and 
David Ricardo, however, took laissez-faire in a new direction, one that did not easily conform to 
American intellectual traditions.  Most antebellum Americans rejected the pessimism inherent to 
the economic reasoning of Malthus and Ricardo.  Domestic conditions simply denied the dismal 
forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo.  This chapter will review the American treatment of Malthus 
and Ricardo during the antebellum era, with special emphasis given to those who wrote in the 
laissez-faire paradigm.   
 Smith launched political economy into the mainstream of the trans-Atlantic public 
sphere.  In 1805, the first academic post in the world bearing the name of the nascent science was 
established at the East India College in Hertfordshire, England.  The position was awarded to 
Thomas Malthus.  Malthus was born in the 1766 in south England.  At eighteen he enrolled at 
Jesus College, Cambridge for a career in the clergy.  Shortly after graduation, Malthus was 
ordained in the Church of England.  He became something of a celebrity following the 1798 
publication of his Essay on the Principle of Population.1  The work went through six editions 
during Malthus’ lifetime, each with important revisions that reflected contemporary criticisms of 
the book as well as changes in Malthus’ perspective.  He published several other works in 
political economy, but he is largely remembered for his work on population.   
                                                            
1 For an overview of Malthus’s career and writings see Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual 
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 In the Essay, Malthus condemned much of humanity to a life of depravity and 
melancholy.  Providence arranged natural laws without regard to the happiness of humanity, 
Malthus concluded.  The most insensitive and pressing of nature’s dictate was the rapidity with 
which humanity populates the earth and the inability of the food supply to keep pace.“These two 
laws,” Malthus wrote, “ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been 
fixed laws of nature; and, as we have not hitherto seen any alteration in them, we have no right to 
conclude that they will ever cease to be what they are now.”2  Man increases its numbers 
geometrically, but the means of subsistence increase by arithmetical progression, or simple 
addition.  Confronted with this ominous calculation, Malthus penned what has become his most 
famous passage:   
A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence 
from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if society do not want his 
labor, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no 
business to be where he is.  At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for 
him.  She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he do 
not work on the compassion of some of her guests.  If these guests get up and 
make room for him, other intruders immediately appear demanding the same 
favor.  The report of a provision for all that come fills the hall with numerous 
claimants.  The order and harmony of the feast is disturbed, the plenty that before 
reigned is changed into scarcity; and the happiness of the guests is destroyed by 
the spectacle of misery and dependence in every part of the hall, and by the 
clamorous importunity of those who are justly enraged at not finding the 
provisions which they had been taught to expect.  The guests learn too late their 
error, in counteracting those strict orders to all intruders, issued by the great 
mistress of the feast, who, wishing that all guests should have plenty, and 
knowing that she could not provide for unlimited numbers, humanely refused to 
admit fresh comers when her table was already full.3 
  
 Malthus predicted little better for the United States.  In America, where labor was well 
compensated, the masses might avoid immediate suffering, but, he cautioned, “It may be 
expected that in the progress of the population of America, the laborers will in time be much less 
                                                            
2 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798; reprint, Oxford, 1993), pp. 12-13. 
 
3 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (London, 1803), p. 531.  This paragraph was 
omitted from the 1806 edition. 
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liberally rewarded.  The numbers will in this case permanently increase, without a proportional 
increase in the means of subsistence.”4 
 Malthus was widely referenced in the antebellum discourse, but with few exceptions, 
Americans rejected Malthusian population theory.  Malthusian population theory was not, 
however, in the words of one historian, “a side attraction.”5  Antebellum free traders accepted 
Malthus as a central figure in British laissez-faire, but they developed an independent logic based 
on the belief that American conditions existed without historical precedence.6  Antebellum free 
traders integrated a distinctly American understanding of population growth into a wider defense 
of laissez-faire.  In the antebellum discourse, laissez-faire was not rigidly confined to the 
strictures of a single paradigm.  Rather Americans engaged laissez-faire with a sense of 
intellectual autonomy.7  The Americans recognized that some principles of British classicism 
suited the domestic context, while other principles did not.  This was particularly the case in the 
South where Malthusianism was manipulated to vindicate the region’s social, political, and 
economic institutions.8  It was not uncommon, however, for Southerners who were sympathetic to 
Malthusianism to simultaneously reject other tenets of classical doctrine.  The American 
                                                            
4 Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, p. 58.  1798 edition. 
 
5 George Johnson Cady, “The Early American Reaction to the Theory of Malthus,” The Journal of Political 
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pp. 224, 269. 
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“Population Doctrines in the United States, I: Anti-Malthusianism,” The Journal of Political Economy 
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8 Joseph Spengler, “Population Theory in the Ante-Bellum South,” The Journal of Southern History 
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treatment of Malthus was remarkably varied and illustrative of the malleability of laissez-faire in 
the antebellum discourse. 
 Benjamin Franklin’s 1751 "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind and the 
Peopling of Countries" was the first serious attempt made by an American to deal with population 
theory.9  American conditions, Franklin argued, prevented redundant numbers.  Even if the 
population doubled every 25 years, a rate calculated by Franklin and one that proved true until the 
Civil War, there was no need to fear overpopulation.  “Notwithstanding this increase,” Franklin 
wrote, “so vast is the territory of North America, that it will require many ages to settle it 
fully...”10  With a seemingly infinite supply of land, labor would not compete for dwindling 
resources.  Rather wages would be kept high enough to afford a decent standard of living.  “A 
laboring man,” Franklin found, “can in a short time save money enough to purchase a piece of 
new land...whereon he may subsist a family.”11  Rules suitable for Europe, Franklin concluded, 
were inapplicable to America.12  Thus, population studies "formed on observations, made on full-
settled old countries, as Europe," Franklin wrote, "will not suit new countries, as America."13 
  Franklin’s ideology was more pragmatic than dogmatic, and he was hardly a laissez-faire 
type.  Still, Franklin set the tone for antebellum treatment of population theory.  The underlying 
tenet that motivated the breach between the Americans and Malthus was American 
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exceptionalism.  By emphasizing American exceptionalism, the antebellum free traders signaled 
their willingness to pursue an alternative economic narrative.  On some occasions, the belief in 
American exceptionalism led to sacrificing the internal consistency of their logic.  If free-trade 
political economy delineated axioms applicable to all, then historical conditions were immaterial.  
But the Americans acknowledged the potential for some laws, in this case population, to bend 
according to prevailing circumstances.  The natural order could be compromised, and the 
otherwise holistic system of laissez-faire political economy be made to account for the American 
experience.14 
 The belief in American exceptionalism dominated Northern treatment of Malthus.  
Northeastern clergy freetraders rejected Malthus for its apparent skepticism in God’s 
benevolence.15  Protectionists countered Malthus with an explicitly optimistic vision of American 
economic development.16  The protectionist rejection of Malthus was based on several points of 
criticism.  First, protectionists quelled contemporary anxieties by arguing that even if the 
Malthusian trap was possible, overpopulation was not “for centuries to come.”17  Few antebellum 
Americans could find any benefit in restricting domestic population growth.18  Besides, western 
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lands provided a ‘safety-valve’ for redundant labor.  Second, Malthus considered each increase in 
humanity as an addition to the pool of consumers, but he failed to calculate the potential each 
human addition had for increasing production levels.  Population pressures spurned Americans 
toward greater industry, advanced specialization, led to the mechanization of labor, and 
ultimately a more effective cultivation of the soil.  Combined, these developments occasioned 
higher yields and higher wages.19  Population density was not something to fear; rather it was a 
reflection of American progress.  The future promised higher standards of living as production 
gains would outpace population numbers.20  Or, put differently, the accumulation of capital would 
outpace population growth.  Finally, protectionists argued that Malthusian overpopulation was 
evident only in countries with corrupt political and social institutions.21  The European masses 
faced a population crisis because their governments were instruments of the aristocracy.  Reared 
in aristocratic England, Malthus was incapable of imagining the benefits afforded to ordinary 
citizens under a democratic-republican regime.  For protectionists, democratic legislation was the 
cure to all economic evils.22 
Northern optimism on American population growth was carried into the antebellum 
South by J.D.B. De Bow, a central figure in Southern political economy.  Born in Charleston in 
1820, he moved to New Orleans as a young man where in 1846 he established the popular journal 
that carried his name.  Two years later he was appointed professor of commerce and statistics at 
the University of Louisiana (Tulane).  In 1853 De Bow was made head of the United States 
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census.  His three-volume The Industrial Resources, Statistics, &c, of the United States and More 
Particularly of the Southern and Western States published in 1854 was a monumental 
achievement in statistical economics.23 
A Southern nationalist and a staunch supporter of slavery, De Bow’s chief concern was 
advancing the economic interests of the South.  De Bow illustrated how a devotion to regional 
interests combined with a general optimism in antebellum conditions shaped the Southern 
treatment of Malthus.  Although dedicated to laissez-faire principles, his economic philosophy 
maneuvered around the Malthusian trap.  The republican nature of America’s polity cultivated 
particular “habits” that engendered a robust industrious spirit, he believed.  Southerners were 
compensated for their virtuous commercial and industrial character with augmented provisions of 
capital and increased wages.  Thus, labor and capital were afforded a constant improvement in 
their condition.24 
Southern free traders like De Bow broke from the British classical tradition in significant 
ways.  They operated on a fundamentally different understanding of the natural order.  In the 
process they effectively established a radically different paradigm distinguished by a genuinely 
Southern appreciation of economic phenomena.  De Bow’s enthusiasm over the development of 
the Southern economy was couched in a sectional tone.  The natural order, De Bow argued, 
issued laws “just as fixed and unalterable as those that presided over the motions of planetary 
masses, or that regulate chemical affinities.”25  But for the South, nature’s system did not promise 
the dismal circumstance described by Malthus.  Indeed, the natural order, at least as it existed in 
the South, offered charitable bounties.  De Bow discovered an alternative state of nature in the 
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antebellum South.  The laws governing the Southern universe were benign, providing opportunity 
rather than peril.        
This appreciation was grounded in Southern optimism.  Southerners had perfected the 
exploitation of nature.  “Speed the plow” De Bow ordered, “raise the capacity of the earth, say 
we, to satisfy the requisitions of a rapidly augmenting population.”  Southern labor commanded 
nature’s treasures, accumulated a vast reserve of capital, and evaded the population crisis that 
troubled Malthus.  “The innate faculty of our people to subdue the physical world, their energy 
and self-reliance, their habitual disregard of discomfort, difficulties and dangers, have made other 
nations say of us, that we alone could instill heroism in the common pursuits of life.”  De Bow 
touted the industrious spirit of Southerners and celebrated the region’s natural resources.  “Let 
two blades of grass shoot up where but one grew before.  Let one man conduct the previous 
operations of two men.”26  
De Bow’s economic thought captures Southern political economy in many ways.  
Although he rejected the Malthusian paradigm for the South, he saw the North in darker terms.  
De Bow is illustrative, in the words of his biographer, of one “reared in an era when the South 
grew conscious and fearful of its inferior position in the union.”27  Employing Malthusianism as 
an intellectual strategy to defend Southern institutions, he considered the population of the 
industrial North moving inevitably toward redundancy.  “The mining and manufacturing 
operatives of the North...labor there from early dawn until after candle-light, from one year to 
another, for a miserable pittance, scarcely above the starvation point and without hope for 
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amelioration.”28  But in the South, slavery provided a social and economic safety-valve.29  The 
region’s slave-based agrarian economy inhibited the development of industry and thus prevented 
the Malthusian cycle from operating.  Slavery raised wages for Southern white workers, raised 
the status of free labor in the South, and precluded Southern labor from finding “employment in 
crowded cities and…competition in close and sickly workshops and factories, with remorseless 
and untiring machinery.”30 
The peculiar uses of Malthusianism in the South found another clear expression in 
George Tucker.  Tucker was born into a prominent merchant family in Bermuda in 1775.  He 
moved to Virginia to study law under the tutelage of his uncle, St. George Tucker.  He later 
served six years in Congress between 1819 and 1825 and was appointed by Thomas Jefferson to 
professor of moral philosophy at the University of Virginia.31  Tucker died in 1861 just two days 
before the attack on Fort Sumter.  
Like De Bow, Tucker failed to recognize nineteenth-century convention that bound 
Malthus with laissez-faire universalism.  Early in his career, Tucker offered what stood as the 
earliest critique of Malthus, only to have later, in the words of one historian, “out-Malthus 
Malthus.”32  His version of laissez-faire was malleable, driven by a will to defend the South’s 
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peculiar institution.  Tucker’s economic thought is indicative of the Southern tendency to avoid 
theoretical discipline, as well as the inability of American freetraders to formulate a consensus.  
“The laws of population, as laid down by Malthus must be considerably modified,” Tucker wrote, 
for “it is clear, then, that moral causes─probably by producing a slight retardation of 
marriage─constitute the operative check in the United States, and that the extraordinary facility of 
subsistence which exist here, seems to exert no influence.”33  His early criticisms of Malthus 
rested on a belief in a benevolent system of natural liberty.  “Liberty seems to have been 
productive of so much good in whatever it has been fairly tried....that we are encouraged to hope 
it would not occasion a mischievous excess of population.”34  Tucker’s natural economic order 
was markedly different from that described by Malthus.  Large populations stimulated human 
progress through increased specialization, a more effective exploitation of markets, and by 
encouraging literature and the fine arts.  The whiggish tone of Tucker’s thought was combined 
with American exceptionalism.  The young nation existed in unprecedented historical 
circumstances.  “There is seldom a day that the most indigent person among us does not eat 
animal; and it is next to impossible for many to suffer seriously here from the want of 
employment.”35  He attributed these conditions to the prudent character of America’s republican 
citizenry.  Population checks in America operated as subtle, voluntary social forces.  In short, the 
American experiment was atypical.   
 Tucker’s population theory grew more Malthusian as tensions between North and South 
intensified.  Tucker’s optimism was replaced by Malthusian fatalism in a set of correspondences 
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with the well-known Boston protectionist Alexander Everett, a Northern anti-Malthusian.  These 
were published in the late 1840s and widely circulated in Everett’s Democratic Review.  “I have 
read much, and thought much, on the subject,” Tucker wrote, “and have persuaded myself 
that...Malthus’s premises are in the main true...”36  Tucker struck a Malthusian tone with Everett, 
arguing that the natural limitations on fertile land coupled with humanity’s propensity to multiply 
would depress labor to subsistence levels.  With civilization came decay as redundant numbers 
exerted a slow, agonizing effect on the food supply; passing from animal, to vegetable, to grain, 
and eventually potatoes.  “Food cannot go on increasing,” Tucker reasoned.37  Labor would suffer 
disproportionately as provisions dwindled to a quantity barely able to support life.38 
Other Southerners, mainly Thomas Cooper and Thomas Roderick Dew, were more 
consistent in their application of Malthusianism to fit the Southern narrative.  Southern political 
economists, according to Dennis Hodgson, “were attracted to Malthusianism…because it allowed 
them to project a bleak future for the ‘free-labor’ system.”39  As the nation drew closer to Civil 
War Southerners manipulated Malthusian logic and laissez-faire principles to argue the failure of 
free-labor society and bolster the legitimacy of Southern slavery.40  Cooper engaged the latter 
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tactic, as we saw in chapter 3, in writings during the nullification crisis.  On population, Cooper 
warned that man’s “tendency to increase is a law of nature: it may be checked, controlled, 
counteracted: by natural causes, by artificial means; but it can not be stopped.”  Cooper wrote in 
contrast to the prevailing optimism of antebellum culture, “if there be more human beings than 
food to support them, some of them must starve.”41 
In Cooper’s political economy Malthusianism fit neatly into his larger narrative of the 
failure of Northern society and the moral superiority of slavery.  Slavery acted as a positive check 
against overpopulation.42  Northern free society allowed its mud-sills to multiply with wanton 
rapidity, but in the South masters managed slave numbers and, if necessary, restricted their 
generation.  Furthermore, because capital (master) in the South owned its labor, the slaveholder 
was more likely afford slaves a decent subsistence to labor since by doing so he improved his 
own assets.43 
Thomas Roderick Dew developed Southern Malthusianism into a formidable defense 
against state-sponsored regulation of slavery.  Born in 1802 into prominent a Virginian slave-
owning family, by the 1830s Dew was, in words of one biographer, a “Southern touchstone” of 
pro-slavery philosophy.44  In 1827 Dew returned to his alma matter of William and Mary as 
professor of history, metaphysics and political economy.45  He was elected president of the 
college the following year and served in this capacity until his death in 1846.  A free-trade 
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fundamentalist, Dew instructed his students from the Wealth of Nations.  “The South,” one 
historian writes, “sat in his classroom and was told what to think.”46 
 Dew’s population theory advanced an anti-statist, laissez-faire maxim that aimed at 
justifying the Southern slave prerogative.  He employed Malthusian rationale to strike at federal 
and state legislation to regulate slavery.  For Dew, Malthus provided evidence of the authority of 
market outcomes.  The free-trade regime was not only nature’s prescribed economic order, but it 
was also consistent with Southern slave interests.47  The principles of laissez-faire, Dew argued, 
“may truly be compared to the great law of gravity in the material world; powerful in its agency, 
frequently counteracted by other forces, but in consequence of its constancy and steadiness of its 
operation, overcoming every other power in the end.”48The slave population adjusted to a natural 
economic order that was beyond the scope of legislatures, thus statutes designed to check the 
slave population would be countered by natural, market-oriented directives.    
Dew’s understanding of population growth was communicated in his Review of the 
Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832.  He argued against a proposal to collect 
funds intended for purchase of the state’s slaves for future deportation or colonization.  Since, 
according to Dew, “Malthus has clearly shown population depends on the means of subsistence” 
the sluggish pace at which Virginia’s white population increased would grind to halt, as taxes 
diminished the availability of the basic necessities.  State-sponsored purchases of slaves would 
instead augment demand, luring enterprising masters to breed slaves at prodigious rates, thus 
counteracting the purpose of legislation.  “The energies of government,” Dew charged in the 
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Virginia legislature, “are for the most part feeble or impotent” in their attempts to counter the 
inexorable natural economic order.49 
As the Civil War drew closer, Dew and other laissez-faire Southerners increasingly 
adapted Malthusianism to their own ends.  They employed the logic of Malthusian population 
theory to highlight the positive effects slavery had on mitigating redundant numbers.  American 
political economists made more profound adjustments in their treatment of Ricardo.50  By the 
mid-nineteenth century reputable political economists could not write on economic matters 
without discussing Ricardo.  “Ricardo’s influence on economic thought in the United States of 
the nineteenth century,” Joseph Dorfman wrote, “was enormous.”51Dorfman’s assessment glosses 
over the intricacies of the antebellum economic discourse.  Antebellum free-traders treated 
Ricardo in a similar fashion to how they handled Malthus. Southerners balked at accepting the 
totality of Ricardo’s doctrine, while most Northerners were unable to find a practical application 
of Ricardian principles in the American economic environment.  The lack of intellectual 
commitment to Ricardo is further indication that British classicism did not dominate the domestic 
discourse.  By the middle decades of the antebellum period the Americans developed a sense of 
intellectual autonomy from the British authorities, one that encouraged a break from classical 
orthodoxy and the construction of a distinctly native laissez-faire political economy.     
 Ricardo was born in London in 1772.  The third of seventeen children, at fourteen he 
joined his father on the London Stock Exchange.  Shortly thereafter, Ricardo renounced his 
Jewish faith to marry a Quaker.  In the process he was estranged from his family. Ricardo began 
his own brokerage business, made a fortune, and retired at age forty-two to become a country 
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gentlemen in Gloucestershire.  In 1819 he became a member of the House of Commons 
representing Portarlington, Ireland, a seat he held until his death in 1823.  By chance at age 
twenty-seven, Ricardo came across Smith’s Wealth of Nations.  This was his first exposure to the 
subject, and, in his own words, he "liked it so much as to acquire a taste for the study."52 
 Ricardo brought a new level of theoretical abstraction to nineteenth-century economic 
thought and he did more than any other economist to articulate classical orthodoxy.  He wrote on 
a wide range of economic topics, but his theories on distribution─mainly rent, wages and 
profits─distinguished his writings.  In his 1817 Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 
Ricardo defined rent as "that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for 
the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil."53  Rent is paramount to Ricardo’s 
analysis since it determines income distribution.  When population expands greater sums of labor 
are required to cultivate less fertile lands.  As it becomes more difficult to extract food from 
marginal lands the costs of labor, food, and rent increase.  Over time labor competes for a smaller 
real wage and is forced to plow less fertile soils.  “The fate of the laborer will be less happy,” 
Ricardo wrote, “he will receive more money wages, it is true, but his corn wages will be reduced; 
and not only his command of corn, but his general condition will be deteriorated, by his finding it 
more difficult to maintain the market rate of wages above their natural rate,” i.e., the Iron Law of 
Wages.54 
Labor is not the only sector disturbed by increased rents.  Because labor’s compensation 
is determined by a wages-fund, what the manufacturer pays in wages is subtracted from profits.  
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As food costs eat away at profits, manufacturers face declining returns.  “Each man may, and 
probably will, have less absolute quantity; but as more laborers are employed in proportion to the 
whole produce retained by the farmer, the value of a greater proportion of the whole produce will 
be absorbed by wages, and consequently the value of a smaller proportion will be devoted to 
profits.”55  Tensions between rents and profits, combined with Malthusian overpopulation, keep 
labor at subsistence levels and diminish profits for manufacturers.  Capital, Ricardo posited, “will 
diminish with every diminution of profit, and will cease altogether when their profits are so low 
as not to afford them adequate compensation for their trouble,” i.e., the Law of Diminishing 
Returns.56  In the Ricardian system, capitalist and labor and the proprietors of land are at odds, 
precipitating social conflict.  “The interest of the landlord is always opposed to that of the 
consumer and manufacturer.”57  Ricardo’s version of the natural order confined commercial 
society to the same rules that command the behavior of plants and animals.58  Market forces are 
comparable to scientific formulas that are ungovernable, indiscriminate in their application, and 
“rendered permanent by the powers of laws of nature.”59  
 The American treatment of Ricardo was as varied and critical as the antebellum 
discussion on Malthus.  There were a few staunch Ricardians, mainly Thomas Cooper, John 
McVickar, and Francis Wayland, who repeated with slight variations the teachings of the 
Englishman.  Their adherence to Ricardo was not determined by the same type of sectional biases 
that influenced the American reception of Malthus.  Protectionists, on the other hand, flatly 
rejected Ricardo.  Protectionists envisioned a dynamic economy, one quite different from the 
                                                            
55 Ibid.,p. 75. 
 
56 Ibid.,p. 73. 
 
57 Ibid., p. 225 
 
58 Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago, 2005), pp. 113-119, 124, 129-134. 
 
59 Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, p. 75. 
 56 
 
static model presented by Ricardo.  Americans were destined for prosperity, increasing returns, 
and had yet to settle the continent’s most fertile lands.  Neither was America home to a 
monopolist class of landlords, as Ricardo had observed in England.  Moreover, capital, labor, and 
agriculture coexisted in perfect harmony.  Finally, Ricardo’s theory of distribution was a bridge to 
laissez-faire, a logic naturally at odds with protectionist ideology.60 
 The immediacy of industrial development in the North brought upon its free-trade 
political economists a special urgency to review Ricardo’s work.  More than any Northern 
economists Henry Vethake exhibited the sharpest appreciation of the Ricardian system.  Born in 
1790 in British Guyana, Vethake moved to the United States at an early age.  He enjoyed a long 
and illustrious academic career, teaching a variety of subjects and serving in various capacities at 
a number of Northeastern institutions.  These included Columbia, Queen’s College (Rutgers), 
College of New Jersey (Princeton), Dickinson, University of the City of New York (New York 
University), and the University of Pennsylvania.  A well-regarded intellectual in his own time, 
Vethake was awarded honorary degrees from the College of New Jersey and Columbia, edited an 
entire volume of Encyclopedia Americana, and was considered the first professor in America to 
teach students political economy.  He died in 1866 as professor of Mathematics at Philadelphia’s 
Polytechnic College.61 
 Vethake’s 1838 Principles of Political Economy drew heavily from Ricardo.62  But his 
sensibility to American exceptionalism precluded Vethake from accepting the totality of 
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Ricardo’s system.  He was, according to John Turner, “not...limited by the orthodox teaching.”63  
Vethake echoed the underlying optimism that marked domestic intellectual culture.  His optimism 
did not rely solely on a materialistic foundation, however.  Like many of his colleagues teaching 
in the Northeast, Vethake was a devout man.  His belief in a benevolent creator provided the 
spiritual inspiration for his economic optimism.  The economic order, Vethake wrote, was 
governed by an “Author of nature…co-operating” with humanity to ensure that individuals 
enjoyed the greatest amount of happiness possible.64  An unwillingness to admit that God 
rewarded the pious worker and industrious capitalist with economic and social disorder convinced 
Vethake of a more positive economic future.       
 Religion was not the only factor that influenced Vethake’s thought.  His economic 
thought reflected the social and political context of the era.  Vethake’s academic posts in the 
Northeast brought him in proximity to the epicenters of American industrialization.  There he 
discovered, contrary to Ricardo’s England, capital and labor working in harmony, encouraging 
prosperity and social stability rather than poverty and social strife.  The entrepreneurial ethos that 
characterized antebellum culture prevented Vethake from forecasting the class tensions explicit in 
Ricardo’s work.  A Jacksonian Democrat, his ideal was a middle-class society where laissez-faire 
benefitted those of an industrious spirit.  Vethake was drawn to political economy in part because 
the discipline offered practical lessons to improve the condition of labor without having to resort 
to the politician’s “superficial views of expediency.”65  But Vethake also made clear that his 
political economy was not geared toward radicalizing labor.  Contrary to labor militants that 
employed Ricardo’s labor theory of value for revolutionary designs, Vethake’s was geared 
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toward subtle reforms.66  He anticipated an alternative industrial course, one with increasing 
returns to manufactures that had the potential to soften labor’s transition into the industrial age.67 
 Vethake’s liking for moderation is obvious in his treatment of distribution.  His theory of 
distribution was heavily influenced by a belief in American exceptionalism and a Jacksonian 
ideology of equal opportunity industrial capitalism.  Vethake rejected Ricardo’s three-tiered 
economic class structure, for “the same person may unite in himself the characters of landlord, of 
capitalist, and of laborer, or of any two of them.”68  The opportunity for social mobility, and even 
more, the parity of land distribution in the antebellum economy drew Vethake further from 
Ricardo and closer to the traditions of American political economy.69 
  While Vethake adapted Ricardian principles to the burgeoning industrialism of the 
North─and in a context of Yankee piety, the Southern treatment of Ricardo was not as clearly 
tied to the region’s institutional and cultural traditions.  A few radical fire-eaters interpreted 
classical doctrine as evidence of an impending collapse of free-labor society, but the more 
objective, academic economists found little relevance in Ricardo’s writings to conditions in 
America.70  Like most Americans, the Southerners were not categorically committed to the 
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classical paradigm.  Jacob Cardozo illustrates this point.  He provided the South’s most learned 
and critical review of Ricardo.   
 Like Ricardo, Cardozo was of Sephardic Jewish heritage.  He was born in Savannah, 
Georgia in 1786, but he spent most of his life in Charleston.  There he published the free-trade 
organ The Southern Patriot.71He ran the paper until his death in 1873.  As a journalist, according 
to one biographer, he exercised tremendous influence on public opinion and he “reveals Southern 
intellectual thought at its highest level.”72 
Cardozo’s 1826 Notes on Political Economy was written largely in reaction to the 
growing trans-Atlantic Ricardian consensus.73  “We are...convinced that if the principles of this 
theory,” Cardozo wrote of Ricardian orthodoxy, “should be adopted as texts for lectures in our 
Colleges and Universities, it will greatly retard the progress of this important science among 
us.”74  He challenged the two most fundamental precepts of the Ricardian paradigm.  First, 
Cardozo rejected the labor theory of value.  He argued that intellectual conventions and European 
conditions gave the labor theory of value its authority in nineteenth-century political economy.  In 
European societies where land was becoming increasingly less productive, economists overstated 
labor’s importance in wealth creation.  The determinant of value was, according to Cardozo, 
never absolute; rather it was decided by a myriad of factors.75 
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Second, Cardozo attacked Ricardian rent.  He was far more optimistic than the 
Englishman.  “What evidence is there, that skill, science and ingenuity are not, in all stages in the 
progress of society, able to overcome the natural inferiority of the soil which refuses to yield, 
without the co-operation of these powerful human aids, an increase of the means of 
subsistence.”76  Cardozo also attacked Ricardo for integrating into his rent theory a Physiocratic 
bias that exaggerated the importance of land and agriculture.77  “The larger portion of the produce 
of the soil transferred, in the form of rent, in consequence of the social arrangements that have 
taken effect throughout Europe, has given rise to the idea of a net surplus that is peculiar to 
Agriculture.”  This prejudice reflected an implicit social value common to European societies 
where land was monopolized by an aristocratic regime.  “But...where more natural arrangements 
prevail, there is no surplus for rent, in the sense of this term as it is generally understood.”78
 Cardozo’s criticisms of Ricardian rent were expanded to cover more generally the 
methodology by which political economists conducted the science.  He emphasized the role of 
historical circumstances in economic analysis, understood political economy as culturally 
specific, and he rebuked Ricardo’s claims of universality. Cardozo drew on American conditions 
for evidence to disprove Ricardo’s so-called natural economic laws.  He was one of the only free 
traders in the antebellum period to explicitly call for an absolute American divorce from 
European models.  The British authorities, Cardozo discovered, had formulated economic 
principles without considering American conditions.  Cardozo advocated for the construction of a 
distinctly American political economy.  The nascent science, Cardozo wrote, could be more 
properly investigated here than in Europe since American “institutions and laws have done less to 
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derange the natural order of things than where a vicious social organization has resulted either 
from military violence or a selfish policy.”79 
 The political economy of Vethake and Cardozo exemplified the American reception of 
Ricardo.  The Americans were not passive recipients of classical doctrine.  Ricardo was not, 
contrary to the historian Paul Conkin, “domesticated.”  Neither did the Americans attempt, as 
Conkin claims, to “amend and revise” Ricardo’s system “in ways that only illustrated how much 
they remained within the same analytical tradition.”80  The Americans operated on an alternative 
paradigm.  Vethake’s theological doctrine was simply more optimistic than Ricardo, and Cardozo 
initiated his economic analysis from a radically different set of precepts.   
 In the process of refuting Malthus and Ricardo, the Americans forged a new brand of 
laissez-faire, one that paid special consideration to domestic conditions.  The failure to fall in line 
with the Malthusian/Ricardian paradigm does not exclude the antebellum economists from the 
trans-Atlantic free-trade movement.  Rather it illustrates the lack of consensus within that 
movement.81  The tent under which liberal thinkers found shelter was broader and more complex 
than traditionally believed, welcoming a plurality of personalities whose understanding of the 
laissez-faire ideal varied considerably.  In the antebellum discourse it was perfectly acceptable to 
be anti-Malthusian, anti-Ricardian, and yet still be labeled a free trader.  The treatment of Malthus 
and Ricardo in the domestic laissez-faire discourse is also indicative of how many antebellum 
free traders did not take seriously the perils the British economists had linked to industrialization.  
Overpopulation, class warfare, and other dangerous features of free-market industrialization were 
attributed to the aristocratic qualities of British political and social systems.  These dangers were 
neutralized by the exceptionality of American circumstances.   
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 As the following chapter will show, however, the belief in American exceptionalism was 
not shared by all.  The forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo were taken seriously by minority sects.  
These groups rejected contemporary notions of American exceptionalism, rebuked bourgeois 
values, rejected Malthus and Ricardo, and decisively broke from the American versions of 
laissez-faire economics.  Although divide by regional lines, they expressed an affinity of ideas 
that provides a rather intriguing expression of the intellectual course of American economic 
thought.  In the South, George Fitzhugh and George Frederick Holmes struck at Smith, Malthus, 
Ricardo and all that was sacred to free-trade ideology.  In the North, the Jacksonian-era race 
toward industrialization cultivated the philosophical origins of American socialist thought.  
Combined, the Southern reactionaries and Northern laborites formed something of an intellectual 
alliance, encouraging a radically alternative social, political, and economic system, and providing 
antebellum American with its most definitive theoretical challenge to the free-market paradigm.                            
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Chapter V  
The Crisis of Free Society: The Southern and Northern Reactionaries 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century American economic thinkers paid increasing attention to the social 
externalities of industrial capitalism.  In the North, a small but vocal group of labor advocates 
demanded profound alterations to the industrial economy.  They appealed to segments of society 
outside of academia and government, mostly urban workers frustrated by market economies.  The 
Northern laborites exemplified antebellum working-class mentality and they made important 
contributions to an organic, domestic version of early socialist thought.  Langton Byllesby and 
Thomas Skidmore were the foremost representatives of this group.  They found something akin to 
an intellectual alliance with Southern pro-slavery theorists, such as George Fitzhugh and George 
Frederick Holmes, who offered broad denunciations of bourgeois institutions.  The philosophical 
inconsistencies of British classicism, the degradation of labor in industrial society, the callousness 
of market competition, and the emerging class stratification in the North serviced pro-slavery 
attacks on the free-labor regime.  Both the Northern laborites and Southern pro-slavery writers 
struck at the core of classical/free-trade orthodoxy.  
 This chapter examines antebellum economic thinkers who articulated the sharpest rebuke 
of the free-trade model.  The Northern laborites and pro-slavery reactionaries further indicate the 
lack of a laissez-faire consensus in the domestic discourse.  The expansion of industry and the 
political conflict surrounding slavery provoked passionate challenges to the intellectual authority 
of laissez-faire.  As the Civil War approached, the anti-market literature, particularly in the South, 
grew more hostile to social and political institutions associated with laissez-faire.  The Northern 
laborites and pro-slavery reactionaries were not intellectual outliers either; they represented an 
essential element in the American discourse.    
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 The sectional divide in American politics exacerbated the divisions in American political 
economy.  Southerners grew increasingly unreceptive of laissez-faire industrial ideology.  
Southern free-traders expressed latent hostility toward industrialization, but the criticisms by 
Southern free-traders like Calhoun and Cooper were moderate, almost affable censures when 
compared to the militant denunciations of Fitzhugh and Holmes.  The radical pro-slavery authors 
of the 1850s offered the period’s most profound rejection of laissez-faire ideology.  British 
classicism, industrialization, and all attendant bourgeois institutions were condemned for their 
lack of morality and abandoned as a mode of thought and policy.  American industrialization, 
these critics insisted, engendered social, moral, and psychological transformations that Southern 
gentlemen found culturally distasteful, ethically offensive and socially hazardous.  In their pro-
slavery literature, Northern ‘wage slavery’ subjected white operatives to ceaseless drudgery based 
on the exploitation of man by man.  Northern labor subsisted under conditions even worse than 
chattel slaves.  Pro-slavery thinkers dismissed claims of American exceptionalism and argued that 
white American labor would be reduced to paupers.They returned, effectively, to the forecasts of 
Malthus and Ricardo.1 
 To Fitzhugh and Holmes fell the task of articulating pro-slavery ideology in its most 
essential form.  Their writings hardly constituted a well-honed scientific study, but this should not 
discount their significance.  Pro-slavery anti-free-trade thought wielded powerful influence in the 
South. “You, [Henry] Hughes, and I,” Fitzhugh reported to Holmes, “have revolutionized public 
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opinion at the South on the subject of slavery.”2  Their Southern contemporaries took them 
seriously.  “My friends tell me that I lead the Southern mind,” Fitzhugh wrote President James 
Buchanan in 1858.3  Although Fitzhugh was prone to exaggeration, he and Holmes were indeed 
at the fore of pro-slavery philosophy.       
  Fitzhugh was born in 1806 near Brentsville, Virginia.  He received little beyond a 
common education, rarely traveled, and spent much of his time reading from his personal 
collection of books and pamphlets.  Before the Civil War Fitzhugh held minor government posts 
in the Attorney General’s office and during the conflict he worked with the Southern Treasury.  
In the Reconstruction era he served alongside an ex-slave as an associate judge in the Freedmen’s 
Bureau.  He later moved to Kentucky, and then Texas where he died in 1881.  In the pre-war era 
Fitzhugh’s ideas circulated widely in articles written for De Bow’s Review and in his two main 
works published in the 1850s, Sociology for the South and Cannibals All!. 4 
 Fitzhugh’s critique of laissez-faire political economy was the platform from which he 
developed the foundational principles of Southern plantation ideology.  “He stripped away many 
of the contradictions and hesitations and brought those assumptions into the open,” one historian 
wrote, “he took a major step toward the formation of a coherent slaveholders’ world view.”5  
Fitzhugh’s attack on laissez-faire economics offered a sweeping censure of bourgeois society.  He 
provided the theoretical superstructure for the most radical and confrontational elements within 
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the pro-slavery movement.  In the process, Fitzhugh assailed not only the Northern free-trade 
regime, but the entire edifice on which liberal America stood.    
 First, Fitzhugh struck at the liberal assumption of the “Right of Private Judgment,” or the 
right to personal intellectual sovereignty and the right to act on that judgment.  For Fitzhugh, the 
right of private judgment was the glue that held together the liberal ideological matrix.6  He 
blamed the “enthusiastic speculative philosopher” Thomas Jefferson for disseminating values that 
were both socially and morally dangerous.  There were natural and universal rights, Fitzhugh 
argued, chief among these was the right “to be taken care of and protected, to have guardians, 
trustees, husbands, or masters; in other words, they have a natural and inalienable right to be 
slaves.”7  He mocked personal sovereignty and self-reliance as impractical ideals.  Indeed, 
Fitzhugh estimated that nineteen out of twenty individuals were incapable of self-care.  The one 
in twenty was fitted for authority, the others for slavery.  “The weak in mind or body require 
guidance, support and protection,” and it is the obligation of society’s leaders to afford them 
protection.8  The protection of the weak was for Fitzhugh what constituted the sacred moral tenet 
in conservative government.  “Instead of relaxing more and more the bounds that bind man to 
man, you must screw them up more closely,” Fitzhugh demanded, “that, instead of no 
government, you must have more government.”9 
The significance of Fitzhugh in the antebellum economic discourse lies in the extent to 
which he inverted the logic of laissez-faire ideology.  He carried the rudimentary axioms of 
laissez-faire to their logical conclusion, illustrated their theoretical inconsistencies, and 
accomplished what he considered was the overthrow of the entire system of free-trade political 
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economy.  Although Fitzhugh dubbed Smith “absent, secluded, and unobservant,” he did share 
with the Scotsman deep skepticism in the human intellect.10  While Smith’s reservations were 
buried in his moral philosophy and generally raised only in discussions on mercantilist policy-
makers, Fitzhugh gave explicit and exaggerated expressions of skepticism that went beyond 
heads of state to ordinary individuals.  Ministers and monarchs were badly mistaken in their 
understanding of the economy, but so too, Fitzhugh argued, were the hewers of wood and drawers 
of water.  The common man was incapable of rationally calculating an enlightened self-interest.  
“Nature has made them slaves,” Fitzhugh wrote, “to protect men, not merely from wrong and 
injustice from others, but from the consequences of their own vices, imprudence and 
improvidence.”11 
Showcasing the internal inconsistencies of laissez-faire ideology was one of Fitzhugh’s 
main pursuits, but he also took special pride in supplying a litany of inflammatory moral 
declamations on the socially abusive features of free-market society.  In the decade preceding the 
Civil War, he participated in an increasingly aggressive campaign against the free-labor system.  
Slavery advocates argued that the Northern industrial regime was morally bankrupt.  Fitzhugh’s 
target was again Smith.  The Wealth of Nations, which Fitzhugh judged the most influential book 
since the Bible, substituted for Christian piety a struggle for survival where the cunning exploit 
the obtuse.  “A beautiful system of ethics this,” Fitzhugh noted sarcastically, “that places all 
mankind in antagonistic positions, and puts all society at war.”12  The danger of Smith’s 
teachings, according to Fitzhugh, is its recommendations for both an economic and moral system.  
“The morality...is one of simple and unadulterated selfishness,” Fitzhugh complained.  “The 
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public good, the welfare of society, the prosperity of one's neighbors, is, according to them, best 
promoted by each man's looking solely to the advancement of his own pecuniary interests.”13 
Fitzhugh’s writings helped introduce in the antebellum discourse sociological and 
psychological approaches to understanding the transformations wrought by industrial capitalism.  
His Sociology for the South was the first American treatise having in its title the term ‘sociology.’  
The subtle, underlying cultural factors that constituted the relations between industrial capital and 
labor elicited Fitzhugh’s attention.  His description of labor’s condition in some ways anticipated 
Marx and it drew strong parallels to antebellum Northern labor literature.14  Labor’s woes 
evidenced the debased moral character of free-market regimes.  Fitzhugh found industrial labor in 
a miserable state, locked in satanic mills toiling without end, living hand to mouth, and 
susceptible to the abuses of capital.  “We do not know whether free laborers ever sleep.  They are 
fools to do so; for, whilst they sleep, the wily and watchful capitalist is devising means to ensnare 
and exploit them.”  Capital stalks labor, into “every recess of domestic life, infects its food, its 
clothing, its drink, its very atmosphere, and pursues the hireling, from the hovel to the poor-
house, the prison and the grave.  Do what he will, go where he will, capital pursues and 
persecutes him.”15  Capital’s exploitation of labor is driven by greed, is methodical, organized, 
and efficient, with booty taking the shape of profits won from a “moral Cannibalism” that free 
society celebrated as the gentleman’s reward.   
In the antebellum economic literature Fitzhugh was the most unequivocal in rejecting 
free-market society as an economic model for the South.  Writing in the 1850s, Fitzhugh and 
most of the Southern intelligencia looked to European rebellions of the 1840s as the North’s 
                                                            
13 Ibid., p. 20. 
 
14 Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, pp. 168, 184-190; John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, 
and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, Volume I: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850 (Cambridge, 
1995), pp. 230, 232.  
 
15 Fitzhugh, Cannibals All!, pp. 202-203, 18, 16. 
 69 
 
future.  Free labor, Fitzhugh wrote, is growing more cognizant of “their own numbers and 
strength,” so that “all the reasoning in the world will not satisfy them that they who produce every 
thing should starve, in order that a handful of lords and capitalists should live in wanton waste 
and idle luxury.”16  Although equality and liberty were promised to bring unprecedented benefit 
to the masses, it was precisely this segment of society that suffered under free-market regimes.  
“The little experiment of universal liberty that has been tried for a little while in a little corner of 
Europe, has resulted in disastrous and appalling failure.”17 
As the Civil War approached, radical Southerners like Fitzhugh amplified their warnings 
of social revolution in the industrialized world.  The specter of labor insurrection helped buttress 
Southern claims that slavery was the most effective form of social organization.  In Britain, free 
markets drove wages to subsistence levels.  In Ireland, John Bull starved Irish peasants.  In 
France, the people enjoyed liberté, égalité, fraternité, but lacked bread.  And in the American 
North, labor was without a “home of his own; he is insecure of employment; sickness may 
overtake him at any time and deprive him of the means of support; old age is certain to overtake 
him, if he lives, and generally finds him without the means of subsistence; his family is probably 
increasing in numbers, and is helpless and burdensome to him.”18  Liberty and equality, what 
Fitzhugh called “new things under the sun,” had given license to the rich to oppress the poor.19 
Fitzhugh’s critique of industrialization drew the Southerner into an awkward intellectual 
alliance with trans-Atlantic socialism.  “We, too, are a Socialist,” Fitzhugh declared.20  The 
affinity Fitzhugh and other pro-slavery writers of the 1850s entertained for socialism is one of the 
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peculiar features of antebellum economic thought.21  Fitzhugh, Marx and other socialists 
expressed sharp opposition to industrial capitalism at almost exactly the same time.  The lines 
separating European and domestic socialists from conservative reactionaries in the plantation 
South often blurred.  Fitzhugh’s Tory-like disparagement of laissez-faire was influenced more by 
Carlyle than Marx, but it indicated the extent to which the pro-slavery theorist was willing to 
stretch his logic to defend Southern institutions, as well as the intellectual elasticity of the 
antebellum conservative-reactionary mind.  Fitzhugh’s attraction to socialism was, however, 
mainly for rhetorical purposes.  “I never read a socialist author treating his subject 
philosophically in my life,” he wrote in 1855.22  Social unrest, precisely the type advocated by 
socialists, was for Fitzhugh and other like-minded pro-slavery agitators a perilous evil.  He was 
after all an agent of the planter elite who read with horror reports on the European revolutions of 
the 1840s.23 
Fitzhugh penned most of his writings after the uprisings of 1848.  Part of his defense of 
slavery rested on its ability to cultivate harmonious relations between masters and slaves.  The 
“benign and protective institution” promoted a mutuality of interest between labor and capital.  
Slavery “begets domestic affection on the one side, and loyalty and respect on the other.”24  Only 
under slavery were the masses, blacks and whites, guaranteed security and happiness.  The 
institution sheltered labor in sickness, and in infancy and old age.  Slavery provided a caring, 
paternal master compelled by moral and social norms to protect the weak and poor.  “We tell 
those who ask for or require protection and support that ‘they must submit to be controlled, for 
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that price of security has ever been, and will be, the loss of liberty.”25  The master will defend his 
slave, Fitzhugh wrote, as he would any of his personal possessions. “A man loves not only his 
horses and his cattle, which are useful to him, but he loves his dog, which is of no use.  He loves 
them because they are his.”  Such was the omnipotent design of Providence, Fitzhugh discovered, 
to make “the selfishness of man’s nature the protecting aegis to shield and defend wife and child, 
slaves and even dumb animals.”26 
In the antebellum economic discourse Fitzhugh’s writings encapsulated the philosophy of 
the American planter reactionary.  He took pro-slavery ideology to its furthest conclusions.  The 
pro-slavery voice grew more belligerent as the period came to a close.  Driven by political 
pressures, Southerners like Fitzhugh employed an increasingly boisterous tone in their attacks on 
laissez-faire ideology.  By 1860 the rift between North and South was as palpable in the period’s 
economic discourse as it was in politics.  Fitzhugh’s attacks on industrial capitalism rattled 
American bourgeois culture and the aggressive character of his writings presumably helped field 
an army in defense of planter institutions.   
In the post-war period Fitzhugh wrote articles for De Bow’s Review, predicting the spread 
of “Yankee isms” in the North.  “We have little hope for the future,” Fitzhugh lamented, “the 
American Republic is near its end.”  The nation’s only hope rested in a “conservative 
reaction....effected by the untrammeled aid of the South.”27  Although a radical voice in the eyes 
of twenty-first-century historians, Fitzhugh was not an outlier.  In the 1850s scores of pro-slavery 
‘fire-eaters’ challenged the emerging industrial-capitalist regime.28  The most systematic and 
learned analysis of this group came from George Frederick Holmes.   
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Holmes was born in 1820 in British Guiana and educated in England before arriving in 
America at age eighteen.  At age twenty-eight he ascended to the presidency of the University of 
Mississippi.  He was by then widely recognized as an authority in social and political thought.  
His time at Mississippi was brief, however.  Much of the remainder of his career was spent at the 
University of Virginia where he taught for 40 years until his death in 1897.29 
In countless articles published in the South’s most influential journals, Holmes presented 
the most mature Southern refutation of laissez-faire in the antebellum discourse.  Holmes’ 
criticisms were more profound than Fitzhugh’s.  He was not, however, as Eugene Genovese 
called him, “an overrated pedant.”30  The methodical and tempered nature of his writings helped 
communicate analyses of Northern bourgeois society in scholarly assessments.  This imbued 
Holmes’ writings with an element of objectivity that was missing from the propagandist style of 
other Southern fire-eaters like Fitzhugh.  Holmes stood closer to the planter-cavalier model than 
any other Southern thinker.  He desired a social order absent of market values and he rejected 
unequivocally the fundamental principles of free-market industrial capitalism.                       
Holmes’ critique of bourgeois ideology assumed several forms.  He was especially 
interested in the social developments attendant to the emergence of large-scale industry.  But 
Holmes also paid special notice to the development of laissez-faire as an intellectual movement.  
Free-trade political economy, Holmes argued, lacked the basic standards by which methodical 
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inquiry is customarily handled and could therefore make no claims to scientific objectivity.  Even 
the most central concepts─capital, labor, and value─lacked precise definition.  “The obscurity 
and fluctuation of their terms arise from the previous want of lucidity in their conceptions, and 
they generate in the progress of speculation further obscurities and fluctuations, and very 
frequently fallacies which are neither discerned nor suspected.”  Holmes contended that political 
economy could not reach definitive conclusions, “the house is built upon sand,” he declared.31 
Challenging the theoretical basis of laissez-faire was a technique that pro-slavery writers 
used to undermine the Northern free-labor regime.  Free-trade ideology, according to Holmes, 
was symbolic of the degenerated nineteenth-century liberal mind.  Like most antebellum 
Southerners Holmes was suspicious of liberal intellectual culture.  The South grew less and less 
tolerable of Enlightenment ideas.32  This anti-intellectual disposition resonated in Southern 
economic thought.  “We are, indeed,” Holmes declared in the Southern Quarterly Review, “no 
great believers in ‘the march of the intellect,’ in the nineteenth century.”33Laissez-faire political 
economy was the most conspicuous and harmful philosophical fiasco of the era, Holmes insisted.  
Indeed, Smith, Ricardo and Malthus were little more than charlatans clothed in learned dress, 
servants to the prevailing industrial order.  Their treatises gave a false air of theoretical prestige to 
“the Gospel according to Mammon,” helping legitimize the impetuous desires of humanity by 
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inventing an ideology marked by “the immediate gratification of the most important 
number─Number One.”34 
Holmes also launched antebellum America’s most systematic critique of the 
psychological consequences of free-markets.  His writings indicate that the differences between 
the North and South in antebellum America were as much cultural and they were economic.  In 
free-market societies, “individual life is swallowed up in....business avocations:─the lust of gold 
is the main-spring of....actions.”35  The human spirit was transformed, according to Holmes, its 
mental faculties reconstructed as monetary scales.  Moral conventions were determined not by 
tradition or ethic, but the ability to satisfy pecuniary wants.  When material gain becomes the 
governing spirit of human existence, Holmes wrote, society “rapidly degenerates into a curse.”36  
The moral and spiritual necessities of the human race were disregarded, “ideas of obligation and 
duty have given place to gain and expediency:─immutable right and unchangeable wrong are 
measured and tested by the surplus or deficit of their aggregate money returns.”  Cast in the all-
engrossing chase for wealth, the individual has “overlooked everything else.”37 
Like many pro-slavery critics of industrial society, Holmes appealed to Northern workers 
in his writings.  Holmes highlighted the exploitative tendencies of industrial capitalism, 
strengthening the intellectual bond between socialists and the conservative planter elite.  
Although his analysis of free labor was geared toward elevating the moral position of slavery, 
unlike Fitzhugh, Holmes harbored a sincere affinity for socialist programs.  “The first grand aim 
then of social amelioration,” he wrote, “should be to establish a more thorough and equal 
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distribution of the means of sustaining life─of productions─by a natural, healthful, and orderly 
modification of the laws of property.”38  His interpretation of the historical development of labor 
was consistent with socialist thought.  The transition from slave to feudal to free labor was 
initiated once capitalists realized the latter optimized profit.  “The more it has been released from 
legal restrictions or deprived of legal protection,” Holmes wrote of labor, “the worse has become 
the condition of the laborer, the more precarious his support, and the more stringent and crushing 
the pressure of the circumstances─that ever burning circle of fire─by which he is surrounded.”  
The emancipation of serf and slave was prompted not by a pious, enlightened heart, but from 
capital recognizing new opportunities to exploit labor with scarcely any attendant responsibilities.  
“The principle which occasioned the substitution of free for slave labor was the prospect of 
diminished expenditure and increased gain...Look into their declamations, contemplate their 
tactics, survey the whole literature of political economy, and it will be manifest that the real 
argument is simply that free labor is cheaper and more productive or profitable than slave 
labor.”39 
For Holmes, industrial capitalism was incompatible with conservative Southern culture.  
Even so the social and moral cannibalism inherent to industrial regimes undermined the interests 
of humanity.  Southern reactionaries imagined themselves global crusaders charged with rescuing 
humanity from the perils of industrial capitalism.  “It is to be feared that capital is applied most 
diligently to the procurement of a cheaper substitute for human labor, and to its exclusion.  The 
steam man is the competitor of the human man.”40  The freemarket employs the wonders of 
science and technology toward the manipulation of the masses.  Laissez-faire political economy 
turned human exploitation into a technical science, soliciting the most efficient methods to profit 
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at the expense of others.  Echoing Malthusian pessimism, he prophesized if the industrial machine 
continued its then current pace, it will “reach speedily the limit when the masses, not of one 
country, but of the whole commercial world will be pauperized, and unable to keep up with the 
production…and enfeebled by disease so as to be unable to supply the physical force required for 
the creation of the raw material.”41 
Holmes’ critique of capitalist exploitation serviced pro-slavery claims that the North 
marched inevitably toward social revolution.  Calhoun’s prediction of worker unrest discussed in 
chapter 3 was a persistent line of argument employed by radical Southerners against free labor, 
and as the nation drew closer to Civil War, pro-slavery thinkers highlighted contemporary 
incidents of worker strife in the North and abroad.  “The different classes are arrayed against each 
other,” Holmes warned, “the rich dread and scorn the power of the masses…The multitudes envy, 
hate, and menace the wealth:─they threaten agrarianism or the less sweeping remedies of 
violence and fraud:─for they feel that inherent discrepancy has grown into bitter hostility and 
inexplicable wrong.”42  Slavery was the obvious alternative.  Nineteenth-century reports on the 
condition of free labor illustrated that the Southern slave was far better off than the factory 
operative.  Holmes voiced the Southern maxim that slavery was a positive good; chiefly because 
the institution accomplished what no other economic system could.  It brought the interests of 
capital and labor together.43 
Pro-slavery reactionaries like Holmes and Fitzhugh engaged the free-market discourse to 
defend slavery, but they also took the opportunity to launch broader criticisms of political 
liberalism.  In the antebellum literature lengthy expositions on political theory often accompanied 
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economic inquiries.  This was especially the case in the radical pro-slavery writings where 
political economy was part of a multi-layered attack on Northern institutions.  Holmes and much 
of the conservative planter elite expressed deep hostility toward liberal political ideology.  In the 
mind of the Southern reactionary, laissez-faire political economy and the doctrine of political 
individualism were intellectual siblings.  “But the cry of the capitalists for the Laissez faire 
system,” Holmes wrote, “in order that their acquisition of gains might be unrestricted, has led to 
the supposition that the entire absence of political restraints was the Utopia of political 
organization, and the surest evidence of Democratic principles.”44  The tendency of nineteenth-
century theorists to unite into a single movement economic and political liberalism threatened 
social stability.  Laissez-faire economics, Holmes argued, finds some truth “within the narrow 
range of their legitimate application; but when we see it wrenched from its just employment, as 
an explanation of the increase of wealth, into a cannon for the government of nations,” it 
engendered social catastrophe.45 
By the 1850s radical pro-slavery authors were denouncing everything associated with 
Yankee culture.  Like Fitzhugh, Holmes elaborated what other opponents of the liberal creed had 
only hinted at.  “There is one great delusion of political economy, not as a science, but as a 
practical rule, that it conceives the world will steadily pursue what is best, not what seems best.”46  
For Holmes, laissez-faire and the doctrine of individual sovereignty left society open to chance.  
He also expressed radically anti-liberal views on private property.  In this regard, Holmes 
illustrated the extent to which reactionary Southern economic thought was divorced from 
American liberal traditions.  “The wants of society,” Holmes wrote, “have outgrown received 
formulas; that the existing elements of social organization have in consequence been thrown into 
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fatal anarchy and discord.”47  The social transformations wrought by political individualism and 
industrial capitalism required that nineteenth-century intellectuals rethink their most fundamental 
assumptions on the moral responsibilities of property ownership.  Property was not sacred, 
Holmes concluded.  “In all ages, the forms in which it [property] must be confined, have been a 
legitimate subject of legislative and constitutional enactment.”48 
    The economic writings of Holmes indicate that laissez-faire was not the dominant 
paradigm of the antebellum period.  Holmes was not an anomaly in an otherwise laissez-faire 
American economic discourse either.  Antebellum economic thought was inclusive of a wide 
range of conflicting ideological platforms.  These differences were amplified as the nation came 
closer to the Civil War.  This is not to say that the political economy of radicals like Holmes and 
Fitzhugh was compelled into existence by political imperatives.  The radical pro-slavery literature 
contains ideas central to American conservative thought that predate the 1850s.49 
The Civil War destroyed Holmes’ vision of America.  He interpreted the conflict as a 
“crusade of anarchy, corruption, and agrarianism.”50  Holmes predicted the North was headed 
toward a military dictatorship.  At Lincoln’s death he forecast that the internal contradictions of 
Northern society would unleash “all the furies of agrarianism and anarchy.”51  After the war 
Holmes took the oath of amnesty and returned to teaching and writing at the University of 
Virginia.  His obituary in the American Historical Review noted the professor had “published 
little, but was of note as a teacher.”52  Despite Holmes’ contributions to the social sciences after 
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the Civil War the anti-market thrust of his writings vanished during the Gilded Age and he was 
only recently rescued from historical oblivion.53 
Holmes, Fitzhugh and the other radical pro-slavery writers who abhorred the doctrines of 
classical political economy represented important facets of the antebellum economic mind.  “The 
reactionary enlightenment” of radical pro-slavery ideology was, as Louis Hartz wrote, “the great 
imaginative moment in American political thought.”  The ideology was not however, rejected or 
neglected as Hartz argues.54  Rather it was defeated by the superior numbers and resources of the 
North.  And contrary to liberal consensus historiography, the radical pro-slavery writers were not 
aliens in an otherwise free-market intellectual environment.  The North had its own cohort of 
critics that issued sharp rebukes of laissez-faire doctrine.  Although the Northern radicals were 
often times abolitionists and prescribed reforms that were quite different from the pro-slavery 
authors, the two groups shared an explicit desire to reconstruct America along pre-market values.  
The Northern anti-market thinkers, like the Southern pro-slavery radicals, contributed important 
conceptual tools that challenged the fundamental principles of laissez-faire ideology.   
 The postponement of an American edition of Marx’s Communist Manifesto until 1871 
did not prevent circulation of socialist literature in America.  European labor radicals that 
migrated to the United States after the revolutions of 1848 found in the industrial North a 
burgeoning working-class movement.  In the 1820s trade and craft associations organized two 
separate Working Men’s Party, one in Philadelphia and the other in New York.  The leadership 
consisted mainly of independent journeymen, but the party rank and file included artisans from a 
variety of industries, as well as dock workers, wage laborers, and even small merchants.  They 
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sponsored public education reform, the 10-hour day, the abolition of imprisonment for debt and 
the end of prison labor.55  
 Labor reformers in the 1820s and 1830s focused a great deal of energy on land reform.  
Increasing rents and the concentration of land ownership that were central components to 
Ricardo’s analysis attracted American labor to land redistribution schemes.  The early American 
agrarian movement worked largely in unison with the labor movement and often shared the same 
leadership.  But the agrarians tended to advance reforms sympathetic to free-market ideology.  
Their chief accomplishment, the Homestead Act of 1862, was considered by advocates a 
fulfillment of the principles of 1776 and in the mode of a Jeffersonian middle-class ideology.56 
 Labor-intellectuals from the agrarian movement injected ideas into the debate that were 
entirely incompatible with bourgeois institutions.57  Chief among these was Langton Byllesby.  
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Born in Philadelphia in 1789 Byllesby was just an infant when his parents died of cholera.58  He 
served as an editor for a local newspaper in Western Pennsylvania before moving his family to 
New York City.  There Byllesby worked as a journeyman proofreader for Harper Brothers.  In 
1826 Byllesby wrote Observations on the Sources and Effects of Unequal Wealth.  The work, 
according to one historian, was “the first angry American economic treatise,” initiating “a 
tradition of class-conscious economic advocacy by those who identified themselves with an 
American working class.”59 
 Byllesby assumed the task of articulating the concerns of the disaffected journeyman 
mechanic.  His political economy gave voice to a burgeoning working-class ideology.  He did 
not, as some historians have claimed, advocate a moderate strain of agrarianism.60  Land 
redistribution was part of his program, but it was ancillary to a comprehensive reorganization of 
the urban, industrial economy.  Byllesby’s economic thought was set in an alternative paradigm 
from the classical model.  Indeed, he sought the complete overthrow of the market economy, or in 
his words, “revision of the present system of the arts of life; and distribution of the products of 
labor.”61 
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 Byllesby’s work is as much a critique of industrial capitalism as it is a systematic inquiry 
in political economy.  He was, however, familiar enough with the nineteenth-century economic 
discourse to structure his criticisms of laissez-faire on the very principles that serviced classical 
doctrine.  He began his analysis with reaffirmations of the Ricardian labor theory of value.  
“Labor alone is the source of all wealth,” Byllesby declared.62  But in the current free-market 
system “the products of labor belong to almost any other than the producer, who generally obtains 
from the application of his power no more than a bare subsistence.”63  The sequestering of labor’s 
wealth into the hands of a parasitic few forced the American worker into a condition comparable 
to the chattel slave.  Moreover, it cemented the class stratification that marked America’s 
industrial quarters.               
Byllesby was one of the first Americans to attribute class hostilities to free markets.  He 
anticipated Fitzhugh and Holmes by more than two decades.  Byllesby emphasized the role of 
four free-market institutions that in his view were responsible for aggravating class relations and 
precipitating inequities in the distribution of wealth.  He struck first at the banking industry.  
Byllesby anticipated Jackson’s war on banks by declaring financial institutions the main culprits 
in effecting economic inequality.  Financiers perpetuated an assembly of frauds on the working 
class.  The moneyed interests combined with middle-men and merchants, or those engaged in 
what Byllesby called “trafficking,” forcing labor to exchange its products for a fraction of their 
worth.64  Commerce, or the various stages separating labor from consumers was tantamount to 
theft since it failed to compensate workers with wages equal to the labor spent in the production 
process.  Byllesby also challenged the ethical propriety of profits.  All profit, he declared, was a 
morally depraved value exploited from labor.  Finally, Byllesby predicted that machinery would 
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hasten unemployment crises, reduce wages, weaken consumer purchasing power, and initiate 
general gluts.  Thus, according to one historian, Byllesby was one of the first American political 
economists to investigate the effects of technology on unemployment and the distribution of 
wealth.65 
The reforms suggested by Byllesby would have abolished the market system.  His plan 
for an “Association for Securing Equal (or Mutual) Advantages (or Interests)” designed a 
program of “equalization.”66  This included the organization of society into industrial 
communities in the form of joint-stock corporations.  These labor associations harnessed the 
productive powers of industry, secured high employment, provided just reward for labor, and 
eliminated poverty.  Labor should, Byllesby figured, when combined with industrial machinery, 
find four to five hours a day sufficient for the production of subsistence.  Under the new regime 
trade would be based rightfully on the principle of reciprocity, all would have equal entitlement to 
the land, inheritance abolished, and interest prohibited.     
Byllesby’s economic system was not, as Joseph Dorfman has suggested, designed to 
defend the laissez-faire ideal.  Neither was Byllesby simply protesting “against privilege and 
invidiousness.”67Dorfman’s liberal/consensus reading of Byllesby─that the laborite incorporated 
“business promotion with socialist rhetoric” is based on the latter’s spoof on the opponents of 
patents.68Dorfman’s assessment failed to recognize the seriousness of Byllesby’s proposals.  
Neither does Dorfman provide adequate explanation for how the revolutionary reforms suggested 
by Byllesby could be reconciled with the free-market antebellum economic order. 
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Like the Southern reactionaries, Byllesby’s political economy was antithetical to the 
laissez-faire model.  Unlike the Southern reactionaries, however, Byllesby was committed to a 
socialist agenda.  He admitted an intellectual debt to the British neo-Ricardian/Ricardian 
Socialists, in particular the Scottish economist John Gray.  The neo-Ricardians/Ricardian 
Socialists extrapolated principles from Ricardian political economy, mainly the labor theory of 
value, to undermine the logic of classical doctrine.  The neo-Ricardians/Ricardian Socialists 
argued that since the value of commodities equaled the quantity of labor embodied in them, yet 
capitalists apportioned the lion’s share of income through interest, rent, and profits, then labor’s 
compensation was unjustly appropriated.  Their ideas were developed during the first-half of the 
nineteenth century and eventually found a more acute exposition in the works of Marx.69After 
having read Gray, Byllesby found a clear “similarity of ideas” and rushed to include protracted 
quotations from Gray’s Lecture on Human Happiness (1826) in his own Observations.70 
Byllesby’s work must be treated beyond the context of the Jacksonian war on monopoly 
and banks.  Antebellum economists were deeply engaged in the trans-Atlantic discourse and often 
exchanged ideas with European thinkers.  Byllesby’s work is indicative of an antebellum 
working-class ideology growing increasingly hostile to free-markets.  As one historian has noted, 
“with Byllesby...we witness the acceleration of a fundamental shift in language and 
sentiment...toward a recognition that a deeper matrix of exploitation and unequal exchange for 
labor was responsible for the plight of the mass...”71 
The socialist impulse behind Byllesby’s thought also appeared in Thomas Skidmore’s 
work.  Son of Connecticut farmer, Skidmore spent his early adult years searching for work in the 
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Northeast.  In 1819 he settled in New York City, educated himself with the works of Jefferson, 
Locke and Rousseau, and became active in local politics.  Journalist, teacher, printer, carpenter, 
and listed as a “machinist” in the catalogues of New York’s Working Men’s Party, the otherwise 
obscure craftsman had by 1830 became the intellectual head of the antebellum labor movement.  
He died in 1832 of cholera at age forty-two.   
Skidmore articulated the most mature expression of working-class antagonisms toward 
laissez-faire ideology.72  His criticisms were as incendiary as Fitzhugh’s.  In his 1829 The Rights 
of Man to Property! Skidmore proposed radical transformations to the antebellum economy.  He 
scoffed at the notion of private property, attacked the foundational principles of classical doctrine, 
and aimed to reconstitute society along pre-bourgeois capitalist lines.  Skidmore intended, in his 
own words, to “entirely remodel the political structure of our state, and make it essentially 
different from anything else.”73 
Skidmore’s criticisms of free-market institutions were developed into an economic 
doctrine entirely at odds with laissez-faire ideology.  He advanced what he described as a 
political economy pursuant of rational ends, taking basic though radical economic assumptions to 
their furthest logical conclusions.  According to one historian, Skidmore contributed to 
“something of a theoretical breakthrough” for antebellum working-class ideology.74  His first 
target was the labor theory of value.  Although labor adds value to property, it does not imply 
property rights.  “Why will not labor bestowed upon property in possession give title: Because the 
property itself, is another’s, and before any labor can be honestly bestowed upon it, that other, 
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who alone owns its, must give his consent.”75  From this premise, Skidmore demanded the 
abolition of private property.  All men have equal claim to the earth’s resources.  “The soil,” 
Skidmore declared, “belongs....equally....to all who are found upon it.”76  Only through the 
community’s consent can property rights exist.  Property rights are not sacred.  Rather they are 
entirely conventional.  Moreover, the accumulation of property by one should never inhibit 
another’s claim to subsistence, for this entailed a violation of the most basic human right.  The 
latter incensed Skidmore and other laborites of the Jacksonian era.  Under bourgeois property 
rights, he wrote, “a part, and that a very large part, of the human race, are doomed, of right, to the 
slavery of toil, while others are born only to enjoy.”77 
The transformative effects of Skidmore’s program separated his economic ideology from 
other laborites.  Skidmore called for immediate working-class revolution.  “Is it not time for the 
people,” Skidmore asked, “those who have rights as well as the rich, to interpose on their 
behalf?”  His measures were directed explicitly at the rich.  “Let us look then upon the rich man, 
as he has been, or as he now is, among us, rather as a curse, than as a blessing, rather as a 
something, himself, which it is proper to exterminate…Nor let the word exterminate, be thought a 
harsh one.  Both rich and poor ought to be exterminated: the latter by being made what we call 
rich; and the former by being brought to the common level.”78  The urgency of Skidmore’s 
political economy was precisely the type of extremism that Southern reactionaries feared and led 
them to infer the failure of free society.  To “unclench the hand of avarice, and make it give up its 
dishonest possessions,” Skidmore urged a radical reconfiguration of the antebellum economy.79  
                                                            
75 Skidmore, The Rights of Man to Property!, p. 37. 
 
76 Ibid., p. 136. 
 
77 Ibid., p. 4. 
 
78 Ibid., pp. 246-247. 
 
79 Ibid., pp. 228, 346. 
 87 
 
The first practical step in Skidmore’s project was the abolition of inheritance.  An 
individual’s lease on property ended with death.  Just as succeeding generations do not interfere 
with the destiny of those who have come before them, the dead have no claim over the destiny of 
the generations that follow them.  God’s resources shall be returned to a common pool upon an 
individual’s death.  “The system which I thus place before the world,” Skidmore declared, “will 
rigidly maintain the principle, that no man or generation of men, have property, or the disposition 
of property, either as to who shall own, or shall not own it, or as to the use that shall be made of 
it, one moment after they cease to exist.”80  Every adult member of society was entitled to the 
property of the deceased, placing each on an equal footing at the entrance of mature life. 
The revolutionary character of Skidmore’s agenda is difficult to exaggerate.  He 
advocated a complete alteration of antebellum property rights.  Skidmore, as one historian wrote, 
“carried the questioning and ambitious temperament of the American artisan radical to new 
heights...in a relentless assault on institutions and hierarchies even his most radical predecessors 
did not challenge.”81  To suggest, as Dorfman has, that Skidmore pursued “business ends” is 
inaccurate.82  Rather Skidmore expressed working-class hostilities toward the laissez-faire model.  
Dorfman’s evaluation is based in part on Skidmore’s support for tariffs.  Dorfman failed to 
understand that Skidmore understood protective tariffs as a means to curtail what he perceived 
were the harmful effects of international competition.  Skidmore’s protectionism was not 
intended to advance the interests of industrial capitalists.   
Neither is it entirely accurate to represent Skidmore’s political economy as alien to an 
American free-market ideology consensus.  In the antebellum economic discourse there were 
dozens of working-class intellectuals who echoed Skidmore’s resistance to industrial capitalism 
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and laissez-faire political economy.  He found a receptive audience, too.  On October 19, 1829 he 
presented his ideas to a New York’s Working Men’s Party convention.  The party endorsed 
Skidmore’s reforms and nominated him a candidate for the New York state assembly.  When the 
final tallies of the 1829 election were counted Skidmore was short of victory by only twenty-three 
votes.83 
The Northern laborites and Southern reactionaries presented antebellum America with the 
most penetrating critique of the laissez-faire model, both as an intellectual system and a practical 
social/economic system.  They constructed alternative paradigms to understand economic 
phenomena and both aimed to reconstitute the American economy without bourgeois capitalist 
institutions.  The cerebral alliance between the two may be owed to what Holmes called the 
“anarchy and confusion” of the nineteenth-century discourse.84  Far from working under a free-
market consensus, the antebellum economic mind lacked clear ideological parameters.     
It is also possible, within the context of the antebellum discourse that both groups 
genuinely believed they were advancing humanity’s cause.  The slave system advocated by the 
Southern reactionaries and the socialism of the Northern radicals sought to liberate the masses 
from the physical drudgery of industrial labor and the mental slavery of the cash nexus.  In the 
antebellum discourse ‘liberal’ was largely appropriated by those who followed a Smithian brand 
of free-market economics.  However, the Northern socialists and Southern reactionaries 
constructed economic visions that claimed to optimize human freedom.  “The Socialists, the 
Communists” Holmes wrote, “are precisely those who most loudly proclaim their desire to 
establish a concentrated and consolidated government, which shall constantly interfere in all the 
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affairs of private life...Yet this is...an indication of the progress of freedom.”85  Socialism 
promised, according to Holmes’ interpretation, emancipation from market forces, the end to 
labor’s suffering, and mitigation of conditions that classical doctrine described as inevitable.  In 
the logic of socialists like Byllesby and Skidmore, freedom from the natural economic order of 
Smith, Malthus and Ricardo represented the ultimate form of human liberty.   
For the Southern reactionaries freedom was interpreted as safety from capital’s exploit 
and security from want.  The differences between the socialist understanding of liberty and that of 
the Southern reactionaries may be obvious to twenty-first-century historians.  But in the context 
of antebellum economic thought the distinctions were not clear.  “Socialism proposes to do away 
with free competition,” Fitzhugh wrote, “to afford protection and support at all times to the 
laboring class; to bring about, at least, a qualified community of property, and to associate labor. 
All these purposes, slavery fully and perfectly attains.”86  For Fitzhugh slavery was the most 
perfect form of socialism.   
It was in this intellectual setting that American protectionism emerged.  Protectionists, 
like the free-traders, the Northern laborites and the Southern reactionaries, constructed a political 
economy that promised to augment American freedoms.  They argued that by restricting Smith’s 
‘natural system of liberty’ in international trade Americans would find their economic freedoms 
enlarged.  In the antebellum discourse it would not have appeared especially contradictory for 
protectionists to argue for an economic system that preserved individual economic freedoms 
while simultaneously sealing off the domestic market from foreign competitors.  Protectionists 
were, in this sense, championing an economic order that offered a different set of freedoms from 
those proposed by the Northern laborites and Southern reactionaries.  Within the protectionist 
framework, restrictions were conceived as liberal, in the same way that the abolition of property 
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rights and the enslavement of the masses were perceived as human emancipation.  When taken 
together, the various strains in American political economy illustrate that the domestic discourse 
functioned in its own particular cerebral sphere, one that can not be accounted for without 
reference to antebellum intellectual traditions.          
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Chapter VI    
Protectionism: An American Political Economy 
 
The domestic treatment of Smithian free trade varied between regions, and Malthus and Ricardo 
were widely refuted by antebellum thinkers who wrote in the laissez-faire tradition.  The 
Southern reactionaries and Northern laborites presented economic ideologies outside of the 
American mainstream, and neither organized into a bona fide school of political economy.  In 
consequence, antebellum Americans expressed the desire for a distinctly native political 
economy.  Protectionists believed they offered just that.       
 Protectionism was the antebellum period’s most successful challenge to classical 
orthodoxy.  It was also antebellum America’s main contribution to the trans-Atlantic discourse.  
Alexander Hamilton fathered the movement, but it was not until the 1850s that protectionist 
thought was united under a coherent ideology by Henry Carey.  During this period protectionism 
went through several stages of theoretical development.  At each juncture, protectionists 
incorporated principles at the core of antebellum economic, political, and social culture.  These 
included American exceptionalism, free-labor entrepreneurialism, national industrial 
development, and economic, political, and ideological independence from the Old World.       
 This chapter traces the intellectual development of antebellum protectionism.  It identifies 
the origins of several key points of protectionist criticisms of laissez-faire economics, and shows 
how protectionism reflected important intellectual and cultural elements of the antebellum 
economic experience.  Protectionism was the period’s most authentic brand of American political 
economy.  The progression of protectionism as an economic ideology corresponded to several 
seminal political and economic events of the period.  Nationalism and domestic economic 
security were the principles that undergirded protectionism during its formative years.  
Throughout the antebellum period, protectionism was centered on questions of American 
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sovereignty.  The War of 1812 encouraged protectionists to elaborate on Hamilton’s nationalist 
assertions.  The collapse of the domestic economy following the peace at Ghent led protectionists 
to refine and expand their positions.  These included the so-called infant industries argument, the 
claim that industrialization bolstered agricultural production, and the notion that tariffs benefitted 
American labor.  The economic arguments were, however, secondary to assertions that 
protectionism secured the republic’s political independence from Britain.    
 Protectionist thought was given additional stimulus during the nullification crisis.  The 
spread of free-trade economics in the domestic discourse forced protectionists to sharpen their 
economic reasoning, become more critical of laissez-faire political economy, and connect 
economic policies to larger questions about the role of government in the antebellum economy.  
The nullification crisis also pushed protectionists to devise a more organic system of thought. 
Finally, the instability that characterized the antebellum economy during the 1830s and 1840s 
gave protectionists further impetus to polish the case behind high tariffs.  By the 1850s the ideas 
of earlier protectionists were cultivate into a well-structured economic ideology that was 
ultimately crystallized in the writings of Henry Carey.1 
 Protectionism was also the economic ideology of American industrialization.  It promised 
Americans industrial hegemony and economic security without the social hazards forecast by 
Malthus and Ricardo.  In this way, the protectionists also anticipated the course of American 
politics.  Originally aligned with the Whigs, Republicans later featured protectionism in their 
platforms before, during, and after the Civil War.  Protectionist arguments provided Whig and 
Republican legislators the economic logic behind some of the world’s highest tariffs of the 
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nineteenth century.2  But the protectionists also had a keen eye for American history.  They 
argued British laissez-faire was incompatible with the course of American history, and developed 
instead what they regarded as an alternative grounded in the exceptional conditions of the 
American experience.    
 Although historians recognize the importance of tariffs to antebellum politics, they have 
largely ignored the ideology that undergirded protectionist thought.3  Much of what has been 
written on protectionism is by economic historians who approach the subject with a free-trade 
bias.4  These tend to minimize the value protectionists contributed to the antebellum discourse 
and they fail to appreciate protectionism as a cohesive economic ideology.  They argue that the 
protectionist movement was orchestrated by industrialists, who for pecuniary advantage 
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converted Congress into a paper mill for special interest legislation.5  While producer interests did 
contribute to tariff legislation, this interpretation gives much greater credence to free-trade ideas 
than Americans at the time did, and it ignores the complex of interests and thinkers who 
developed and supported the protectionist position.  
 The development of American protectionism began with Hamilton’s 1791 Report on 
Manufactures.6  In it, Hamilton dispelled what was then the popular Physiocratic convention on 
the advantages of agriculture and the disadvantages of manufactures.  Conditions in America, he 
admitted, gave the appearance that the nation was perfectly suited for agrarian pursuits, but that 
agriculture should be allotted, Hamilton argued, "any thing like an exclusive predilection, in any 
country, ought to be admitted with great caution."7  Hamilton’s rebuke of Physiocracy was in 
essence a swipe at Jeffersonian agrarianism, and it helped establish legitimacy to industry in the 
domestic discourse.  Second, Hamilton explained how the expansion of manufactures 
complimented agrarian economies by affording an "extensive domestic market for the surplus of 
the soil."8  Western and Southern agriculture was assured a steady home-market from Northern 
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industry, thus cementing the union into a harmonious economic and political relationship.  Third, 
encouraging manufactures would increase America’s productive capacity.  Compared to 
husbandry, industry employed more machinery and capital, and it advanced the specialization of 
labor.  Industry also brought idle women and children into the workforce.  Finally, to critics who 
charged that tariffs inflated the price of manufactured wares, Hamilton reasoned that tariffs 
increased the number of domestic manufactures, enhanced competition, lowered prices, and 
prevented the establishment of monopolies.9 
 Nationalist and statist overtones saturate Hamilton’s writings on tariffs.  For Hamilton 
protectionism was as much a political doctrine as it was an economic policy.  His brand of 
protectionism enhanced the economic authority of the sovereign.  Hamilton linked a nation’s 
political strength to its economic power.  The surest path to defending American sovereignty was 
a strong domestic economy independent from international markets.  This, Hamilton argued, 
would promote wholly American political institutions free of European influence.  National 
security and national culture were central to Hamilton’s protectionist program.10 
 The generation of economic writers who lived through the War of 1812 picked up and 
elaborated on Hamilton’s economic nationalism.  The conflict with Britain incited an insurgent 
nationalism that was precipitated by what contemporaries believed was an economic and political 
rivalry with Britain.11  Few could ignore the recurrent military hostilities between America and 
Britain.  It was also evident that London and Washington engaged in a kind of commercial Cold 
War, both sides competing for markets and vying to better the other in their respective capacities 
for industry.  Throughout the antebellum period, protectionists exploited nationalist and anti-
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British currents then prevalent in American culture.12  Much of protectionist ideology hinged on 
anxieties that Britain threatened America’s political and economic sovereignty.  "We were," an 
American protectionist testified, "as much bound to Britain after the Revolution as before."13  
Perceptions of Britain provided the superstructure on which protectionists based their theoretical 
claims.  "What all have at present most to fear,” a protectionist warned, “is the industrial 
supremacy of England."14  Britain was master of the economic universe to be guarded against 
with all that America could muster.  "The gigantic power of England…the wonder of the world," 
that mighty nation was powerful enough to bring the world to its knees.15  "All states," a 
protectionist reported, "have a common interest in defending themselves against the damage that 
England, enjoying world economic supremacy, can arbitrarily inflict upon their industries."16 
 Protectionists gave special emphasis to Britain’s ability to undermine American 
sovereignty through economic imperialism.  "Well might Napoleon dispense with arms when he 
had conquered the world; and well might Mr. Huskisson recommend free-trade when it would 
make the world tributary to England."17  The notion that British commercial policy intended an 
economic "war of extermination" drummed up fears, and protectionists were keen on 
manipulating this worry.18  Parliament, one protectionist wrote, sought to "revive the old system 
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of colonial dependence," capturing the young nation with a "manufacturing and commercial 
yoke." Economic policy was critical to assuring national sovereignty.  Free trade with Britain 
meant Americans would essentially "cede their political power in order to render British 
productive and political power omnipotent."19 
 More than any figure Mathew Carey infused protectionist thought with an Anglophobic 
tone.  Dublin born in 1760, Carey worked as a pamphleteer campaigning for Irish independence 
in his youth.  In 1784 Carey’s essays caught the attention of royal authorities who issued warrants 
for his arrest.  He fled for America and eventually settled in Philadelphia.  There he became one 
the nation’s leading publishers and one of the founding members of the pro-tariff Philadelphia 
Society for the Promotion of National Industry.20  Carey was one of the principal figures in the 
early protectionist movement.  He died in 1839.  
 Carey did little to refine the economic logic behind protectionist ideology.  However, the 
Anglophobic tone of his writings became a permanent staple in antebellum protectionist thought.  
Carey’s works emphasized the need to protect American markets from British economic 
imperialism.  His brand of protectionism was geared primarily at inciting anti-British fervor.  
American political culture was especially receptive of Carey’s economic nationalism following 
the War of 1812.  British industrial power, according to Carey, threatened America’s 
independence.  He wrote frequently of Irish suffering under British rule, cautioning Americans of 
the dangers that came with failing to guard their economic sovereignty.  By opening its markets, 
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the United States, according to Carey, "have voluntarily adopted the colonial policy of 
England."21  All were aware of the current commercial warfare that existed between the United 
States and Britain.  "It was vain for any man to shut his eyes against the active rivalship and 
persevering hostility of British manufacturers."22 
 Carey’s anti-British tune was carried into the latter half of the antebellum period by 
Calvin Colton.  Born in 1789 in Massachusetts, Colton graduated from Yale and was later a Whig 
propagandist.  He became something of a celebrity among Whigs with his partisan, ten-essay 
Junius Tracts published in 1840.  His major literary accomplishment, however, was a six-volume 
work The Life and Times of Henry Clay in 1846.23  He died in 1857.   
 Colton’s seminal economic treatise Public Economy for the United States (1848) offered 
little akin to refined analysis.  Instead, Colton stroked the nationalist key by exposing what he 
believed were British commercial policies aimed at colonizing the United States.  It was "simply 
a question of justice, as the American revolution was a war of justice―and precisely, identically 
the same interests are at stake now as then.  'Free trade' would give up all which American 
independence acquired―all that is worth having."24  Colton believed he had uncovered British 
plans to sabotage America in Parliament debates.  Lord Henry Broughman, an influential British 
statesman, was a favorite culprit for Colton.  He believed Broughman’s speeches evidenced a 
British plot.  Speaking to the House of Commons in 1816 on the state of American industry, 
Broughman declared “it was well worth while to incur a loss upon the first exportation in order 
by the glut to stifle in the cradle those rising manufactures in the United States which the war had 
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forced into existence contrary to the usual course of things.”25  In this light, protectionists like 
Colton pictured the British threat; economic imperialists bent on undermining American 
sovereignty by exploiting the republic as a metropolis does its colony.   
 The threat of British economic imperialism was amplified by a supposed intellectual 
offensive on the American mind.  Protectionists grew paranoid over the circulation of British 
laissez-faire on domestic soil.  Carey estimated the works of Adam Smith and the French free 
trader Jean-Baptiste Say to have sold over 7,000 copies in America.  These works, according to 
Carey, were intended "to paralyze our industry, and, to a certain degree, to render the United 
States virtually colonies of the manufacturing nations of Europe."26  Protectionists pointed to 
sinister forces to account for the dissemination of British laissez-faire in the domestic discourse.  
Free traders were instruments, accused one protectionist, of "British manufacturers and their 
agents and representatives."27  British free-trade imperialists had infiltrated Washington.  "Our 
anti-tariff politicians," another wrote, "are as much playing into the hands of the English, in all 
their measures, as if the words were put into their mouths by England, and our laws penned by 
her too…No two nations ever existed, that could have played into each other's hands so 
completely, as this country and England."28 
 Colton, Carey and other protectionists sensed something akin to British intellectual 
imperialism.  Before Smith, the British wrote exclusively in the mercantilist tradition.  But once 
Britain became an industrial power its economists advocated laissez-faire.  British cunning and 
deceit explained the transformation.  "The doctrine of free-trade is a fraud, imposed upon the 
                                                            
25 House of Commons, April 9, 1816.  Found in Niles’ Weekly Register, December 28, 1816, p. 284.  For 
another example of Parliament debates cited in protectionist works, see Willard Phillips, Propositions 
Concerning Protection and Free Trade (1850; reprint, New York, 1968), p. 230. 
 
26 Mathew Carey, Autobiographical Sketches in a Series of Letters Addressed to a Friend (1829; reprint, 
New York, 1970), p. ix. 
 
27 Phillips, Propositions Concerning Protection and Free Trade, p. 163. 
 
28 Ware, Notes on Political Economy, pp. 97-98. 
 100 
 
world by pensioned writers for the benefit of Great Britain chiefly, which originated the 
fraud…Dr. Smith did not begin his Wealth of Nations till he was seduced from his high dignity at 
Glasgow...and became a beneficiary of the British government."29  With no American author was 
this belief held stronger to than by Colton.  Smith, the "pensioned economist," perpetuated a 
"great conspiracy against mankind."  "Was he not paid for it?" Colton asked.  "And how should it 
happen that nearly all British writers on this subject, from Adam Smith down to this time, and 
nearly or quite nearly all the lecturers of the universities, and almost the entire periodical 
press…should have become one solid phalanx of Free-Trade advocates…This, certainly, is a very 
extraordinary spectacle."30 
 Protectionist suspicions over the legitimacy of laissez-faire were added to by nineteenth-
century British trade policy.  Although British writers were at the fore of the laissez-faire 
movement, London promulgated mercantilist policies.31  For centuries, one protectionist reported, 
Britain kept her ports "hermetically sealed…If every bale and parcel of manufactures from every 
part of the world had been infected with the plague."32  Now that Britain was the industrial 
hegemon its economists clamored for free trade.33  "Here is the misfortune," Colton wrote, "the 
trick, as it might, with more propriety and truth, be called: Great Britain is the Jew, that has 
furnished other nations with books on political economy, to suit herself―not such as she follows, 
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but such as she wishes them to follow, and they are quoted in argument by American free-traders, 
who are, by this means, Jewed."  The spread of laissez-faire literature was projected to advance 
British interest, so that she might "become the richest nation in the world―in that way, the most 
powerful―and to maintain that ascendancy."  Free trade, another wrote, "had not been intended 
for home consumption.  It had been intended for export."34  Modern historians find some 
legitimacy in this claim.  "The parliamentary free traders," according to one historian, "strove not 
so much to achieve a cosmopolitan system…but to preserve Britain's industrial predominance, 
and, if possible, to achieve a virtual monopoly for a British Workshop of the World."35  An 
industrial and commercial Pax Britannica accomplished through free-trade policies and the 
proliferation of laissez-faire doctrine was according to protectionists calculated to undermine 
America’s economic independence, and thus its political sovereignty.          
 Protectionist criticisms of British free-trade imperialism were typically combined with 
charges that laissez-faire political economy lacked scientific rigor.  Smith was consistently 
targeted by protectionists.  "Whilst he treats,” one protectionist wrote, “detached matters with 
great ingenuity and experience, his system, considered as a whole, is so confused and distracted, 
as if the principal aim of his books were not to enlighten natives, but to confuse them for the 
benefit of his country…"36  Carey found that "in no science, are the general maxims of mere 
theorists more delusive, and more distrusted, than in political economy.  This branch of 
knowledge is yet in its infancy...Its principles are not yet established.  Those which have been 
considered as the most fixed, have been overthrown; those which have been taught as self-
evident, are questioned; and the whole are subject of ardent discussion."  Carey quoted Smith’s 
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Wealth of Nations at length, arguing certain passages contained "much sophistry and unsound 
reasoning…and there is likewise, as in all the rest of the doctor's work, a large portion of 
verbiage, which is admirably calculated to embarrass and confound common understanding, and 
prevent their forming a correct decision."37 
 Protectionists also disparaged Smith and other laissez-faire economists for having 
indulged in speculative abstractions.  Smith’s background as an Enlightenment philosopher 
predisposed the Scotsman to metaphysical assumptions on human psychology and morality that 
clouded his assessment of economic systems.  "The casual association of its teaching with moral 
philosophy,” one protectionist alleged, “is the circumstance to which is to be attributed that 
metaphysical bias, manifested by almost all Economical writers, in their method of investigation, 
and which has conducted them to such vague, hypothetical, and unsatisfactory results."38 
Deductive reasoning was, protectionists charged, a critical flaw in laissez-faire methodology.  
Public policy and a stronger regard for the empirical sciences were for protectionists important 
analytical tools in economic inquiry.  "This science is in its nature essentially practical, and 
should be treated in a plain, practical way.  Adam Smith, Mr. Say, and others who wrote upon 
this subject, were too abstract and theoretical for common use."39  Carey found Smith "to have 
been duped by his own system."40  A sophist confused by webs of abstractions and an idealist 
cosmopolitanism out-of-touch with real-world conditions.  A "fool's gold," Colton wrote, "born in 
a closet" with assumptions passed off as natural laws, able only to "prove itself by itself."41  The 
freetrader was a "speculative professor, who concocts abstract theorems of political economy in 
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his closet."  A doctrine "profligate, false, and absurd," based on "dreamy hallucination, made up 
of fallacies, sophistical assumptions," and unsound reasoning.42  "It is against such visionary 
projects, that we have raised our hands," Carey declared, "it is to warn you from the closet 
speculations of theorists, to invite you to common sense practice, founded on the nature of 
things."43 
 Protectionist criticisms of the metaphysical tone of laissez-faire were indicative of the 
pragmatic bent of antebellum intellectual culture.  The American knack for common sense was 
raised above the 'book wisdom' of laissez-faire philosophers.  Distrust of the privileged, cloistered 
philosopher formulating abstract theories in an Ivory Tower was American custom.  This attitude 
informed protectionist critiques of laissez-faire.  By placing in the fore regard for American 
conditions and keeping as a central goal for economic inquiry the discovery of practical policy, 
protectionism conformed to domestic intellectual traditions.44  Protectionism, according to one 
historian, was an "economics of the street."45  The experimentalist, utilitarian, and policy-oriented 
tradition of Hamilton was raised above the ‘enlightened economics’ of Smith and the abstractions 
of Ricardo.     
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 The cultural tendencies that shaped protectionist skepticism of laissez-faire philosophy 
were reinforced by antebellum political events.  During the Jacksonian era anti-intellectualism 
reached new heights.  The egalitarian thrust of democracy engendered a culture where academics 
were suspect.  A political mileu with an "I'm-as-good-as-you population" of equals raised few 
men's knowledge to esteemed levels.46  Alexis de Tocqueville noted this distinctly American 
quality.  The "independence of the mind" led Americans "to mistrust the judgment of others, and 
to seek the light of truth nowhere but in their own understanding.  Everyone then attempts to be 
his own sufficient guide, and makes it his boast to form his own opinions on all subjects."47  
Accustomed to distrust the scholar's counsel, knowledge was sought not in books or philosophy 
but in home-grown intuition and folkish wisdom. 
 The pragmatic style of protectionist thought reflected American culture.  But to reconcile 
the anti-theoretical, more pragmatic bent of antebellum culture with their own demands for 
scientific rigor protectionists incorporated into their works a bounty of economic data.48  
Protectionists extolled the value of historical details in political economy.  It served the dual 
purpose of toughening their claims to scientific legitimacy while simultaneously challenging the 
methodological approach of free-trade ideology.  In doing so, the protectionists championed a 
methodological revolution in economic inquiry.  While laissez-faire was based on "the invisible, 
the mysterious, the fluctuating internal nature" of moral philosophy and deductive reasoning, 
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protectionism "pursued the opposite method; to have started from facts, and not assumptions."49  
Protectionists steered economic inquiry away from abstraction.  Argument by deduction, 
protectionists believed, had skewed objective analysis and widened the gap between political 
economy and the positive sciences. 
 Historical statistics were for protectionists a natural bridge to economic history.  
Blending economic history with theoretical economics is one of the lasting contributions 
protectionists made to the trans-Atlantic discourse.  The Historical School, that is, the enrichment 
of economic study by emphasizing history, institutions, sociology, politics, and culture became a 
seminal feature in American economic thought for the second-half of the nineteenth century.  The 
historical economics movement materialized in 1885 when the American Economic Association 
adopted principles that stressed the historical economics of antebellum protectionist literature.50 
 Friedrich List is considered "the earliest example on American soil of the Historical 
School of Economic thought."51  Born in 1789 in Württemberg, List came to the United States in 
1825 fleeing Prussian arrest for inciting German nationalism.  He settled first as a farmer near 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, then Reading where he worked as a journalist until his return to Europe 
in 1832.  After a series of literary and business failures List fell deathly ill and in 1846 committed 
suicide.  List is remembered as the architect of the Zollverein, a customs union that brought 
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eighteen German states under a single trade regime.  In the words of one List scholar, he was "the 
driving force behind the Zollverein…In a very real sense he was the Alexander Hamilton."52 
 During his American sojourn List became a leader in the protectionist movement.53  By 
emphasizing historicism and a more relativist approach to economic theory, List further cemented 
protectionist ideology to American intellectual currents.  For List, political economy comprised 
three distinct fields─philosophy, politics, and history.  He argued that history was critical to 
political economy since it encouraged the formulation of economic theory based on national 
history.54  List expanded on the theoretical basis of the Hamiltonian matrix by renewing the 
association between national economic growth, industrial might, and political sovereignty.  List 
imparted his vision in a series of letters prepared for the protectionist Harrisburg Convention in 
1827.  The letters were syndicated in over 50 newspapers and later compiled in his Outlines of 
American Political Economy.   
 As with Hamilton, List brought questions of national sovereignty to the fore of his 
political economy.  "Between the individual and the whole human race there is the nation," List 
wrote.55  Citizens were bound to a common will that obligates individuals to contribute toward 
national economic power.  Political sovereignty, List argued, rested on a nation’s ability to 
control its economic destiny free from foreign, mainly British influence.  Though expressed in 
economic terms, List's nationalist ideals were more political.  They reflected a cultural statism 
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typical of nineteenth-century German thought and an inclination growing within American 
protectionist circles.  List argued the nation-state deserved special notice in political economy.  
"National economy," what List labeled his brand of economic thought, "teaches by what means a 
certain nation, in her particular situation, may direct and regulate the economy of individuals…to 
increase the productive powers within herself…a world within herself, in order to grow in power 
and wealth."56 
 List’s influence in antebellum protectionism is indicative of the importance nationalist 
sentiment played during the formative years of the movement.  List emphasized the role of the 
state in industrializing economies.  Protectionists argued industrial development, and thus 
economic independence from stronger, more mature economies like Britain, required 
developmental policies aimed at advancing national industrial evolution.  To achieve this end, 
domestic industrial forces required instructions from central government cognizant of the 
historical differences between nations.  "Every nation,” List argued in direct contrast to the 
universalism of free trade, “has its particular political economy."57  British laissez-faire, List 
argued, discounted the concept of nationalism and ignored the responsibility of the nation-state in 
advancing growth-oriented policies.58 
 List’s national political economy helped refresh in antebellum protectionism a 
Hamiltonian/realist perception of international relations.  Protectionist ideology took as a basic 
assumption a Hobbesian view of international relations.  This was a diametrically opposed world 
view from British laissez-faire.59  Free-traders posited a world moving toward peace, harmonious 
trade, and a fraternal order where nations were obsolete.  "In the actual world," List wrote, 
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humanity was divided into nations violently competing for economic power.60  To defend 
American sovereignty from foreign aggression List advocated well-measured trade policies that 
favored national industry over personal interests.  Laissez-faire only considered "how the 
economy of the individual and of mankind would stand if the human race were not separated into 
nations."  Failure to appreciate the essential correlation between individuals and nations, and 
moreover the centrality of the nation-state in the modern world, List found laissez-faire 
misguided by "a chimerical cosmopolitism, which does not comprehend nationality, and has little 
regard for national interest."61  List elevated the nation over the individual.  In his communalistic 
brand of political economy, coordination and cooperation at the national level were essential.  
Economic policy ought to promote national concerns, nurture a nation's productive powers, and if 
necessary, restrict personal behavior.  "An individual, in promoting his own interest, may injure 
the public interest; a nation, in promoting the general welfare, may check the interest of a part of 
its members.  But the general welfare must restrict and regulate the exertions of individuals."62 
 The emphasis protectionists gave to national economics marks an important ideological 
breach with the laissez-faire tradition.  List was not concerned with maximizing private wealth.  
He believed there was a higher, national calling for the burgeoning science.  Rather than instruct 
individuals on how to amass personal fortunes, political economy should focus on national 
economic policy.  The writings of List and other antebellum protectionists stressed the interplay 
between economic and political institutions.  "The Scot's theory,” List wrote, “in spite of the very 
name they chose to give their science, they will make us believe that there is nothing of politics in 
political economy.  If their science is properly called 'political economy,' there must be just as 
much 'politics' in it as 'economy,' and if there is no 'politics' in it, the science has not got the 
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proper name, it is nothing else than economy."63  Protectionists challenged the standard free-trade 
maxim that political and economic inquiries were two distinct fields of study.64  Political 
economy, List argued, "should be concerned as much with politics as with economics."65 
On this point List was not entirely original.  His visit to the United States came just after 
the publication of the first treatise on political economy written in America.  Daniel Raymond 
published in 1820 his Thoughts on Political Economy.  Raymond issued a second edition with 
significant revisions under the title The Elements of Political Economy in 1823.  John Adams 
wrote to Raymond that he had "never read any work upon Political Economy with more 
satisfaction," and that the book stood as "a proud monument of American literature.”66  Still, 
Raymond’s work did not reach a wide audience.  Only 750 copies were issued and of that number 
over 200 were sold at auction.  Born in Connecticut in 1786, Raymond attended the prestigious 
Litchfield Law School and eventually settled in Maryland where he was accepted to the bar in the 
Baltimore County Court.  In 1842 he moved to Cincinnati and established a weekly paper, but the 
endeavor lasted less than six months.  He died in 1849 of cholera.67 
A romantic nationalist sentiment guided Raymond’s economic thought.  He treated 
economics from a research paradigm squarely at odds with the laissez-faire tradition.  "Political 
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economy is a science which teaches the nature and causes of public or national wealth…the 
means of promoting a nation's wealth…"68  Raymond anticipated List by censuring free traders 
for being fixated on the individual accumulation of riches.  "Instead of treating public economy 
they in fact treat private economy; instead of talking about nations they talk about individuals."69  
Private economy reflected an individual’s temporary, pecuniary interests.  Political economy, on 
the other hand, was for Raymond the science of the legislator.  In Raymond's vernacular, political 
economy took into account that a nation might last into perpetuity.  The science was not a second-
rate branch of knowledge for private interests; rather it dealt with more important issues that 
effected national conditions and the public's well-being.       
 Raymond’s definition of what constituted political economy illustrated the ideological 
differences between protectionism and laissez-faire.  By confusing private and public economy, 
the free traders had also obscured the differences between national and individual wealth.  For 
Raymond, private wealth and national wealth were radically different concepts.  "It is most 
unfortunate that for the science of political economy, that the word wealth has been applied 
indiscriminately, to nations and to individuals."70  Private wealth was defined by Raymond as an 
individual’s possession of property to obtain the necessities and comforts of life.  National wealth 
was comprised of a number of elements─political, economic, social and cultural─that contributed 
toward national production in the present and future.     
 The basic error regarding individual and national wealth led to other points of confusion 
regarding private and public interests, according to Raymond.  Laissez-faire assumed what was 
good for the individual was beneficial to the nation.  Raymond found this association erroneous.  
An individual's interest could be opposed to a nation's interest, just as the nation's prosperity may 
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be detrimental to an individual's private economy.  "The sophistry of Dr. Smith's reasoning 
consists in a great measure,” Raymond wrote, “in his not discriminating between national and 
individual interests.  He considers the interests of some particular class of citizens, as identical 
with the interests of the nation, when in reality they are, perhaps, directly opposed."71  The failure 
of laissez-faire to provide clear direction for legislators on how best to increase national wealth 
originated in its reasoning from individuals to nations.   
 Like Hamilton, Raymond’s political economy transmitted the concerns of a newly 
independent nation still debating the role of the sovereign.  Personal economic freedoms were not 
sacred, particularly if they undermined national interests.  Government had the right and 
obligation to place the national economy ahead of its citizens.  "It is ever to be remembered,” 
Raymond wrote, “that the public interests are paramount to individual interests…that when a 
political economists has shown that public and private interests are opposed...the interposition of 
the government is necessary─he cannot be required to prove that private interests ought to give 
way─this is to be taken for granted."72 
 Both List and Raymond echoed antebellum nationalist currents, particularly in the North, 
by emphasizing the role of government in the development of emerging economies.  But it was 
List who entreated Americans to recognize that the United States was perfectly situated to assert 
its economic independence.  Indeed, America was presented with an “unexampled” opportunity 
to control its economic destiny.  "The condition of this nation cannot be compared with the 
condition of any other nation," List declared.73  Like many antebellum foreign visitors, List 
articulated a feeling that the American experience offered something positively different.  A 
number of laissez-faire thinkers employed American exceptionalism to counter Malthus and 
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Ricardo.  These laissez-faire economists did not, however, make American exceptionalism a 
foundational element of their ideology.   
More than any antebellum school of economic thought the protectionists made American 
exceptionalism a central tenet in their political economy.  Protectionists combined socially 
accepted notions regarding the exceptionality of America's historical, political, and economic 
conditions to challenge classical assumptions and construct an explicitly optimistic economic 
philosophy.74In doing so, they aligned protectionism with a seminal feature of America culture.  
Unlike the antebellum free traders, the protectionists relied heavily on American exceptionalism 
to advance their understanding of economic phenomena, but they also incorporated the concept to 
defend their vision of economic development.   
Protectionists pointed to several political, social, and cultural elements that contributed to 
America’s distinct historical standing.  First, the nation’s democratic institutions promised 
unprecedented economic opportunity.  Protectionists reflected antebellum cultural assumptions 
regarding the wide-spread benefits of democracy, and they incorporated the economics of 
democracy into their ideology.  Protectionism grew increasingly popular in the 1830s and 1840s 
precisely during the so-called ‘Age of Democracy.’75  Protectionists believed democratic 
government was genuinely responsible to the people's demands.  "Government is instituted to 
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guard the interests of the nation confided to its care," Carey wrote.76  Carey considered the tariff 
an honest effort to defend through democratic means the economic prerogatives of constituents.  
In this way protectionism revealed the nation's political milieu and might be considered a form of 
economic democracy.  Their confidence in democratic institutions was premised on a belief in 
American exceptionalism.  The United States was the first nation with an enlightened majority 
willing to sacrifice their economic interests for the common good.  But the United States was also 
exceptional because its legislators were responsive to voters.  British laissez-faire mistakenly 
assumed that political interference in the economy was adverse to the public's interests.  
Protectionists argued that the anti-statist tone of laissez-faire was a natural reaction to experiences 
under the Old Regime.  However, Americans had no reason to dread state meddling in the 
economy.  The constitution itself, Colton posited, was "enacted for the purpose of establishing a 
protective policy…to protect the persons and rights of people."77In protectionist ideology the 
strong arm of government was not feared.78  A positive state promoted prosperity, facilitated 
industrial development, and served as a paternal figure in the economy.  Its principal function was 
to aid the people.  For Raymond, this meant providing Americans with employment.  “So it is the 
duty of the legislator to find employment for all people, and if he cannot find them employment 
in agriculture and commerce, he must set them on manufacturing."79 
The historical uniqueness of American democracy made for economic and social 
conditions that were equally distinct.  Protectionists celebrated these distinctions as essential 
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qualities of American exceptionalism.  The absence of aristocratic institutions fashioned a 
landscape free of rank and hereditary privilege, abound with social mobility, and an equality of 
access to a vast continental expanse where every citizen could fulfill republican dreams of 
proprietorship and economic independence. 
 American exceptionalism also contributed to protectionist understanding of the historical 
uniqueness of domestic labor.  The celebration of American labor was palpable in Northern 
economic literature.  The American worker, if protected by high tariffs, had no reason to fear the 
dismal conditions described by Malthus and Ricardo.  Indeed, in an American fortress no sector 
of the population was promised greater prosperity than the laboring classes. By the 1850s labor 
was raised to the pinnacle of American economic, social, and political life, especially in Whig 
and Republican circles.80  Labor was thought as an instrument for self-advancement, the source of 
all value, the fountain of improvement and the cause of civilization's progress.  Labor was not 
demoralized by endless competition, nor the unfortunate result of Adam’s curse.  Rather, it was a 
dignified calling eagerly and voluntarily responded to by all.81 
 Free-labor ideology was one of the sacred principles of protectionism, and it brought 
protectionists further in-line with American cultural traditions.82  The use of free-labor mythology 
in protectionist thought was not a form of industrial/capitalist apologetics.  Neither was it a 
dishonest effort to capitalize politically on the assumptions of naive workers.  Instead, 
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protectionists hoped tariffs would soften the social externalities of industrialization.83 
Protectionism was as much a social creed as it was an industrial one.84  Protectionist sympathy for 
labor illustrated a producer/collectivist mentality that was shared by many antebellum Americans.  
They argued British laissez-faire overestimated the importance of distribution and therefore failed 
to acknowledge that the essence of men lay in the fruits of their labor.  Malthus and Ricardo 
taught that labor was an instrument of capital, the human spirit behind labor’s production a 
materialistic reaction to satisfy base desires.  “In the eyes of modern political economy he [labor] 
is nothing, and can be nothing, because it takes no note of the qualities by which he is 
distinguished from the brute.”85   For protectionists man was a producer first, then a consumer.      
 The protectionists however, did more than purport a germane version of free-labor 
ideology.  They infused the labor theory of value with moral authority.  The American worker, 
Colton argued, “occupies an elevated, influential, honorable position."86  To toil was the 
American fashion, that which provided one distinction.  "Labor, work, is the spirit, the genius of 
the American people.  It was so from the beginning by of necessity; it became a fixed habit of the 
community; and has ever been a part of the morale of the country."87  The founding of the new 
republic had ushered "a new era of labor…the true millennium of labor."88  Only after the 
revolution from Britain was labor able to exercise its long-dormant republican virtue.  "The 
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breaking of the British scepter was the installation of American labor in its rights; it was the 
foundation of an empire of working men; and from that hour labor has been the great political 
power of the country.  The event was a jubille─the jubille of labor."89  The political leverage 
provided domestic labor with social and economic power.  In the American republic of labor, the 
worker was not simply the handmaiden of capital.  Labor acted as an "independent agent."90  
Indeed, capital courted labor; it was dependent upon labor; labor was its master.  In this 
environment labor, "does not accept a price imposed but commands its own price."91Capital, 
however, had nothing to fear about labor’s power.  Domestic conditions made anxieties over class 
conflict a moot point.  Protectionists were keen on dispelling Ricardian assertions of class 
conflict.   
 In their celebration of free labor, protectionists presented a radically different narrative 
from classical orthodoxy.  Protectionists assumed a progressive American working class that took 
advantage of the nation’s easy upward mobility.  Indeed, capital and labor shared identical 
interests; they were essentially one in the same.92  High tariffs engaged workers and capitalists in 
a mutually beneficial relationship where increasing wages corresponded to augmented production 
and did not infringe on profits.  "That the interests of the capitalist and the laborer are thus in 
perfect harmony with each other," one protectionist reported, "as each derives advantage from 
every measure that tends to facilitate the growth of capital."93  Writing in 1844, Colton declared 
"That every American laborer can stand up proudly, and say, I AM THE AMERICAN 
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CAPITALIST, which is not a metaphor, but a liberal truth."94  The social and economic divisions 
imagined by British free traders did not exist in America.  In protectionist thought, there was no 
reason for labor to rebel, and thus no reason for capital to shrink from the laboring masses.  By 
strengthening labor, the rule of law and the sanctity of property were not jeopardized.95  Indeed, 
higher wages, according to one protectionist, promised "a steady improvement in the condition of 
both laborer and capitalist.  That the former, while enjoying a constantly increasing measure of 
the comforts and conveniences of life, experiences a constantly increasing facility in becoming 
himself a capitalist."96 
 In protectionist logic, the power of labor was made possible by the availability of western 
lands.  The safety-valve theory, widely accepted in Northern intellectual culture, was a standard 
assumption of antebellum protectionism.  It is also another clear indication that features of 
American exceptionalism were critical to protectionist ideology.97  The condition of domestic 
labor was unique precisely because it had access to an expanse of unclaimed territory.  Access to 
Western lands inhibited European-style pauperism for American workers by affording labor an 
alternative.  The safety-valve concept contributed to protectionist arguments that American 
industrialization would follow a course that was fundamentally different from that posited by 
British laissez-faire.               
 Protectionism reflected American economic culture in still other ways.  Protectionism 
was the only school in the antebellum discourse that championed the rapid and comprehensive 
industrialization of the American economy.  The exceptionality of American historical 
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circumstances, the unique conditions of domestic labor, and the harmony that existed between 
labor and capital contributed to protectionist optimism over the expansion of industry.  Contrary 
to the Southern free traders, the Southern reactionaries like Fitzhugh and Holmes, and the 
Northern laborites, industrialization promised wide-spread benefits.  Industrialization guaranteed 
national economic and political sovereignty.  Carey argued that industry advanced society by 
cultivating the sciences, the arts and literature, and served as "the only sure foundation of national 
virtue, happiness, and greatness."98  Manufactures were, according to one protectionist, "the great 
agents and tokens of the increase of national opulence, and the progress of civilization."99  
Neither did domestic labor have anything to fear over industrialization.  Industrial workers gained 
the most.  According to Colton, industrial labor was provided “the best state of health in body and 
mind…What industrial calling has not its quiet aspects by day, and its refreshing sleep at 
night?"100  
 Despite protectionist glorification of industry, many Americans believed the nation’s 
future wealth rested on its comparative advantage in agriculture.  Protectionists were, therefore, 
compelled to explain how industry could advance without threatening agriculture's place in 
American culture.  Indeed, America was such an exception that agriculture and industry could 
development in harmony.  The growth of industry subtracted from what protectionists believed 
was an overstocked labor supply in agriculture.  This increased domestic demands for the farmer's 
labor.  Industrialization also provided a home market for agrarian produce.  Operatives in search 
of food, as well as industrialists in search of raw materials, guaranteed a steady market for 
domestic agriculture.  To bring, in the words of one protectionists, "the loom and the anvil to take 
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their natural place by the side of the plough and the harrow."101  Carey argued that without an 
industrial sector the future of American agriculture was jeopardized.102  Farmers and planters saw 
their products carried from port to port seeking buyers, expending great costs in transportation, 
and ultimately sold at dock-side auctions.  Foreign markets were glutted with American 
agriculture, precipitating a fall in commodity prices and the exhaustion of domestic soils.  "The 
system of foreign trade, of itself, necessarily tends to impoverish the land already under 
cultivation…in order to maintain its rate of production."103  The expansion of domestic industry 
even benefited Southern planters.  "It will then have a home market," one protectionist declared, 
"there is no interest that ought to hail the establishment of manufactures louder than this."104 
 The home-market argument posited not only the preservation of agriculture's 
predominance, it also served commercial interests.  Protectionists crafted arguments that appealed 
to a variety of economic sectors.  They assured the public that merchants and industrialists were 
not rivals competing for a fixed income fund.  Rather industrialization expanded the merchant's 
share of national wealth by opening new trading opportunities.  Coastal and internal trade would 
increase if food staples and raw materials from the South and Mid-West were provided industrial 
markets in the Northeast.105 
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 The emphasis given to the home-market drew protectionists into the logic of isolationism.    
"Protection looks homeward.  Free trade, under existing circumstances, looks abroad."106  The 
isolationist tone of protectionist thought was colored with a patriotic zeal that reflected 
antebellum notions of nationalism and Anglophobia.107  No nation’s economic sovereignty was 
assured without a self-sufficient, interdependent domestic market.  "Home consumption, and a 
home market," Raymond wrote "is, therefore, always to be preferred to a foreign one."108    
Economic isolationism was consistent with an over-arching view that the world was a dangerous 
place.  "The occasional occurrence of war…must be calculated on as inevitable."  In protectionist 
ideology international markets were characterized by conflict and fluctuation.  "Every alternative 
year," one protectionist figured, "has been on an average a year of war."109Protectionists called for 
Americans to shun the outside.  "All people must look at home first, and stop not short of 
securing the home market in its fullest extent to themselves…The home market is like an 
inherited patrimony; we may claim it as belonging to us, as of right ours."110 
 Isolationism in the protectionist context was a by-product of American exceptionalism.  
"No nation, ancient or modern,” Carey argued, “ever possessed more solid advantages than are 
here enumerated."111  Colton agreed, declaring "Never, in the history of the world, did a nation 
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occupy such a position, or have within its reach such means of wealth and power, as the United 
States."112  The exceptional conditions existing in America afforded the potential for absolute 
economic independence.  "As if America were not a world in itself, and able by its ingenuity and 
skill to supply every luxury, as well as every necessity," Colton wrote.113 
 Protectionists grew increasingly isolationist both economically and intellectually as the 
antebellum period came to a close.  "For the most part, ours is a different world from theirs," 
Colton declared, "things here started different, have grown up different, and are different."114  
This attitude reflected a domestic desire to break from the Old World.  Raymond believed his was 
the first economic treatise for the new nation.  He aimed to divorce America, in his own words, 
"from the fetters of foreign authority─from foreign theories and systems of political economy."115  
The American school, as the protectionists called themselves, believed Old World economists 
were too prejudiced by their social and political institutions to devise economic theory applicable 
to the American experience.  "It is morally impossible from the social position of European 
economists,” Colton wrote, “that they should be able to adopt a system of political economy to 
America."116Laissez-faire ideology was simply irrelevant in the United States.  Neither did 
laissez-faire convey an accurate understanding of economic phenomenon.  American conditions, 
according to Raymond, engendered markets of the purest form, unaffected by corrupt human 
institutions and artificial impediments.  Here the clearest manifestations of the natural economic 
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order allowed American thinkers “much greater advantages for studying the science of political 
economy than Europeans."117 
The New World demanded a new political economy that reflected the distinct history and 
reality of the American economic experience.  For many Americans protectionism was that 
system.  As we see in the following chapter, Henry Carey crystallized protectionist ideology by 
bringing a sense of intellectual continuity to the variety of positions that made up the lexicon of 
antebellum protectionism.  In doing so, he provided the antebellum period with its most 
formidable theoretical challenge to laissez-faire economics, one that for many Americans 
represented the sharpest expression of the native economic mind.   
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Chapter VII  
Henry Carey, Nature, and the Destiny of Man  
Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to 
maintain and reproduce so must civilized men, and he must do so in all 
social formations and under all possible modes of production.  With 
this development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of 
his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy 
these wants also increase.  Freedom in this field can only consist in 
socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their 
interchange with Nature, bringing it under the common control, instead 
of being ruled by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the 
least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and 
worthy of, their human nature.1 
 
Henry Carey united protectionist ideas into a coherent ideology.  He was the most 
important thinker of American protectionism.  More than any other antebellum 
economists, he drove protectionist thought to its furthest logical conclusion.  Carey 
borrowed from a variety of antebellum intellectual and cultural sources to construct what 
stands as the most complete repudiation of British classicism.  By highlighting American 
exceptionalism, free-labor ideology, nationalism, and an optimistic vision of the natural 
economic order, Carey penetrated the paradigmatic foundations of free-trade doctrine and 
presented an economic narrative that was radically different from the British model.  His 
political economy was based on a whiggish interpretation of the American economic 
experience.  It reflected important antebellum beliefs of America’s economic destiny.  
Carey’s works epitomized not only the protectionist brand of American political 
economy, but in many ways his writings encapsulated the most authentic expression of 
the antebellum economic mind.   
 Born in Philadelphia in 1793, Carey was the eldest son of Mathew Carey.  His 
interests in political economy were sparked as a boy perusing the commercial tracts that 
passed through his father's publishing house.  At twenty-eight he succeeded his father as 
                                                            
1 Karl Marx, Capital (1894; reprint, Oxford, 1995), p. 470. 
 124 
 
a partner in the firm.  In 1834 Carey retired from the printing business to launch a career 
as a public intellectual.  He enjoyed a moderate celebrity during his time, writing 
numerous books and dozens of articles.  In protectionist circles Carey was an icon.  His 
economic ideas were widely circulated.  Carey’s works were translated into several 
languages.  And when Lincoln ascended to the White House Carey became one of the 
President's chief economic advisors.2 
 Carey’s intellectual development in some ways was analogous to the historical evolution 
of antebellum political economy.  Early in his career Carey professed the principles of Smithian 
laissez-faire.  In 1840 he completed a three-volume work illustrating a commitment to free-trade 
maxims.  He admired Smith deeply, and extolled him as "the great father of political economy."3  
But as Carey matured, he distanced his thought from the works of Malthus and Ricardo.  “Need 
we then wonder,” Carey wrote, “that by that school the field of economical science has recently 
been so reduced in its proportions that it is now limited to the consideration of the mere acts of 
buying cheaply and selling dearly, having thus become a sort of shopkeeping science.”4  If Smith 
were alive in the mid-nineteenth century, Carey posited, the Scotsman would oppose the very 
science attributed to him.5  The decisive moment in Carey’s intellectual life came one morning in 
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the 1840s when, as if struck by an epiphany, he "jumped out of bed, and dressing myself, was a 
protectionist from that hour."6 
 Indications of Carey’s liberal apostasy were communicated in his 1835 Essay on the Rate 
of Wages.  Like most Americans, he did not find evidence of Ricardo’s conclusions in prevailing 
domestic conditions.  For Carey, American industrialization would follow an alternative course 
from the British model.  Carey’s rebuke of Ricardian theories of distribution hinged on a belief in 
the exceptional circumstances enjoyed by American labor.  American workers were eager to 
contribute to the nation’s unprecedented productivity precisely because they were justly rewarded 
with a sizable share of profits.  "No people," Carey found, "ever had stronger inducements, so 
none ever pursued their avocations with more earnestness."7  Contrary to Ricardo, higher wages 
did not take from profits.  Neither did wages come from a fixed wages-fund.  Instead, wages drew 
from a rapidly increasing pool of profits and capital.  "Where wages are highest," Carey wrote, 
"there capital increases most rapidly."8  Advances in manufacturing technologies promised 
increasing returns.  Ricardo’s so-called Iron Law of Wages and Law of Diminishing Returns were 
not evident in the American economy.  Indeed, Carey found that the value of labor increased over 
time, or put another way, became more effective at exploiting capital.  Therefore, capitalists and 
workers enjoyed higher yields and greater access to the comforts of life.   
 Carey's theory of wages reflected protectionist claims that America lacked a permanent 
class structure.  By the 1850s protectionists took an increasingly whiggish tone in their 
interpretations of American industrialization.  This was a strikingly different interpretation of 
economic development from the Ricardian model.  Carey celebrated free-labor mythology and 
                                                            
6 Quote found in Malcolm Rogers Eiselen, The Rise of Pennsylvania Protectionism (New York, 1974), p. 
176.   
7 Henry Carey, Essay on the Rate of Wages (1835; reprint, New York, 1965),pp. 145, 23, 32, 83, 88, 90. 
 
8 Ibid., p. 23. 
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touted social mobility as hallmarks of the American economic experience.  His wage doctrine 
also helped further the divided between protectionism and classical doctrine over theories of rent 
and profit.  Ricardo maintained that as population and capital increased humanity moved to 
cultivate less fertile lands, dwindling returns on capital and labor.  Carey rejected this historical 
narrative.  He criticized Ricardo for presuming that the earliest settlers cultivated the most fecund 
lands.  Instead, Carey argued that the most fertile lands were rarely the first to be tilled.  Early 
settlements, often times selected for their strategic positioning, required little clearing, seldom 
occupied a region's most alluvial soils, and generally afforded a small return to labor.  These 
settlements were typically founded during the primitive stages of civilization and were therefore 
ploughed using experimental tools and archaic agronomics.  Only after a community felt secure 
did men venture out, from the "hills and mountains toward the rich lands at their feet: and 
everywhere, with the growth of number, penetrating the earth to reach the lower soils."9  With 
each passing generation more fertile lands were discovered, cultivated with more effective 
implements that facilitated larger returns to labor and capital.        
 Carey’s interpretation of migratory patterns pointed to human agency as the determining 
factor in rents.  Carey’s theory of rent reflected the prevailing optimism Americans harbored over 
their ability to control the economic fate of the nation.  He rejected the Ricardian assumption that 
rent was dependent upon the "original and indestructible powers of the soil."  For Carey, 
agricultural yields were controlled by man's imposition of their labor and capital on nature.  
"Labor and skill have been applied, and the difficulty is removed, a consequence of which is that 
they are becoming very valuable, although their fertility is no greater than before."10  The 
development of technology and the ability of man to employ its labor more effectively meant that 
the greatest returns lay in the distant future.  Carey infused his theory of rent with a buoyant 
                                                            
9 Henry Carey, The Past, the Present, & the Future (1847; reprint, New York, 1967), p. 48. 
 
10 Henry Carey, Principles of Political Economy (1837; reprint, New York, 1965), vol. I, p. 46. 
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optimism.  "We possess no means of measuring the extent of the powers of the earth.  It produces 
now vastly more than it did half a century since, and the close of the present century will see it 
rendered greatly more productive than at present."11  Each successive generation builds upon the 
improvements of the previous, promising humanity greater command over natural resources. 
 Carey’s confidence relayed antebellum attitudes on the ability of Americans to mold the 
continent to their liking and shape their nation’s economic destiny.  The optimism he expressed in 
his theories of distribution was radically different from the ominous features of classical doctrine.  
Increasing returns were accelerated or slowed depending upon society's ability to, according to 
Carey, "combine their exertions for the increase of production and for mutual production, thus 
rendering their labor more productive, and promoting the further increase of production."12  
Heightened production rates were precipitated by the inclination in all men to gravitate toward 
one another and form associations that pooled together human energies.  Human association was 
inherent to the march of civilization, engendering a greater social diversity of productive powers 
and a more refined division of labor.  The latter enlarged what Carey referred to as concentrated 
"motion" or "local action."13 
 With the help of his disciple E. Peschine Smith, Carey’s theory of association was 
formulated into an economic law of human society based on organic chemistry and ecological 
studies.14  In the antebellum literature, Smith and Carey helped establish a new approach to 
economic inquiry.  Carey undermined classical conventions by presenting an alternative 
                                                            
11 Ibid., p. 130. 
 
12 Henry Carey, Principles of Political Economy, (1840; reprint, New York, 1965), vol. III, p. 252. 
 
13 Henry Carey, Principles of Social Science, (1858; reprint, New York, 1963), vol. I, p. 292. 
 
14 E. Peschine Smith studied at Columbia and Harvard, was professor of mathematics at Rochester, served 
the U.S. government as commissioner of immigration, and in 1871 began a five-year stint as special advisor 
in Japan.  His principal treatise The Manual of Political Economy was published in 1853.10% of Smith's 
work is quoted verbatim in Carey's Principles of Social Science.  Many of Carey's ideas are given emphasis 
in Smith's work. 
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understanding of the natural economic order.  Extracting the nutritional values from land, 
digesting those nutrients, and recycling residual refuse back into the ecosystem was not only the 
natural sequence, but a strategy that promised unprecedented returns.  Recycling nature's store 
was for Carey fundamental to civilization’s progress.  The intensification of association, or, the 
increase in exchanges generated by bringing together within a restricted area the forces of 
production and consumption advanced the accumulation of wealth.  "The more distant the loom 
and the anvil, the more labor and manure are wasted…The nearer the place of exchange, the less 
labor are wasted on the road, and the more uninterruptedly is labor applied…"15  When producers 
trade goods in distant markets they forfeit valuable residuals that would have otherwise been 
credited to a community’s local resources.  In short, distance precluded regeneration, for "the 
manure cannot be returned to the land."16 
 For this reason Carey chided merchant trade for inhibiting the process of association and 
thus slowing the accumulation of wealth.  His theory of association struck at Ricardian notions of 
comparative advantage and complimented the protectionist home-market argument.  Carey also 
illustrated an intellectual debt to Adam Smith.  The Scotsman had noted the efficiencies of 
domestic markets in his Wealth of Nations.17International trade widened the space between 
producers and consumers, limiting the extent of human association and exchange within a 
community.  On various occasions Carey backed the abolition of long-distance merchant 
trade.18The "converters and exchangers" of the world reaped what the farmer sowed, stole from 
                                                            
15 Henry Carey, The Harmony of Interests, Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Commercial (1851; reprint, 
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16 Carey, Principles of Social Science, vol. I, p. 367. 
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labor’s wage, and imposed an "exhausted tax" on consumers.  British laissez-faire led to what 
Carey called the "centralization" of the forces of production and consumption.19  In other words, 
by restricting the diversity of national production a population became more specialized in certain 
industries, encouraging dependence on foreign trade and preventing localized action from 
enhancing the regenerative powers of a community.  By widening the gap between producers and 
consumers national economies in general and labor especially, becomes "more completely an 
instrument of trade."20  A protective tariff was the most efficient measure at blocking the 
destructive tendencies of international trade.  Tariffs helped establish a national economy with 
regionalized divisions of labor, secured for workers and capitalists higher returns, and stalled 
domestic migration to western lands.  Most importantly for Carey, tariffs liberated America from 
the fetters of foreign markets.21 
 Although Carey claimed his theory of association was a natural economic law, like most 
protectionists his political economy rested on an understanding of economic development that 
was peculiar to antebellum America.  The association theory expressed contemporary cultural 
perceptions of how Americans might employ technology against the natural environment.  During 
the antebellum era industrial technologies were thought by many the harbingers of the modern 
age.22  The ultimate expressions of human reason, machines took on a progressive metaphysical 
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idealism.  Machinery was the "great instrument of civilization," empowering Americans in their 
historical quest to tame nature and bring the earth’s resources under their control.23 
 For Carey the earth was a passive agent; its wealth depended upon man's ability to 
combine his powers of production and consumption.  The rate at which these powers were 
coordinated determined society's technological potency, which in turn established the American 
capacity to mine from nature its wealth.  "The earth is a great machine, given to man to be 
fashioned to his purpose.  The more he fashions it, the better it feeds him, because each step is but 
preparatory to a new one more productive than the last; requiring less labor and yielding larger 
returns…He is obtaining a daily increased power of the various treasures of the earth."24  There 
was no way to tell how much from nature's store labor and capital could extract.  In the distant 
future, Carey conjectured, Americans will employ technologies to subjugate the unknown powers 
of the earth, "powers so wonderfully great that it would be absurd, with our present limited 
knowledge, to attempt a definition of their extent."25 
 Carey’s ideology of optimism contrasted starkly with the laissez-faire tradition.  It was 
based largely on the belief that Americans had at their disposal the power to direct nature’s 
course.  Contrary to classical political economy, the natural economic order was not beyond 
man’s control.  Neither was nature something to fear.  Rather nature’s immeasurable treasures 
were open to man’s exploit.  "To the power of the earth…there are no limits.  Her treasury 
overflows with the raw materials of food and clothing, and all she asks is that he will come and 
take them."26  Malthus and Ricardo, Carey argued, failed to comprehend man’s ability to wring 
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from nature what he desires.  British classicism described man as a “mere brute animal.”  “The 
real man,” Carey declared, “the being made in the image of his creator, fitted for becoming 
master of nature and an example worthy to be followed by those around him.”27  In an explicit 
rebuke of Malthus, Carey figured "twice, or thrice, ten, or twenty, or fifty times the population 
could be supported, even with our present agricultural knowledge…we cannot hesitate to admit 
that the productive power of land exists in measureless quantity."28  The English economist had 
made the profound mistake of underestimating the powers of man over nature.  Malthus and 
Ricardo were blind to the “breath of the spirit” in man.29  "Mr. Ricardo makes him,” Carey wrote, 
“throughout, the victim of a sad necessity that precludes the existence of hope.  He is destitute of 
power over the land, or over himself, and he can have no confidence in the future.  The machine 
he uses must deteriorate."30 
 Carey’s brand of protectionism stretched beyond economic analysis toward a theory on 
human evolution.  His inflated assessments of man’s position vis-à-vis nature were central to his 
economic philosophy and an explicit rebuke of British classicism.  Classical political economy, 
Carey found, "teaches, that all the evils of society are the result of one great force constantly 
impelling man in a wrong direction─increasing the number of mouths, as the machine by help of 
which, alone, they can be fed, diminishes."31  Beginning with Smith, laissez-faire posited a belief 
in a natural order governed by laws that, if they were even discernable to man's fickle 
understanding, exercised absolute command over the course of human existence.  According to 
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the British authorities, "the power of nature over man [was] steadily increasing," Carey wrote, 
with man becoming "more and more her slave."32 
 Carey transformed the economic relationship between man and nature.  Nature and 
humanity were not aligned so that the order established by Providence devolved toward self-
destruction, leaving men weak and destitute.  "The great Architect of the universe was no 
blunderer," Carey posited, "can it be, then, that after having given to man all the faculties required 
assuming the mastery of nature, it has been a part of his design, to subject him to absolute and 
irreversible laws, in virtue of which he must inevitably become nature's slave?"33For Carey man 
reigned over nature.  Her order was understood, its once troubling mystical and subliminal 
powers made "to serve the purpose of man─and with his coming we find the important difference 
that whereas all other animals were bound to continue forever the slaves of nature, he alone was 
gifted with the faculties required for enabling him to become her master, and to make her do his 
work."34  While Malthus and Ricardo looked to "the ultimate enslavement of man by nature," 
Carey reversed the sequence.35  He recounted a sweeping historical narrative of the epic struggle 
between the physical powers of the earth and the intellectual powers of humanity.  "Matter and 
mind were to be brought face to face with each other, contending for mastery of the world; the 
former armed with powers so prodigious that words scarcely suffice for their enumeration and 
description; the latter at first so weak as to be deficient in many of the qualities by means of 
which even the lowest animals had been fitted for self-preservation."  Nature's colossus bore 
down heavily on man's frail and feeble intellect, bringing distress and privation to the early 
human condition.  With time civilization's march began, and "step by step, mind is seen gaining 
                                                            
32 Ibid., vol. III, pp. 134, 147. 
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on its opponent, seizing his outworks and on the instant turning upon him the captured gains, each 
forward movement proving thus by simple preparation for a new and greater one."36 
 In Carey's dialogue with laissez-faire the destiny of man held an inestimable 
improvement in the human condition.  The industrial revolution was the catalyst in Carey's 
narrative.  Industrialization accelerated humanity’s exploitation of nature, "constantly battering at 
her gates, and overthrowing her walls."37  History was the story of man's progress.  Carey's work 
is very much a solicitation for political economy to recognize man's newly acquired dominance 
over nature.  Americans’ ability to employ technology over nature was an increasingly popular 
concept by the end of the antebellum period.38  "At every step there is an increased consciousness 
in man of the existence of power to improve his condition, producing increased desire of 
improvement.  Desire produces determination, and determination creates power."39  A more 
effective deployment of industrial technologies left nature subject to man’s will.  "With each 
addition thereto, he finds less resistance to his further efforts; and hence it is, that each successive 
discovery proves to be but the precursor of new and greater ones.”  “Each successive year” Carey 
continued, “thus augments the power of man, and with every new discovery utility is given to 
forces that now are being wasted.  The more they are being utilized─the more nature is made to 
labor in man's service─the less is the quantity of human effort required for the reproduction."40 
 Market forces and the natural economic laws that Smith, Malthus and Ricardo had argued 
humanity was powerless over were cast in a new light by Carey.  The market could be controlled, 
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the natural order fashioned to the benefit of man, and nature’s forces brought under man's 
dominion.  The pessimism of the classical school seemed if not entirely unwarranted, then 
certainly excessive.  Carey premised his political economy on the economics of affluence.  He 
offered an alternative to the British political economy of poverty.  "The whole English politico-
economical system," he maintained, was "invented for the purpose of accounting for the poverty 
and wretchedness which are its results."41 
 This belief contributed to calls for a distinctly American political economy.  A "really 
American policy," Carey wrote just after the Civil War.42  The success of protectionist ideology 
in the antebellum and post-Civil War periods indicates that American economic culture was 
primed for a paradigmatic alternative to British laissez-faire.  For an American system of 
economic thought protectionists believed the native mind needed to turn inward.  Carey’s 
protectionism reflected an understanding that the United States advanced toward unchartered 
economic territories of unprecedented material prosperity.  The American experience required a 
nuanced intellectual framework, one radically different from Old World traditions, and one that 
reflected the economics of the American conscience. 
   Although Carey’s brand of protectionism was in the main an expression of Northern 
economic ambitions, it drew from an assortment of cultural and intellectual traditions that 
permeated much of American intellectual and economic history.  Under Carey, protectionism 
combined various strains of the American economic mind into a single ideology.  It made 
American exceptionalism the central piece of an overtly optimistic political economy that 
rebuked the dismal forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo.  In doing so, protecitonists helped relieve 
domestic anxieties over the negative social consequences of industrialization.  Protectionism 
promised that the tariff would serve as a practical measure to soften labor’s transition into the 
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industrial age.  In no way did the protectionists wish to overturn free-market institutions in the 
domestic economy.  Instead, they challenged the agrarian disposition of the antebellum free-trade 
movement by formulating a political economy aimed at hastening the proliferation of industrial 
capitalism in domestic markets.  The protectionists also relied on an understanding of 
international relations that legitimated contemporary concerns of foreign aggression.  Finally, the 
protectionists constructed an economic ideology unequivocally opposed to the extremism of 
Southern reactionaries.  By fusing these components into a unified school of economic thought 
the protectionists believed their ideology met American aspirations for industrialization, and 
political and economic independence.        
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Chapter VIII 
Liberalism, Republicanism, and Finance 
 
Had a committee of clever men been selected to devise means by which the 
public might be tempted to engage in all manner of absurd projects, and be most 
easily duped and swindled, we do not know that they could have hit upon 
anything half so likely to effect their object as the existing American banking 
system.  It has no one redeeming quality about it, but is from beginning to end a 
compound of quackery and imposture.1 
 
 Henry Carey cemented the divisions between American laissez-faire and protectionism.  
The distinctions in antebellum discussions of trade did not, however, extend to every aspect of the 
economy.  When it came to finance and financial markets, Americans entertained a variety of 
perspectives, few of which conform to the conventional understanding of economics and 
ideology.  Most expressed feelings of skepticism and suspicion, but the opposition to finance took 
on several shades of theoretical nuance.  Critics described financial institutions as obscure, 
shadowy and not quite legitimate, a position that even the most dedicated pro-market economist 
shared.  Indeed, the opposition to finance sprung typically from the most ardent supporters of 
free-market economics.  Likewise, advocates of finance encouraged state intervention.  In short, 
Americans constructed as dynamic a discourse on finance as they had on industry and trade.  
Opponents and supporters drew ambiguous ideological lines unique to the antebellum discourse.  
In both cases, the literature lacked a definitive consensus, showcasing the general discord that 
marked antebellum political economy.                                                       
 Historians of antebellum finance tend to simplify the complexities of the financial 
discourse.  One interpretation posits a neat division between two rival camps.  These historians 
define the differences as a kind of class warfare, with those opposed to the expansion of finance 
pitted against an enterprising elite bent on modernizing financial institutions at the expense of the 
common man.  According to this interpretation, lower class urban workers and farmers joined 
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Navigation (Philadelphia, 1852), vol. II, p. 778.  
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forces to wage war on financial capitalism; Andrew Jackson led them.  The resistance crystallized 
in 1832 with Jackson's veto of the Bank of the United States.  The president's use of class rhetoric 
lends credence to the class-conflict interpretation.  In his bank veto message to the Senate, 
Jackson lamented "that the rich and the powerful too often bend the acts of government to their 
selfish purposes...make the rich richer and the potent more powerful."2  Suspicions of an 
aristocracy of banking marauders led King Mob, according to one historian, to whip up into a 
frenzy "a democratic challenge to bourgeois/middle class hegemony that is unparalleled in 
presidential annals" and "politicize popular resistance to capitalist transformation by mobilizing 
patriarchal democracy against the money power."3  In short, opposition to finance precipitated a 
wider struggle against capitalism. 
 Other historians have found less class conflict in Jacksonian America.  What Jackson 
wanted, they argue, was more not fewer banks.  Jackson exemplified an incipient bred of 
bourgeois individualism intent on democratizing capitalism, liberating markets, and facilitating 
access to cheap credit.  All Americans desired a thriving financial sector; they did not organize 
against it.  An authority on this interpretation, Bray Hammond, writes, "The millionaires created 
by the so-called Jacksonian revolution of 'agrarians' against 'capitalists'―of the democracy 
against the money power―were richer than those they dispossessed, they were more numerous, 
they were quite as ruthless; and laissez faire, after destroying the monopolies and vested rights 
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the Jacksonians decried, produced far greater ones."4  Jackson's veto message, according to 
Richard Hofstadter, "is not the philosophy of a radical leveling movement…What is demanded is 
only the classic bourgeois ideal…This is the philosophy of a rising middle class; its aim is not to 
throttle but to liberate business, to open every possible pathway for the creative enterprise of the 
people."5 
 This chapter argues against both of these interpretations.  It introduces a middle variant 
expressed by most antebellum political economists.  Though liberal in most aspects of their 
economic philosophy, these moderates opposed financial capitalism (even while they celebrated 
markets and capitalism in all other aspects).  Most possessed not an anti-capitalist nerve in their 
body, but all dreaded the moral, social, political, and economic consequences of financial 
institutions.  Indeed, opposition to finance was testament to an economist’s devotion to free 
markets.  The opposition literature also drew inspiration from a classical republican tradition 
whose origins stretched to Augustan England.6  Antebellum critics of finance fused laissez-faire 
and classical republicanism to form a financial opposition ideology unique to America.     
 The seminal event in antebellum finance was Jackson’s veto of the Bank of the United 
States.  "I do not dislike your Bank any more than all banks," Jackson wrote BUS president 
Nicholas Biddle in 1829, "but ever since I read the history of the South Sea Bubble I have been 
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afraid of banks."7  Jackson was referring to England’s first major financial crisis in the early 
eighteenth century.8  The South Sea Bubble of 1720 incited a republican style of economic 
thought that had at its center opposition to finance.9  Jackson’s republican political economy was 
likely informed by the English protest writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon.  From 
1720 until 1724 they penned essays for the London Journal later published as Cato's Letters.  
Trenchard and Gordon were the principal fund from which most Americans learned of English 
opposition thought.10  Whether Americans realized it or not, they repeated the same arguments 
and used almost identical rhetorical strategies as England's classical republicans.  The migration 
of English opposition thought to America points to a fairly consistent attempt at the formulation 
of a decidedly anti-finance strain in republican political economy.11 
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 In America, republican opposition to finance first surfaced in response to Alexander 
Hamilton’s program for financial modernization.  Presented in the early 1790s, Hamilton’s plan 
included the assumption of states’ debts, discrimination in the repayment of revolutionary debt, 
increases in domestic excise and tariffs, the funding of the national debt, and the establishment of 
a national bank.12  He declared credit the “invigorating principle.”13  And Hamilton’s brainchild, a 
national bank, was touted as “an institution of primary importance to the prosperous 
administration of the finances" that encouraged "the augmentation of active or productive capital" 
and provided a boom to the national economy.14  His scheme was based in part on the 
controversial point that "public debts are public blessings."15  In his view, the modernization of 
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domestic finance would improve America's credit rating.16  Trust in the nation's financial 
institutions was, according to Hamilton, "the palladium of public safety."17  By attracting the 
interests of financiers, the republic’s strongest economic supporters would come from the 
financial sector.  "To promote the increasing respectability of the American name,” Hamilton 
wrote, “to cement more closely the union of the states…[and] to add to their security against 
foreign attack."18 
 The sharpest critique of Hamilton’s agenda came from John Taylor of Caroline.  Taylor 
was born in 1753 into the political elite of Virginia’s gentry.  A distant cousin of James Madison, 
a confidant of Thomas Jefferson, and son-in-law to a signee of the Declaration of Independence, 
Taylor served in the Virginia House of Delegates and in the U.S. Senate.  He authored a number 
of political, social, and economic tracts that exemplified Southern republican opposition to the 
expansion of finance.19  Taylor died in Port Royal, Virginia in 1824, not far from where Fitzhugh 
took up residence five years later.  Taylor established a pattern of oppositional thought that 
anticipated the anti-finance movement of the later-antebellum period.  Thus, he embraced the 
principles of laissez-faire economics, at the same time, he repudiated financial institutions.   
 Taylor’s opposition to finance rested on a laissez-faire-republican critique of the 
relationship between financial institutions and legislatures.  "By incorporations, great bodies 
politic, whole parties, and entire states, may be degraded into clientage, and bribed to obedience; 
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and legislators themselves may participate in every bonus they bestow."20  And like most early 
antebellum republican opponents of finance, Taylor incorporated a pastoral idealism into his 
critique of financial institutions.  Combining laissez-faire with agrarianism was common in the 
antebellum movement against finance.  The expansion of finance hastened "a decay and 
impoverishment both in mind and fortune of the landed gentry, and an exchange of that honest, 
virtuous, patriotic and bold class of men, for an order of stock-jobbers in loans, banks, 
manufactories…and an infinite number of inferior tricks to get money, calculated to instill 
opposite principles."21  In republican political economy, agriculture provided the source of 
wealth; therefore, the prosperity of financiers came at the expense of farmers.  "Hence we see 
capital flying from the fields,” Taylor wrote, “to the legal monopolies, banking and 
manufacturing.  The laws have established a thousand modes by which capital will produce 
quicker and larger profits, than when employed in the slow improvement of agriculture."22 
 Taylor’s agrarianism should not discount his attachment to free markets.  A disciple of 
Adam Smith, according to one historian, Taylor “applauded economic ambition, consumptive 
goals, and profits as high as one can earn by honest labor and fair exchange.”23  His dedication to 
laissez-faire did not interrupt his opposition to what was becoming a fixture of free-market 
economies─financial capitalism.  To suggest, as Hammond has, that Taylor’s opposition was 
based on an agrarian “ignorance of banking” is inaccurate.  Neither is it correct to imply that 
Taylor’s opposition lent itself to an unbridled entrepreneurialism.24  These characterizations 
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minimize the complexities of Taylor’s republican distrust of finance.  It was entirely possible to 
champion free markets while simultaneously attack finance.  Taylor’s republican economic 
thought was a prominent strain in the antebellum literature, one that embraced a nuanced version 
of laissez-faire-republicanism and expressed concerns of Americans genuinely bothered by 
financial institutions.  His economic thought was at the crossroads of republicanism and 
liberalism.  He did not attack free markets; he made war on financial corporations.      
 The laissez-faire, anti-finance position of Taylor reflected structural changes taking place 
in the antebellum economy.  Opponents like Taylor struggled to reconcile their attachment to free 
markets with financial institutions.  The modern financial economy, with its regional, national, 
and sometimes global credit networks tied even the most disconnected market participants to the 
complexities of finance.  Credit as form of social mutuality, or trust, facilitated network-building 
in the commercial community, and credit offered numerous economic opportunities.  But credit 
also made individuals vulnerable to an interdependent and sometimes arbitrary economic order 
where mutuality felt like dependency.  Only recently have historians started to explore the effects 
of financial institutions on the social and cultural character of antebellum America.  Public 
attitudes toward finance, particularly debt and insolvency began to change during the early 
1800’s.  The traditional understanding of economic failures as consequence of personal 
indiscretions and moral culpability was replaced by an awareness that insolvency could result 
from market pressures outside an individual’s reach and that failure was to some degree inherent 
to antebellum commercial enterprises.25 
 Republican anti-finance showcased the trouble many Americans had in accepting the 
social externalities of the financial revolution.  Their commitment to an idealized past 
characterized by hierarchical relations was shaken at its very foundations by the expansion of 
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financial capitalism.  To some historians, this has been taken to mean that republican economic 
thinkers were backward looking in all aspects of their thought.  Gordon Wood argues that the 
republican synthesis of the antebellum period was "essentially anti-capitalistic."  According to 
Wood, republicanism represented "a final attempt to come to terms with the emergent 
individualistic society that threatened to destroy once and for all the communion and benevolence 
that civilized men had always considered to the be the ideal of human behavior."26 In fact, 
however, Wood’s interpretation of republican ideology in early America simplifies the 
ideological retinues of Taylor and other republicans.  Wood and other historians fail to 
understand the republicanism of America that both accepted free markets yet held finance 
capitalism in contempt.   
   The South Carolina economist Thomas Cooper exemplifies this point.  Cooper in many 
ways stands as the essential representation of how free marketers treated finance.  As we saw in 
chapter 3, Cooper vigorously advanced laissez-faire principles.  He attacked financial institutions 
for the same reason he criticized tariffs.  Finance and tariffs derived from corrupt legislatures 
pandering to the interests of capitalists.  Cooper, however, broke from the earlier generations of 
republicans like Taylor in distinct ways.  He integrated into his opposition to finance a more 
explicit defense of free-market institutions.  Cooper also neglected to engage in the type of 
romantic eulogies of an agrarian, pre-capitalist, primitive economy that were characteristic of 
Taylor’s thought.27 
 Cooper’s republican opposition to finance was also based on political and social theory.  
He opposed the incorporation of banks on constitutional grounds.  "I am unshaken in my 
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opinion,” Cooper argued, “that every bank charter is unconstitutional: depriving the great 
majority of citizens, of rights...and conferring exclusive privileges on another class, upon motives 
and pretense often fraudulent, seldom excusable, never justifiable.”  Bank speculators and 
legislators, Cooper found, "have too much of a fellow feeling."28  Corporate limited liability 
especially, he charged, sanctioned "a mode of swindling" that sacrificed the earnings of decent 
laborers to the risks and misjudgments of others.29  "I REST ON REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES," 
Cooper declared, "a monopoly of privilege, with power of acquiring profit without limitation, 
conferred on persons whose liability to pay their debts does not extend beyond the share of which 
they posses in a joint stock of a privileged company, is a fraud on the honest and confiding part of 
the public."30  Corporate proprietors accumulated debts without incurring any responsibility 
beyond their invested stake.  For Cooper, this standard corporate practice discouraged community 
trust.  Absolving a man from repaying debt flew in the face of traditional standards of social and 
moral justice.  "How then are they to know to what extent to trust this company, who may (as 
often has been done) divide their principal, as a dividend of annual profits, and then sell out to 
unsuspecting purchasers not in the secret?"31 
 Cooper represents a shift in the intellectual development of American republican 
criticisms of finance.32  Cooper’s critique of finance relied less on the agrarian values that 
characterize Taylor’s work.  His Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy was published 
the same year as Jefferson’s death (1826), and the work signifies a kind of changing of the guard.  
As the nation matured Southern economic thought grew attached to an anti-statist disposition.  
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Although Taylor railed against state intervention in financial markets, his opposition to finance 
was not tied to a defense of slavery.  For Cooper, opposition to finance was couched in a states-
rights, pro-slavery ideology.  Southern political economists employed republicanism more as a 
supplement to laissez-faire.  Cooper developed this line of thought by synthesizing anti-
corporatist republicanism and laissez-faire arguments for a circumscribed federal government.33 
 Cooper’s opposition to finance was also focused more on the corporatist model of bank 
charters.  He favored free-banking, or, the end of chartered corporations with debt liabilities 
limited to their subscriptions.  Like many republicans of the Jacksonian era, Cooper recognized 
finance as an integral piece of the nineteenth-century economy.  Thus, his reforms aimed at 
limiting the influence financial institutions had on legislatures.  Free-banking, Cooper argued, 
would encourage conservative lending practices and institute in banking a renewed ethic and 
responsibility.  "I have no objection in great and expensive undertakings to joint stock 
companies,” Cooper wrote, “but the common law of partnership is equity, viz: those who claim a 
dividend of unlimited profits, are liable to the loss.”  “All this can be managed well enough 
without the interference of government or the legislature,” Cooper continued, “who are seldom 
known to meddle but to do mischief…we may surely venture in this new country to say, when 
our rulers attempt to regulate the private investment of capital, 'let us alone.'"34 
 Cooper's free-banking approach reflected a society growing more accepting of the 
economic benefits afforded by financial institutions.  By 1820 there were over 350 banks in the 
United States.  In the five years that followed Jackson’s so-called war on banks, an additional 200 
banks were established.35  During this period, in the South there was a 130% increase of notes in 
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circulation; in the wild-cat West a 100% increase; and in the more conservative East a 50% 
increase.36  All the while specie reserves in most cases hovered around 4%.  The proliferation of 
banks corresponded with the expansion of other financial and monetary institutions.  By 1830 
there were approximately 10,000 business corporations in the United States.  Stock exchanges in 
New York and Philadelphia traded securities, debt, and commercial notes on margin and were 
informed by credit reporting agencies.  A seemingly perpetual call for more credit could be heard 
for much of the antebellum period.  The financial sector responded accordingly by facilitating 
information symmetry and licensing some 1500 banks by 1857, all of which helped monetize and 
integrate a financial system that by 1860 had over $6 billion invested in the American economy.37 
The financialization of the antebellum economy is not, however, evidence that American 
hostility toward finance was insignificant.  Financial institutions developed in spite of the anti-
finance consensus that marked the period’s economic literature.  Indeed, even the advocates of 
finance agreed that certain tendencies of financial institutions were damaging to the social and 
economic fabric of America and thus required state oversight.   
During the second-half of the antebellum period Whigs were consistently the group that 
advocated the development of American finance.38  And like the laissez-faire republicans, Whigs 
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blurred the lines of economics and ideology.  The Whigs backed the modernization of American 
financial institutions, but they did so from a decidedly anti-market position.  The Whig model for 
developing antebellum finance was driven by state initiatives.  In the antebellum economic 
discourse, arguments in favor of expanding finance were typically set in a broader economic 
agenda that was hostile to market imperatives.  Put differently, the champions of American 
finance were often the enemies of free markets.     
This is not to say all Whigs conformed to a statist program.  Whigs exhibited flexibility 
in their policy and ideological positions toward finance.  And while Whigs were in the avant-
garde of the movement to modernize the domestic economy, many within the Party expressed 
serious reservations over the social externalities associated with the expansion of finance.39  
Whigs had the appetite for the financial capitalism, but only so long as finance was carefully 
managed by legislatures.  
The New Englander Nathan Appleton exemplified Whig ambiguities toward finance.  A 
‘cotton Whig,’ financier, merchant, and principal of the ‘Boston Associates,’ Appleton articulated 
the Whig case for restricting the expansion of banking.  Born in New Hampshire in 1779, 
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Appleton became a leader in American industry.  He was one of the founders of the 
manufacturing complexes at Waltham and Lowell.  Appleton also served in the Massachusetts 
House of Representatives, was elected to Congress in the early 1830s as an anti-Jacksonian, and 
later in the 1840s as a Whig.  He died in 1861.40 
 Appleton’s critique of antebellum banking echoed the concerns of America’s commercial 
and industrial elite.  He was suspicious of the entrepreneurial nouveau riches that the domestic 
banking system encouraged.  Appleton’s criticisms were different from republican opponents.  
Agrarian hostility toward banks, he wrote, derived “from a superficial view of the subject.”41  
Still, Appleton criticized the role of reckless bank directors for abandoning moral responsibility in 
their business practices.  Suspension of payments in particular, once a rarity that he considered 
“an opiate, which if justifiable at all, can only be justifiable where the paroxysms are so violent as 
to endanger life,” Appleton chided for having become a regular fixture of the domestic 
economy.42  In this way Appleton confirmed the social concerns of Taylor.  Bank suspensions 
amounted to an act of ethical impropriety.  “It is difficult to perceive how honorable men,” 
Appleton wrote, “holding the office of bank directors, can reconcile a continued suspension to a 
proper sense of moral obligation.”43 
Appleton broke with republican critics, however, by attaching to his paternalistic review 
of banking upstarts a discussion of the wider social and economic benefits provided by sound 
financial institutions.  Credit was fundamental to the national economy, as was paper currency, he 
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argued.  Contrary to hard-money activists, paper currency was more practical than a metallic 
medium.  Neither were currency brokers parasites preying on an unsuspecting public.  They 
afforded a legitimate public service in exchanging notes disfavored by the community.  To 
counter the negligent bank directors of the so-called ‘wildcats,’ Appleton recommended, in the 
words of one historian, “mechanisms for enforcing responsibility.”44  He suggested restrictions on 
the ability of banks to issue currency with a stringent specie-to-note ratio of 20% and a 3% tax on 
circulating notes.45  Appleton figured the latter would reduce the profitability of banks whose 
only function was issuing notes for circulation.  His aim was to abolish banks established for 
speculative purposes.  The merits of market competition, according to Appleton, should not 
preclude the establishment of highly capitalize national and regional banks from policing the 
smaller country banks.   
Appleton’s position reflected the entrenched financial and industrial interests that 
populated the elite ranks of the New England Whig party.  Their opposition did not originate 
from republican concerns.  And, unlike Cooper, they exhibited little confidence in market 
mechanism to facilitate financial expansion.  Appleton did however, share with republican and 
laissez-faire opponents anxiety over certain social effects of finance.  Indeed, their call for state 
management over financial markets indicates that even within the New England Whig business 
mainstream, there circulated serious reservations over the nature of financial institutions.46 
 Not all Whigs shared a statist perspective on financial matters.  Richard Hildreth, for 
instance, offered what stands as the most acute Whig endorsement of free-banking.  For Hildreth, 
support of financial institutions did not necessitate abandonment of laissez-faire principles.  His 
dedication to free markets, yet his opposition to financial corporatism conflicted with 
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conventional Whig thought.  Hildreth’s free-market critique of finance indicates that some Whigs 
corresponded to the republican anti-finance movement.  Born in 1807, Hildreth’s seminal work 
was a six-volume History of the United States published between 1849 and 1852.  Harvard 
educated, abolitionist, poet, essayist, moral philosopher, and founder and editor of the Boston-
based Whig paper the Atlas, Hildreth presented his views of American finance in his 1840 Banks, 
Banking, and Paper Currencies.47 
Although Whigs normally supported state intervention in the economy, for Hildreth, 
however, the financial sector had been ruined by state meddling.  He criticized state and national 
legislatures for disrupting the otherwise natural and sound operations of financial institutions.  
State intervention in the financial sector was originated from strictly political motivations, 
Hildreth concluded.  Jacksonian opposition to finance was, Hildreth argued, “for the purpose of 
creating a new bank, the stock of which might be shared among their friends and partisans.”  The 
state banks that fought against Biddle were rewarded the following year with the redistribution of 
federal deposits, the “spoils of victory” according to Hildreth.48  This was not unusual, for no 
matter their political disposition “it was most amply justified by the practice of all our legislative 
bodies, which have ever been in the constant habit of confining the grant of bank charters to 
influential persons of the prevailing political party.”49 
Hildreth’s rebuke of political finance was rare for antebellum Whigs.  His anti-
corporatist, laissez-faire criticisms of the BUS showcased the complexities in the Whig financial 
discourse.  It also indicates a lack of consensus within the pro-finance movement.  Hildreth 
advocated banking be controlled not “at the mercy of ignorant and reckless politicians, or at the 
mercy, no less to be deprecated, of a few purse-proud, domineering, dictatorial bank directors,” 
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but by the “Laws of Trade─laws which do not act by jerks and starts…but by a constant, steady, 
gentle, yet inevitable pressure.”50Hildreth’s recommendations amounted to free banking.  He 
disparaged the national bank, referring to the institution as a “sort of absolute monarch.”  Hildreth 
argued that by eliminating the monopoly control of the national bank, along with promulgating 
general laws for bank incorporations, market forces would check profligate circulation of notes 
through regular calls for redemption.51Hildreth was aware of the speculative and corrupt 
tendencies of financial institutions.  However, his admiration for banks as agents of economic 
progress combined with his desire to see the financial sector expand freed from the fetters of state 
makes Hildreth something of an anomaly in the antebellum discourse.       
The reforms suggested by Whigs like Appleton and Hildreth were amplified by the 
opposition movement of the later-antebellum period (1830-1860).  The later-antebellum 
opponents of finance expressed a dedication to laissez-faire principles by advocating the absolute 
withdraw of state intervention from the financial sector.  But by forcing banks to conform to 
market forces, opponents aimed at limiting the social, political, and economic influence of 
financial institutions.  The central features of this literature drew on the republican style of 
thought that harkened back to John Taylor.  "The great banking bubble of American was the same 
in principle as the South Sea Bubble," a Jacksonian noted, "but of longer continuance, and 
involved in it the fortunes of the whole community."52  Other later-antebellum opponents widened 
criticisms of earlier republicans to challenge the foundational principles on which antebellum 
finance rested.     
Republican political economy continued to serve critics as a vehicle to attack finance.  
But in this case republicanism was not engaged as a medium to articulate an agrarian hostility 
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toward capitalism.  More than the Augustan English and Southern detractors like Taylor, the 
later-antebellum critics recognized finance as a permanent staple of a free-market system most 
cherished.  Like Cooper, they fused a more explicit and thorough synthesis between 
republicanism and laissez-faire.     
The later-antebellum critics certainly found the same reasons as earlier republicans to 
condemn the moral dangers of finance.  Financial institutions were responsible for engendering a 
social psychology marked by a frantic mental state that surrendered all rational thought.  
Financiers employed "every art of cajolery and allurement…excited a thirst for speculation…until 
it increased to a delirious fever, and men, in the epidemic frenzy of the hour, wildly rush upon all 
sorts of desperate adventures."53  Profligate extensions of credit and specious expansions of paper 
money induced "a reckless fanatical spirit of speculation, unparalled, perhaps, in the history of the 
world."54  Finance also normalized a debased ethic in commercial affairs that undermined social 
morality and justice.  The financial system "is wrong in principle, and must be ruinous in its 
effects on the integrity, the morals and the ultimate prosperity of a people."55 
Antebellum critics kept to the traditions of republican political economy by focusing 
much of their contempt on credit.  Credit created a socio-economic order based on fantasy and 
delusion.  "A very uncertain and fluctuating thing," credit contorted reality by distoring personal 
and social estimations of an individual’s wealth.56  Mental and emotional psychoses were 
offshoots of a frenzied credit-filled atmosphere “that madden the brains of whole communities,” 
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casualties of a banking system that served as "the insane root that takes the reason 
prison."57Credit also transformed the social division of labor by promoting speculation and 
encouraging Americans to avoid traditional forms of labor.  The plough stood idle, the merchant 
square vacated, and the workshop fell silent, "while to those employed in the paper money 
laboratories, the temptations to fraud and peculation are so strong, and the opportunities so 
inviting, that many men of ordinary honesty are thereby turned into rogues."58  In short, credit 
slowed the progress of market-driven economic development.  Credit was also damned for its 
association with debt.  Indebtedness was akin to slavery; the person and property of debtors 
subjugated to the whims of creditors.  A source of humiliation and shame, debt signified the worst 
kind of oppression, for a debtor was always "reduced to the condition of his bondsman or serf."  
"The prolific mother of crime," debt "taints the course of life in all its streams."59 
 Later-antebellum opponents used similar rhetorical strategies as earlier republican critics, 
but they also broke from earlier traditions by intensifying the claim that finance undermined free-
market institutions.  As they grew more familiar with the internal operations of banks they began 
to detect the ways, as they saw it, that banks violated the basic principles of the free market.   
They harbored special animosity toward the practice of limited liability.   
 Condy Raguet offered the period’s most developed critique of limited liability.  Born in 
Philadelphia in 1784, Raguet was a merchant and journalist by trade, served several terms in the 
Pennsylvania state senate as a Federalist, and had a brief stint as American consul to Brazil.  
After diplomatic service, Raguet returned to Philadelphia in 1827 and found himself in the lion’s 
den of protectionism.  To counter the protectionist movement, in 1829 Raguet established the 
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Free Trade Advocate.  Two years later he organized a Free Trade Convention in Philadelphia 
attended by the leading laissez-faire spokesmen of the period.60 
 Raguet’s criticisms of limited liability were articulated as affirmation of laissez-faire 
principles.  Confidence and responsibility were critical social values in a market economy, both 
of which were undermined when legislatures failed to hold banks accountable for their debts.  
Releasing corporate bodies from discharging their debts was an affront to commercial and social 
integrity.  "To destroy all moral sense of justice and rectitude by absolving each individual from 
personal liability” Raguet wrote, “as if a legislative act could absolve men from the discharge of 
their moral duties, or which the payment of debts, where there is ability, is one."61 
 Raguet’s desire for strengthening ethical standards in the financial sector sprung from a 
laissez-faire disposition.  Free markets were effective only in so far as they helped balance private 
and public interests.  Indeed, he held bankers to a higher set of socially responsible values in 
order to foster healthy and honest competitive financial markets.  Acts of incorporation did not 
pardon men for acts of impropriety.  Raguet suggested enforcement of strict convertibility of 
paper notes.  By holding corporate investors and bank directors responsible for their paper 
obligations, "the over-trading of each particular bank would be checked by the prudent regard to 
self-interest which would operate upon its managers; and if recklessness should characterize the 
conduct of one, or a dozen, or a hundred, it or they would simply fail, like individual traders."62 
 Raguet contributed to a widening literature in the later-antebellum period that highlighted 
the social injustices perpetuated by financial institutions.  These tendencies, according to Raguet 
and others prevented the expansion of market economies.  Much of this literature focused on the 
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supposed evils of paper currency.  Paper notes represented fictitious values, at times redeemable 
for fractions of their alleged worth, at other times not redeemable at all, but at all times a 
"fraudulent system of money making out of rags."  A bank note was simply a debt, a "paper 
trash" containing "no intrinsic value and which a breath of public suspicion may at any time 
destroy."63  Moreover, critics charged that specie convertibility was a farce.  It was tacitly 
understood that paper notes were not backed by bullion.  "All men of ordinary sagacity know that 
the representative character of convertible paper money is, in part at least, an ingenious 
fiction."64Indeed, as one cynic wrote, "the whole amount of the precious metals scattered 
throughout the world, would scarcely be sufficient to redeem the paper credits of the United 
States."65 
 Later-antebellum opposition to paper currency should not be confused for an anti-
capitalist ideology.  Indeed, the opposition literature insisted that by revolutionizing financial 
institutions a more durable free market would emerge, promoting the interests of business and 
labor and encouraging economic growth.  Wild fluctuations in currency values traumatized 
market participants.  "Its tendencies are eminently demoralizing.  By its alternate and ever 
recurring expansions and contractions of the money machine, it keeps the standard of value 
constantly vibrating.  This unsettles business as well as prices; it makes fortunes and mars them; 
it excites men's gambling propensities...it leads to recklessness, extravagance, and immoral 
practices."66 
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William Gouge was the period’s most distinguished laissez-faire opponent of paper 
money.  Born in 1796, his 1833 The Curse of Paper Money and Banking: or A Short History of 
Paper Money served as "the bible" of the Jacksonian hard-money movement, was widely read, 
and earned Gouge an international reputation on banking.67  A journalist and publisher by trade, 
Gouge also worked intermittently in the Treasury Department for 30 years.68  In 1841 he edited 
the Jacksonian Journal of Banking.  There he repeated the standard Jacksonian maxim, "we are 
friendly to free banking."  But Gouge was referring only to banks of deposits, lending and 
discount, not to the free issue of notes.  "Free competition in paper money banking would be little 
more than a competition of cunning," fostering a commercial environment that was "essentially 
evil."69 
Gouge exhibits the various shades of ideological distinctions that Americans harbored in 
their opposition to finance.  He imagined himself a "disinterested political economist" responsible 
for helping Americans understand that prevailing economic difficulties were the effects of"a 
Banking system resting on principles fundamentally erroneous."70  Gouge was not anti-capitalist.  
Rather he defended adamantly the sanctity of private property and the accumulation of wealth.  
His denunciations of corporate banks and demands for replacing the paper currency with a 
metallic medium were couched in a Smithian laissez-faire ideology.  These associations were not 
incompatible in the antebellum discourse.  Neither was Gouge’s hard-money program suggestive 
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of a labor/agrarian extremism as some historians have implied.71  “Make gold and silver coins the 
exclusive money of the country,” Gouge declared, “and the evils of the system would be greatly 
diminished.”72  He genuinely believed paper currency hindered economic growth.  Gouge helped 
bring legitimacy to the hard-money movement by outlining the feasibility of abolishing paper 
money.  What he and other hard-money advocates expressed was a growing desire among 
Americans of various classes and politics for a practical though revolutionary alternative to the 
prevailing monetary order.73 
  Gouge’s writings demonstrate that the hard-money movement articulated criticisms 
entirely compatible with laissez-faire values, and thus centered squarely in the antebellum 
mainstream.  Most Jacksonian opponents were not radical outliers.  Neither were opponents 
necessarily interested in reforms intended to democratize and cheapen access to credit markets.  
The opposition movement was led by individuals who found finance anathema to both social 
justice and laissez-faire principles, and thus sought reforms aimed at preserving market 
institutions.     
 The Massachusetts lawyer Lysander Spooner illustrates this point.  Spooner’s criticisms 
were reminiscent of republican conventions; however they were marked by an exaggerated 
commitment to laissez-faire values.  Born in 1808, as a young man he spent years under the legal 
tutelage of future Chief Justice Charles Allen.  Although he served for a short period as a clerk at 
Albert Gallatin’s National Bank of New York, Spooner’s understanding of American finance was 
reached during the Panic 1837.  At the time, Spooner was speculating in Ohio land.  The crisis 
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sent Spooner back to his father’s farm in rural Massachusetts to contemplate transformations in 
finance.  Spooner published his ideas in Poverty, Its Illegal Causes and Legal Cure (1846) and 
later The New System of Paper Currency (1861).74 
 Today Spooner is remembered as one of America’s most prolific philosophical 
anarchists.  He was in essence, an anarcho-capitalist determined to maximize individual 
sovereignty through an extreme form of free-market economics.  His commitment to laissez-faire 
principles was unequivocal.  Spooner’s devotion to free markets motivated his distrust of finance.  
 To reform financial markets, Spooner suggested significant alterations to the procedures 
behind debt collection.  These measures were reminiscent of earlier republican demands to 
reestablish credit networks on a more intimate basis.  Spooner’s program would have 
revolutionized the financial order.  Still, Spooner’s reforms had as their ultimate goal a financial 
system constructed along strict laissez-faire models.  At the maturation of a debt, Spooner argued, 
the borrower was liable only for what could he could muster up at that moment.  Debt, Spooner 
figured, "has no legal obligation, and generally no moral one, beyond the means of the debtor to 
pay at the time the debt becomes due."  Since none could predict what might become of an 
enterprise, all contracts and obligations made without provisioning for "all the contingencies and 
accidents that may occur to defeat his purposes" were "void from the beginning."75  According to 
Spooner debt was the equivalent of a value purchased by creditors subject to rise or fall 
throughout the term of the loan.  The value of a debt, like all property, was exposed to market 
risks and thus carried the potential for variation.  A lender assumed as much risk and 
responsibility for a debt as the borrower.  In short, Spooner called for the abolition of laws in the 
collection of debt.  Doing so would tighten credit and incline lenders to investigate the substance 
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of a borrower's plans.  Spooner articulated absolute confidence in the market to provide creditors 
with perfect information on individual borrowers.  "When a capitalist loans money to a 
laborer...he does not look, for himself, into the merits of the enterprise as he would if he knew 
that his ultimate security for his capital depended solely upon the success of the enterprise, 
instead of depending also upon the subsequent earnings of the laborer."76 
 Spooner is the essential representation of an exaggerated free-banking ideologue.  At the 
core of his analysis is the desire for credit networks that operated on a more personal level.  This 
was in line with both classical republican and free-market values.  Opponents of finance typically 
eulogized the economic tranquility of times past, where credit relations were shared between 
intimates rather than unfamiliar, corporate institutions.  "In the old fashioned way of credit,” one 
critic figured, “few men were enabled to go so much in debt, as that they would not be detected in 
time to save their creditors."77  Spooner’s desire to restore personal credit relations was not a 
manifestation of an anti-market ideology.  Indeed, state intervention on behalf of financial 
institutions in the processes of debt collection undermined the free-market order.      
 George Opdyke, one-time mayor of New York City and prominent figure in the Free Soil 
and Republican parties, also worked to tighten the bonds between creditor and borrower as a 
means to advance laissez-faire principles.  Born in 1805 in New Jersey he grew familiar with 
finance through his business associations in New York City’s Chamber of Commerce.78  He 
presented his views on finance in his 1851 A Treatise on Political Economy.  A dry goods chain 
storeowner turned self-made millionaire, for a time Opdyke’s textile and merchandising 
businesses were the largest in New York City.  He died in 1881.   
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 Opdyke was no extremist, but his suggested reforms were nothing short of radical.  He 
epitomized the slippery ideological disposition of republican critics of finance.  The anti-tariff, 
anti-slavery, big-city businessman who as a Republican would later call for an irredeemable 
national currency was not anti-capitalistic; nor does he come across as an entrepreneur thirsting 
for cheap credit.  Rather Opdyke is genuinely interested in removing the socially damaging 
features of antebellum finance.  He employed traditional republican rhetorical strategies in his 
description of financial institutions.  Opdyke likened credit markets to a game of hide and seek.  
"As the matter now stands…it is accounted meritorious to evade the payment of an honest debt.”  
“Creditors look more to the law than to honesty or honor of their debtors for the enforcement of 
payments,” Opdyke continued, “and while such is the case we must expect that evasions of 
payment will be regarded as skillful achievements over the law and the sagacity of creditors, 
rather than as acts of dishonor."  Under existing circumstances the abolition of laws for the 
collection of debt seemed the only viable option.  This would ensure that creditors had adequate 
knowledge of a borrower's capacity for repayment.  Extensions of credit would rest on the 
decency and moral constitution of men rather than legal recourse. "Increase the demand for 
integrity of character, frugality, and diligence, by basing credit exclusively upon them, and you 
will soon stimulate and develop these desirable qualities of character to such a degree that any 
one who should prove so far deficient therein as to refuse payment of a debt…would be utterly 
discountenanced in all respectable society."79  Curtailing state involvement in creditor-debtor 
disputes and forcing lenders to employ discretion in their credit extensions promised a moderate, 
more prudent set of lending standards.  "Increase the demand for virtue and you will increase the 
supply; enlarge its reward and you will not fail to improve its quality, and thereby elevate the 
national standard of morality."80 
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 The desire to reinstate traditional methods of credit networks based on intimate relations 
harkened back to earlier republican criticisms.  But in removing legal institutions from the 
process of debt collection, later-antebellum opponents placed greater emphasis on market 
imperatives than earlier republican like Taylor.  Spooner and Opdyke employed republican values 
as a medium to advance laissez-faire principles.  Their ultimate goal, unlike earlier republican 
critics of finance, was not necessarily the construction of an agrarian ideal.  Rather republicanism 
was a means to a distinctly modern free-market economy.  The emphasis given to laissez-faire by 
later-antebellum critics was also supplemented by traditional republican-based anxieties over 
state interference in the economy.  The fear of financial institutions corrupting legislatures was 
the most enduring theme of the opposition literature.  In this way, laissez-faire and classical 
republicanism formed its strongest intellectual bond.   
 The synthesis between liberal-republicanism was given further impetus by William 
Leggett.  Leggett lived an eventful yet shortened life.  Born in 1801 in Savannah, Georgia, as a 
young man he attended Georgetown College.  The failure of his father’s business curtailed his 
enrollment, and shortly after Leggett joined the Navy.  In 1828 he moved to New York City 
where he found work as a theatrical and literary critic for local papers.  William Cullen Bryant 
recognized talent in the young man, hiring Leggett as a writer for the Evening Post.  Leggett was, 
however, hindered by Yellow Fever contracted while he was in the Navy.  He later became a 
leader in New York’s Locofoco movement, but the disease ended his life just before his fortieth 
birthday.81  Leggett’s critique of finance was expressed in two widely-read periodicals that he 
established in the late-1830s, the Plaindealer and the Examiner.   
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Leggett solidified the union between laissez-faire and republican principles in the 
opposition discourse.  His writings are further indication that antebellum opposition to finance did 
not advance an anti-market agenda; rather it served as reaffirmation of the market regime.  By 
resisting the spread of financial institutions Leggett aimed at encouraging competitive markets.  
These values were hardly outside of the antebellum intellectual mainstream.  Indeed, they were 
fundamental to American economic heritage.  For Leggett, the “sister doctrines" of republicanism 
and laissez-faire were reciprocating ideologies.  A stubborn, unbending commitment to Smithian 
free trade was the driving force behind Leggett’s pleas for republican equal rights.82Laissez-faire 
and republicanism, he declared, advance "the largest liberty…both are equally opposed to all 
special privileges and immunities; and both would leave men to manage their own affairs, in their 
own way, so that they did not invade each others natural rights."83  Mixing government and 
business inevitably led to special legislation that corrupted markets and ruined republican polities.  
Purge society of the "unholy alliance between politics and banking," Leggett demanded, and "let 
commerce, and let the currency…regulate themselves."84 
Historians have minimized the intellectual affinities between liberal-republicanism and 
anti-finance.  They have failed to note the compatibility between antebellum laissez-faire and 
anti-finance.  In doing so, they have also largely ignored important theoretical developments in 
the antebellum discourse.  Criticisms of finance provided a medium for opponents to articulate 
broader economic philosophies.  Liberal-republicans drew most heavily on contemporary laissez-
faire ideology to attack financial institutions.  State intervention in the banking system through 
corporate legislation was thought by most liberal-republicans obstructions of a natural financial 
order.  The state tarnished an otherwise flawless natural system governed by immutable laws and 
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universal principles.  "If we do die," Gouge wrote, "it will be of the doctor not of the disease."85  
To be sure, critics were convinced that there existed an intrinsic evil in finance.  But legislative 
interference exacerbated financial vices by disrupting organic processes with artificially contrived 
institutions.  "If there is something essentially bad in fictitious money, there seems to be 
something in human nature which prevents it being properly managed."86  
Leggett gave this strain of thought its most lucid expression.  His criticisms of finance 
were comparable to Smith’s censures of mercantilism.  In an 1837 Plaindealer article Leggett 
explained the omnipotent character of the natural economic order and the shortcomings of human 
institutions in their attempts to manage economic phenomena.  "While trade is in prosperous 
operation, it seems governed by laws as fixed and harmonious and to most minds as inscrutable, 
as those of the universe.  Each link in the mighty chain, each part of the prodigious whole, 
performs its allotted office, and contributes to the grand result─the improvement of the physical 
and intellectual condition of mankind."  Employing language analogous to Smith, Leggett 
continued, "But when derangement takes place, when any thing occurs to interrupt the 
harmonious movement, such are the mutual relations and dependence of the various parts, that the 
inquirer is bewildered in his attempts to investigate the cause of the confusion…"87  "Ignorant 
legislators" promulgated directives in an "attempt to control what is in its nature uncontrollable, 
and should be as free as air."88  In short, markets worked best when left alone.  "Leave trade to its 
laws, as we leave water to the laws of nature, and both will eventually be equally certain to find 
their proper level."89  Rather than liberating finance the state "forces credit out of its natural 
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channel."90  Leggett argued that by freeing financial markets from state management "the simple 
order of nature" would find encouragement.  The financial system would be left to bend naturally 
to universal directives.  "That is most excellent,” Leggett declared, “which comes nearest to the 
simplicity of nature."91 
Leggett’s admiration for laissez-faire values demonstrates that the supposed bond 
between free markets and finance in the popular historical imagination did not exist in the 
antebellum discourse.  The dichotomy maintained in the historiography between republicanism 
and capitalism masks the complexities of the anti-finance movement.  The antebellum economic 
mind was not shaped by distinct ideological lines.  Indeed, support for the expansion of financial 
institutions was normally espoused by individuals partial to state intervention in the economy.  
The historiography has also misrepresented opposition as a pretense for unbridled financial 
entrepreneurialism.  Opponents were genuinely disturbed by the moral, social, and political 
externalities attendant to the spread of financial institutions.  Neither were the opponents of 
finance always militant laborites or radical outliers.  The anti-finance movement was inclusive of 
a wide-range of positions and personalities, few of which operated on the fringes of antebellum 
intellectual culture.  Even high-brow free-trade academics articulated misgivings toward finance.  
Henry Vethake, for instance, complained of banking speculation as having excited "a corrupt 
spirit of gambling."92  And Jacob Cardozo disparaged paper money for having afflicted the world 
"with a moral evil" more "pestilent and dreadful" than anything that had passed before it.93  On 
the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, George Frederick Holmes denounced “the financial 
dragons” as “absolutely fatal to public morals...utterly antagonistic to political order or the 
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permanent prosperity of States, and must prove the ruin of all governments...They are consuming 
the vitals of society, and rendering the continuance of social order an impossibility.”94 
 Then, as in more recent times, serious hostility was directed at financial institutions.  
Opposition toward finance was so widespread in the antebellum discourse that if anything, the 
opposition literature constituted American convention.  This is not to say the movement to 
modernize American financial institutions was without support.  America’s emergence in the 
twentieth century as a leader in global financial markets shows that pro-bank interests were well 
represented.  What the antebellum discourse on finance illustrates is a deep division in the 
American economic mind between ideology and practice.  Like the debate over industry and 
trade, the financial literature was marked by a diversity of thought reflective of the broader lack 
of consensus that permeated the economic discourse.                
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion: The Old and the New in American Economics 
 
The appointment of Charles Dunbar to the chair of political economy at Harvard in 1871 initiated 
a new era of economic study in the United States.  Other institutions followed suit, establishing 
and later expanding their political economy departments.  While the professionalization of 
economic analysis may have then begun in earnest, this dissertation shows that during the 
antebellum period the discipline was pursued with comparable levels of intensity.  Antebellum 
political economists demonstrated originality, inquisitiveness, and were relevant participants in 
the public sphere.  Antebellum economic thinkers worked toward the formulation of an economic 
science suited to the domestic experience, but in no way was American thought insulated from 
Old World influence.  The American writers reviewed in this dissertation were in constant 
dialogue with European, particularly British thinkers.  Although British laissez-faire influenced 
the antebellum economic thought, classical orthodoxy never dominated the American discourse.     
 In the post-Civil War period this trend continued.  Following the conflict, the influence of 
laissez-faire classicism over the American economic mind proved just as tenuous as it had been 
during the antebellum era.  Although instruction in political economy after the war was delivered 
mostly by professors of the laissez-faire persuasion, within the free-trade movement there was 
sharp disagreement over important principles.1  By the early 1870’s classical economics began to 
rapidly lose its credibility.  The same year Dunbar assumed his post at Harvard, the Englishman 
Stanley Jevon’s theory of marginal utility dealt a decisive blow to classical convention by 
                                                            
1 Michael O'Connor, Origins of Academic Economics in the United States (New York, 1974).  In 1876 a list 
of the ten ‘most saleable works on political economy’ registered John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political 
Economy and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations at the top of the chart.  Joseph Dorfman, The Economic 
Mind in American Civilization, 1865-1918 (New York, 1969), p. 81. 
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discounting Ricardian models of distribution and value.2  The collapse of Ricardian orthodoxy, on 
both sides of the Atlantic, was nothing less than an intellectual revolution.     
 In America the marginalist movement was largely a home-grown phenomenon.  A 
similar theory was elaborated in John Bates Clark’s 1885 The Philosophy of Wealth.  The 
Columbia University professor found value a measurement of utility determined by a series of 
subjective calculations, both individual and social.3  Clark’s criticizing of classical orthodoxy was 
not limited to the theory of value, however.  He saw in the industrial and financial behemoths of 
the Gilded Age reason to question the classical assumption of perfect competition and he also 
thought humanity driven by motives other than pure economics.4  When Clark did finally depose 
Ricardo’s principal tenets of their authority, the American was adapting to an established 
domestic tradition of subjecting classicism to critical revision.  Malthus experienced a similar fall 
from theoretical grace in the late nineteenth century.  Rising standards of living and improved 
agricultural productivity had proven Malthus’ conclusions about population outrunning the food 
supply wrong.  European political economists began to realize what American thinkers had long 
argued with respect to population.   
   The post-Civil War breach initiated by Clark was complimented by a methodological 
rift.  Clark, like thousands of other American students during the post-Civil War period studied in 
Germany and brought back to the United States an appreciation of historical economics.  German 
universities were then captivated by the historicism of Leopold von Ranke, and students of 
Gustav von Schmoller and Wilhelm Roscher in particular were instructed to challenge the 
                                                            
2 T.W. Hutchison, On Revolutions and Progress in Economic Knowledge (Cambridge, 1978), chapters 3 
and 4; Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought (New York, 1942), pp. 417, 79. 
 
3 George Tucker had made similar arguments with his psychological theory of value.   
 
4 Richard Ely, “A Decade of Economic Theory,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science (March, 1900), pp. 96-101 
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precepts of ahistorical classicism.5  American students of the historical school imported the 
German Methodenstreit to the domestic discourse.  The controversy over method came to a head 
in 1885 when the ‘New School’─young economists influenced by German 
historicism─established the American Economic Association.  The organization’s founding 
constitution declared, among other things, “the state as an agency whose positive assistance is one 
of the indispensable conditions of human progress.”  And on the progression of the economics 
discipline, the ‘New School’ conceded that they “appreciate the work of former economists,” 
however “we look not as much to speculation as to the historical and statistical study of actual 
conditions of economic life…”6 
 There are obvious but largely neglected ties between the principles of the ‘New School’ 
and antebellum protectionism.  Friedrich List is the obvious conduit, but Henry Carey was also 
celebrated in Germany for initiating a revolution in economic theory.7  Like the antebellum 
protectionists, the New School economists clamored for a revised and socially engaged political 
economy.  Both envisioned the state as facilitator of economic development and both believed 
democratic institutions should be employed to promote the people’s economic interests.  Each 
gave special emphasis to the inductive method, found economic theory dependent upon 
prevailing social, political and economic conditions, and both favored practical solutions over 
academic abstractions.8 
                                                            
5 Henry William Spiegel, The Growth of Economic Thought (Englewood Cliffs, 1971), pp. 421-424; Joseph 
Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Oxford, 1954), pp. 807-812; Erik Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of 
Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany, 1864-1894 (Oxford, 2002), pp. 122-126. 
 
6 Found in Joseph Dorfman, “The Role of the German Historical School in American Economic Thought,” 
The American Economic Review (May, 1955), p. 27.  
 
7 A.D.H. Kaplan, Henry Carey: A Study in American Economic Thought (Baltimore, 1931), p. 1. 
8  Sidney Fine, Laissez-faire and the General Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought, 
1865-1901 (Ann Arbor, MI, 1969), pp. 198-221. 
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 The New School economists of the late nineteenth century have received more attention 
in the historiography than their protectionist predecessors.  Historians continue to slight the 
contributions made by antebellum protectionists.  But in the antebellum battle of economic ideas 
it is clear the protectionists triumphed.  The promulgation of Treasury Secretary Robert Walker’s 
liberal tariff schedules in 1846 was an American laissez-faire moment in a century otherwise 
dominated by protectionism.  The post-Civil War debate over trade policy further 
institutionalized the protectionist agenda as the United States did not effectively participate in the 
global trading community until the early twentieth century.9 
 The primacy of protectionist policy certainly contributed to American industrialization, 
as well as the expansion of state authority in the economy.  The failure of antebellum 
protectionists to recognize the potential threats to individual liberty by state interventions and to 
labor by industrial conglomerations speaks more to their lack of perfect foresight and their 
acceptance of American exceptionalism than a concerted effort to advance the agendas of 
Republicans and Robber Barons.10  Only in the decades that followed the Civil War did most 
American thinkers begin to believe that the course of American industrialization would follow the 
British model.  The United States, it seemed, was not exceptional.  The social difficulties 
associated with industrialization were criticized most poignantly in the post-Civil War era not by 
the disciples of Carey but by an expanding body of labor/socialist literature, much of which was 
anticipated by George Fitzhugh, George Frederick Holmes, Langton Byllesby and Thomas 
                                                            
9 Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY, 1993), pp. 81-131; Richard 
Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1866-1900 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 457-460; 
Frank Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York, 1964), pp. 170-276; Paul Bairoch, 
Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes (Chicago, 1993), p. 53; Percy Ashley, Modern Tariff 
History: Germany-United States-France (New York, 1970), pp. 181-204. 
 
10 James Huston, "The Political Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of Protectionist Labor 
Doctrine," The Journal of American History (June, 1983). 
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Skidmore.11  Ironically, voices that were counted as the least progressive with regard to 
economics before the Civil War were seen as prophetic of the need for a socialist economics to 
replace capitalism after the Civil War.  
 Perhaps the single element that draws the rather different antebellum reactionaries 
together with the postbellum socialist was their questioning of American exceptionalism.  
Fitzhugh, Holmes, Byllesby, and Skidmore were part of a larger corps of domestic thinkers 
familiar with European, particularly British patterns of industrial development.  They rejected 
what they considered were the negative social, moral, and political residuals of industrialization.  
They found significance in the gloomy forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo and were convinced the 
consequences of industrial capitalism knew no national boundaries.  My dissertation shows that 
the Northern and Southern reactionaries were not alien intruders to an otherwise optimistic 
liberal-capitalist discourse.  Their brand of economic thought was widely circulated, helped shape 
the contours of the antebellum economic dialogue, and would prove to have an enduring appeal 
by resurfacing with greater tenacity later in the century. 
 Industrialization and the organization and efforts of labor in the post Civil War period, J. 
Laurence Laughlin wrote in the inaugural 1892 issue of the Journal of Political Economy, were 
largely responsible for broadening American curiosities in political economy.  Industry was, 
however, not the primary feature in the postbellum discussion.  Laughlin attributed what he called 
“the new-born interest in economics” to public outrage over currency and banking.12  During and 
after the Civil War financial institutions expanded rapidly, hastened by Republicans and 
                                                            
11 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor 
Activism, 1865-1925(Cambridge, 1927). 
 
12 J. Laurence Laughlin, “The Study of Political Economy in the United States,” The Journal of Political 
Economy (December, 1892), p. 4. 
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Northeastern businessmen eager to mobilize the nation’s capital, offer the public a cheap and 
stable medium of exchange, and transform the United States into a financial hegemon.13 
 Since this nation’s founding the nature and responsibility of financial institutions have 
provoked a complex and energized agitation among economic thinkers.  Antebellum attitudes 
toward finance reflected cultural and historical traditions deeply rooted in the American 
experience.  Those who embraced much of the free-market agenda often stopped their celebration 
when it came to financial markets.  In America, it was entirely possible to be a devoted champion 
of laissez-faire and simultaneously abhor finance.   
 After the Civil War the American economic discourse expressed a similar ambiguity 
toward financial institutions.  Americans debated the advantages of a redeemable national 
currency, the intrinsic value of hard money, the dangers of bank monopolies, and the 
government’s role in regulating financial markets.  Financial issues were tied to moral concerns 
on the distribution of wealth, interest rates, the nature of private property, and the accumulation of 
profits.  Industrialists, merchants, agrarians, and labor vacillated in their support for various 
financial schemes, often employing rhetorical strategies and a manner of thought that echoed 
antebellum economic thinkers.  There was conflict over financial policy, and in words of the 
historian of Reconstruction finance Irwin Unger, “often it generated frustrations and aggression 
just short of the social flash point.”14  As was the case in the antebellum period, it is hard to find 
consensus in the postbellum financial discourse.   
 My dissertation shows antebellum political economy was inclusive of an extensive and 
dynamic range of ideological and theoretical positions that made consensus.  The American 
discourse was not dominated by British laissez-faire, and was routinely inviting of an economic 
                                                            
13 Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865-1879 
(Princeton, 1964); Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in 
America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge, 1990), chapters 4 and 5; Bensel, The Political Economy of American 
Industrialization, 1977-1900, chapter 6. 
 
14 Unger, The Greenback Era, p. 404. 
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thought that complimented both the style and substance of the American experience.  An 
awareness of these differences provide a clearer measure of American intellectual history and can 
improve our appreciation of how the economic dialogue helped set the narrative for the political 
discord that culminated with the Civil War.                                                                            
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